1991 Pulse of Europe
SECTION I
SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW

After fifty years of world war, cold war and communism, Europeans are in the process of resuming the twentieth century.

The end of communism in the East and the immanent economic integration in the West have unleashed forces of nationalism and ethnicity contained for the last 45 years by the exigencies of the Cold War. From the Atlantic to the Urals the publics of Europe are once again in conflict over the issues and questions that dictated the course of European history in the past.

The Times Mirror Survey suggests that contradictory forces are pulling Europe in opposite directions. One side is the Europe of the past, filled with ethnic hatreds, animosities and possible conflict. On the other is the new Europe of cooperation and enlightened tolerance. As the twentieth century comes to a close the two Europe's exist side by side, present in every society examined, and struggling to determine which will dominate the future.

Our in depth survey of 13,000 European in nine nations and the Republics of Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania finds many reasons to be pessimistic about future developments. Eastern Europeans and citizens of the former Soviet Union are reconsidering their governance, their economy, and large parts of their social structure. These fundamental questions are before publics that are deeply skeptical of political leadership, profoundly depressed by
economic conditions, and reawakening to nationalist impulses and ethic grievances. In Western Europe, despite apparent political tranquility, questions about race, the protection of borders, and the reemergence of a dominant Germany take on new significance as the economic integration of Europe speeds ahead.

The most optimistic finding is that, in general, the younger and best educated citizens have their feet firmly planted in the New Europe. Increasing emphasis on education and the speed and impact of global communication provide reason to believe that the more positive attitudes of these citizens may one day dominate the European landscape. However, the troubling implications of expressed ethnic hatreds, even among significant numbers of the educated young, are clearly the most troubling of the study's results.

With no tradition of ethnic multi-culturalism and an absence of communist enforced tolerance, Eastern Europeans and Soviet publics readily voice their antagonisms toward ethnic minorities within their countries and toward the people of neighboring nations. In the west, hostility toward minority groups is quite evident as the major countries of the EC become more ethnically heterogenous on the brink of the integration.

German views of Poles and French opinions of North Africans are every bit as negative as the opinions of Eastern European toward their minority populations.

In every country in the east 40% or more of respondents said they held unfavorable opinions toward the principal minority people
of that nation. 41% of Poles said they dislike Ukrainians, 49% of Czechoslovaks said they disliked Hungarians. Four in ten Russians and Ukrainians said they had an unfavorable opinion of Azerbaijanis.

To put these finding in perspective 13% of white Americans hold unfavorable opinions of blacks. This is one third the percentage of Germans who dislike Poles or Frenchmen who dislike North Africans.

Overwhelmingly, Eastern European people believe that recent economic and political changes have led to an increase in ethnic tensions. This is the case in ethnically, pluralist countries, such as the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia, where separatism is very much at issue, but it is also the prevailing opinion in Eastern European countries with generally homogeneous populations.

Ethnic hostilities in these countries reflect centuries old disputes over borders, religion and other matters of national eminence. No fewer than six in ten Hungarians and Poles believe that there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to Poland and Hungary, respectively. Hungarian antipathy toward Rumanians and Polish dislike of Ukrainians give testimony to the feelings of peoples whose borders are flash points that stir deep emotions.

Opinions about two minority groups, Jews and Gypsies are obviously a different matter, because of historical context and current condition.

Gypsies are clearly the most disliked ethnic group in Europe.
For example, in Spain, where Gypsies are most tolerated, 50% held unfavorable opinions of them. At the other extreme, in Czechoslovakia nearly everyone questioned (91%) had some thing unfavorable to say about these nomadic people, who are hated openly, and equally often at all levels of European society.

In contrast, Europeans are much more circumspect about dislike of Jews. "No opinions" ran as high as three in ten in some countries. However, in the Jewish killing fields of Europe, from Germany eastward, about one in five expressed anti semitic beliefs. But, in Poland and Slovakia we found, as many as one in three holding unfavorable opinions of Jews.

(For perspective - in the United States 6% of respondents give Jews an unfavorable rating).

The correlates of anti semitism in this survey had a familiar ring. In almost every country Jews were more disliked by less well educated people and by those who were unhappy with the political situation. In Poland, where there are almost no Jews left to dislike and where anti semitism has been corollary to all sides, in all arguments, we found a clear relationship between religious profession and the holding of unfavorable opinions of Jews.

Recent events in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union underscore the volatility of Eastern European societies and their potential for disestablishment and conflict.

Most notably we found Czechoslovakia to be even more two nations today than before the revolution. By so many indicators Czechs and Slovaks see the world through different eyes and could
well concur that their differences are insurmountable. To the south, ethnic differences are equally large, but passions seem to run even higher: tensions between Hungarians and Rumanians over disputed Translyvania are palpable, and in Bulgaria, antagonism toward the muslim minority and neighboring Turkey is a threat to that society.

As Eastern Europeans wrangle with age old ethnic rivalries they are also engaged in a new experiment in democracy - the results of which are inconclusive.

The vast majority of Eastern Europeans approve of multi party pluralism and like their new found personal freedoms. But with few exceptions, opinions of fledgling political institutions, political leaders and parliamentary bodies tends to be unfavorable.

Political leadership in the new democracies of the east has to overcome extraordinary public mistrust of governance. Eastern publics are deeply suspicious of their political leadership's motives and skeptical that their newly elected officials care what they think. Overwhelmingly, people who have lived under communist rule do not believe that the state runs for the benefit of the people.

For all the talk of increasing political alienation in the US, former Soviet bloc publics easily eclipse American skepticism of their political leadership. However, a more crucial difference between east and west is that people of the east have yet to feel empowered by their votes. Relatively, few Russians, Ukrainians or Hungarians believe their votes give them a say in how their
government runs things. Even though only half the eligible vote bothers to turns out for a presidential election, 73% of Americans think that voting empowers them.

A lack of connection to the fundamentals of democracy show up in other ways in the study. Eastern peoples are far more likely than western Europeans to favor measures that would deny freedom of speech to people espousing unpopular political views. – ie only one in three Americans or British citizens think that freedom of speech should not extend to fascists, while 67% of Czechoslovaks and 65% of Russians take that position.

Holding aside Russia and the Ukraine, where opinion about democracy and political freedom was to some extent equivocal before the coup attempt, Hungary and Poland may provide the earliest test of whether democracy will take root in former communist countries.

In Poland, feelings of national accomplishment regarding the overthrow of communism and the ouster of the Russians have not deterred the public from disillusionment with the individuals and institutions that led the revolution: trade unions, Walesa, and the Church. Public support for all three have plummeted, as resentment has grown toward the new power centers of Polish society.

Hungarian disillusionment with its political leadership and parties runs even deeper. Fewer than half of the public approves of the political and economic changes that have taken place in country and a small vocal minority volunteers that the democracy itself is what's wrong with the way Hungary has changed.

Many more people voice less strident, but similar discontents.
A plurality of Hungarians feel that the parliament is having a bad influence on the way things are going in the country, and if parliamentary elections were held, Hungarians would splinter their votes between six parties. And in a country that has struggled to achieve freedom for the past 40 years, today no fewer than 54% say they are losing interest in politics. Indeed, majorities or near majorities of the publics in every former communist country, except Czechoslovakia, say they are losing interest in politics.

The study found in every country in the east a clear link between feelings about democracy and feelings about efforts to establish a market economy. It is safe to say that the success of these two efforts are inextricably bound.

The democracy capitalism connection is sharpest in Hungary. Discontent with parliament reflects Hungarian impatience with the pace of conversion to a market economy. Parliament has been mired in disputes about how to privatize state enterprises in this the former communist country with the most experience with capitalism.

In Hungary, as in Poland, a huge public outcry over spiraling prices has to some extent replaced discontent about empty shelves, that is so pervasive in the Soviet republics. But, for all the countries of the east the major economic questions is how to reconcile public aspirations for a market economy on the one hand, with public reservations about the reforms required to achieve that goal.

Privatization is the big stumbling bloc in public acceptance of capitalism. While public support for privatization is high in
the service sector, it is very low for manufacturing in most countries of Eastern Europe. Overwhelming majorities want to see industry and mining run mainly by the state. Similarly, transportation, utilities, and health care are also seen as areas that should rest mainly with the state.

In most countries of Eastern Europe, the public prefers that shops and restaurants be mainly run privately, but in most countries, especially Russia, the Ukraine and Bulgaria many want the state option to exist side by side with privately run enterprises. Russians and Ukrainians are more resistant to privatization than the publics of most Eastern European nations. In eight out of ten areas of economic activity larger percentages of the Russians and Ukrainians vote for continuing state control than do Poles, Czechoslovaks or Hungarians.

Russians and Ukrainians also stand out by how harshly they judge the emerging entrepreneurial class in their society. Soviet citizens rate cooperative owners only somewhat better than they rate black marketeers. In contrast, people who own their own business are looked on very favorably by Eastern Europeans.

Even though Eastern Europeans admire their emerging business class, each country studied registered alarms about the way the social character of their societies have been changed by the new ways. Rising crime, falling public morality, people who don't care as much about their neighbors are majority complaints in all nations and they seem more linked to public views about capitalism, rather than to feelings about the way democracy has
opened up society.

While most Eastern Europeans decry the sociological consequences of the revolution, many applaud the psychology of the new era. Pluralities say the political and economic changes of the past year have had a good influence on the way they think about things. In many ways it is an appreciation of the psychological dividends of the revolution that separates those who seem most willing to endure the social and economic disruptions from those who are already disillusioned.

Younger, better educated people, and those who live in major cities express more approval of the change and appear much more able to adjust to the new requirements of their societies. On the other hand, greatest danger to the viability of the revolutions is the degree to which the people in the villages, the less well educated and older segments are targets for demagoguery. For it is they who are having the hardest time coping, they whose world views have not changed and they who express the least support for democracy and they hold the most regressive political values.

The importance of the success of the revolutions in the east are not lost on Western Europeans. A flood of refugees has replaced a column of tanks as the greatest concern of Europeans as they look eastward. The top international worries of Germany is that it will be enveloped by flood of refugees from the east, fueled by an economic collapse of the Soviet Union.

German antagonism toward Polish, and Rumanian emigres is now on par with a more long standing antipathy toward the Turks.
German opinions of Soviet refugees are only slightly less negative.

Skittishness about borders goes beyond the German frontier on the East. Seventy nine percent of British respondents favor placing greater restrictions on control and entry into the country. Support for such measures were about as great, or greater in every major country of Western Europe, on the eve of pan European passportism – France (86%), Spain (66%), Italy (84%) and Germany (70%).

But, the survey finds little evidence that Europeans are having second thoughts about the "Great European Market", either from this point of view or from the point of view of how well their country may fare when the continent is integrated. Seven in ten or more in Italy, Spain, and France and six in ten in Great Britain like the idea of the truly common economic market that is headed their way in 1992. However, in each country far fewer think that their own economies will be strengthened by this move.

The British divide about evenly between those who think that their economy will be strengthened versus weakened. A plurality of the French expect their economy to suffer and only in Spain does a majority see stronger economy as a result of the integrated market.

A continent whose economy is dominated by Germany is envisioned by many Europeans, except in Germany itself, where concerns about the costs of unification cast a shadow over German optimism about the future.

Our survey finds Germany itself enigmatic in how it sees both the future and the past. Germans, both east and west continue to
approve of unification. However, looking back many residents of the former GDR feel there might have been a better way than being overwhelmed by their western cousins and made to feel like second class citizens in their own country. These are the prevailing views of all east Germans, but they are especially evident among younger Germans, whose outlook most clearly reflects the 40 years of separation between the two Germanies. While east Germans would not undo unification their political values and outlook bear an unmistakable socialist imprint, in contrast to west Germans.

Nonetheless, east Germans of all ages told us they feel their nation has made progress, they themselves feel better off, and they expect to be even better off in the future. East German optimism far exceeds that of other people of the East and seems to exist, almost without reference to the extraordinary level of economic dislocation experienced by almost everyone in east Germany.

On the other hand, the lives of West Germans have been largely untouched by unification. They express the highest level of satisfaction with life in Europe, yet most think that their nations course is on a downward spiral. Retrospectively, Westerners voice less enthusiasm for unification, and feel resentful of the heavy burden of mounting costs in the east.

The meeting ground between east and west Germans opinion is in a shared vision of how long it will take the two Germanies to become equally prosperous. Eight in ten Germans see this occurring in no less than five years, but in no more than ten.

In the end the political tone of Germany may well be set by
the validity of that forecast. The potential for disappointment and feelings of exploitation are far greater in East Germany than in any other former Soviet bloc country, because expectations are so high. Sixty-two percent of east Germans expect their life will take a turn for the better in five years — some comparable figures are: 26% Hungary, 41% Czechoslovakia, 36% Poland, 40% Russia.

Questions about expectations are among a number of questions raised by the study about how the disposition of east Germans may change the character of the new Germany. Most importantly to the West, the strong anti military values of east Germans when added to the already pacifist tone of the former FRG may make it difficult for the new Germany to be a reliable military ally. Only 37% of east Germans felt that it was sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain world order. In the western part of the country 56% concurred — This compares to 84% in the UK, and 77% in France who see justification for using military force.

The political positions of people in the east also call into question how the CDU will fare in the future. The values of former citizens of the GDR seem much more amenable to successful appeals from the Social Democrats than from Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats in the long term.

As opinion within Germany is enigmatic, so is opinion about Germany amongst its European neighbors. The publics of its World War II enemies in the east cite Germany more often than any other country as the nation they can rely on as a dependable ally. Only in Poland, where enemies are not easily forgotten, is there any
many of measure of antipathy or suspicion about Germany.

Not only do people of the east not worry about a German threat, the Czechoslovaks, Poles, Soviets, and especially the Hungarians, see Germany as playing positive influence in the way things are going in their countries. These feelings coupled with the positive views expressed about western investment, suggest that German economic development of the East will meet little resistance.

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Our survey of Europe, east and west provided a number of important insights into American values and an unanticipated perspective on gender differences in political values, both here and abroad.

A profound gender gap in attitudes toward democracy and the change to a market economy was evident in every former communist country. In eastern nation surveyed, but especially the Soviet Republics, women showed less support for democracy and less support for efforts to establish a market economy. Gender differences go beyond women expressing less approval of these concepts. Women profess consistently less democratic values and appear to have absorbed more socialist thinking than have men.

Gender gaps were found in every country in the east, on every question that dealt with democracy versus totalitarianism, or socialism versus capitalism.

Before the events of August 54% of Russian women approved of
multi party democracy compared to 69% of men. The gender difference persists between Soviet men and women of all ages, in major cities, as well as villages and at all levels of education. It exists in all other Eastern European countries as well, but on a smaller scale. Eastern women of most nations are less likely than men to believe that freedom of speech should extend to people expressing unpopular views and women would place greater restraints on political parties than men. The survey also found them giving stronger support than men to virtually all social welfare measures.

Other demographic differences observed in this study are more easily explained. Generational differences can be accounted for by the greater capacity of younger people to accept new ideas. Better educated and urban populations have a broader information base than other segments of the population and are therefore more able to cope with the demands of a market economy or the pluralistic challenges found in a democracy.

The gender difference reflect more fundamental difference between the sexes. Indeed, we found that the gender differences of the East, extend to Western Europe and the United States. Women express more socialist values and express less support for political freedom than men on a number of measures across the thirteen countries included in the survey. In 50 of 65 comparisons of survey results, women were significantly more socialistic or anti-democratic than men. In the US, 62% of men compared to 54% of women favor allowing all political parties to carry on even those that do not believe in democracy. Similarly, a smaller
percentage of women (48%) than men (57%) valued freedom from
government interference over guarantees that nobody in society is
deprived.

As the study may bring some perspective to the gender gap
puzzle, it also sheds light on how different American political
values are from the basic political beliefs of Europeans. On
questions of social welfarism, individualism and empowerment,
eastern and western European differences were dwarfed by the trans
Atlantic gap.

Support for a welfare state, or at minimum a social safety
net, runs nearly as high among the populations of major Western
european nations as it does among Eastern European nations. Beliefs
that the state should guarantee basic food and shelter or take care
of the poor are as prevalent in Britain, France and Spain as they
are in Russia, Poland or Hungary. In this regard the publics of
Western europe appear nearly as socialist as the publics of former
communist nations.

The great divide on attitudes toward the welfare state is not
between Eastern Europe and Western Europe. It's between the United
States and Europe. Americans think very differently about their
responsibilities to their fellow citizens and the role of
government than do Europeans.

Only about one in four Americans completely agree that it is
the responsibility of the government to take care of the very poor
who can't take care of themselves or that the government should
guarantee basic food and shelter. The vast majority of Europeans in
every nation, East or west expressed complete agreement with these ideas.

Only Americans, West Germans, and Czechoslovaks attach a higher priority to freedom from state interference than to guaranteeing that nobody in their societies is in need. In every other European nations. Majorities of the public say that is more important that the state play an active role in society to assure that no one is deprived.

While Americans show consistently less altruism and social concern for the well being of the poor and disadvantaged, they feel more in control of their lives and less alienated than most european publics. Majorities of Europeans, both East and West think that success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside of their control. In contrast a majority of Americans disagree that their destiny is directed by others.

Americans also see hard work yielding success to a greater extent than do Europeans. Two in three Americans disagree with the idea that hard work doesn't guarantee success. Only four in ten British, French and even hard working Germans took this position. In most eastern nations majorities agreed that hard work doesn't pay off.

More affluent people in the West have greater feelings of empowerment than poorer people in these societies. This is particularly the case in the US, and in Great Britain. In the East, especially the Soviets Republics people who earn more money are no more likely than poorer people to feel in control of their
own destinies or to feel that hard work pays off.

Generally, income is more correlated with satisfaction with one's life and personal confidence in the future in the West than in the East. How many rubles one earns says less about a Russian's view of life than do income differences for Americans.

However, Americans with annual family incomes of under $40,000 and black Americans express more feelings of personal empowerment than do most European publics, regardless of their income strata.
OTHER COMPARATIVE FINDINGS:

Hopes, Fears and Aspirations
The hopes and fears of Europeans, both East and West are financially based, except in Germany, where matters of health take precedence over financial matters.
(nearly a third of the French and Spanish aspire to better jobs - almost rivaling concerns among East Germans)

Aspirations for good health and personal happiness are luxuries that the publics of Eastern Europe can't afford. Russian, and other Soviet publics are more apt than most other European people to hope for improvements in their societies.

The starkest contrast between materialist and post materialist aspirations is found in Germany where East Germans hope for jobs and West Germans hope for better health.

Europeans Assess Their Lives And The State of Their Nations
Prior to the events of August, Russians and Ukrainians felt terrible about the present, looked back on the past as only somewhat better, and viewed the future with meager optimism.

Only one out of every forty Russians said they were leading an ideal life. Evaluations were almost as grim in Lithuania, but the Baltic public was sustained by the prospect of freedom from Soviet domination.

Bulgarians judge their lives as poorly as Russians, but they are much more positive that their lives will improve
in the future.

Hungarians, Czechoslovaks and Poles provide equally depressing assessments of the state of their lives, but they differ on how they see the future.

Reflecting national character, the Hungarians are the most pessimistic people in Europe. They are more pessimistic than other Eastern Europeans about the future, even when they are relatively sanguine about their current economic circumstance. When Hungarians are discontented with their present circumstance their optimism about the future goes into free fall.

East and West Germans view their lives present, past and future quite differently

East Germans express more discontent with the way their lives are going than West germans and feel than they have lost ground over the past five years. West Germans feel that they have made personal progress in past five years.

But, East German expect to make more relative progress over the next five years than do West Germans

East and West Germans make a distinction between the direction of their lives and the direction of their countries. Again present, past and future are seen through different eyes.

East Germans feel that the state of the nation
has improved and expect even more improvement five years hence. West Germans feel that their country has deteriorated and are far less bullish about their country's future.

The Poles, like the East Germans feel a sense of national progress that is not matched by feelings of gain in their personal lives.

At the other end of the spectrum, Slovaks feel a loss of national progress. In fact, many Slovakians look back fondly on times when their nation was in the Soviet orbit.

The unraveling of the socialist societies has taken its toll on the personal well being of the people of Eastern Europe. The publics in each of the countries studied feel that they have lost ground in achieving their life's goals.

Eastern Europeans look back on five years ago as a better time for them than the present, but in absolute terms they rated their life five years ago far less positively than did Western Europeans. Slovaks are the exception to this rule in reporting high levels of contentment with their personal life five years ago.

Western Europeans feel that over the past five years they have made progress in reaching their life's goals. Pluralities in the UK, Spain, Italy West Germany and France see progress rather than personal decline in their lives. However, in France those who see progress barely outnumber those who see personal decline.
The West Germans are clearly more contented with their lives than are the peoples of other nations. The British, French, Spanish and Italians evaluate the state of their live about equally but they are less contented than West Germans.

Like Americans, the people of Western Europe make a distinction between the way their own lives are trending versus the way they see things in their country going. In each major country of Western Europe, except Spain pluralities believe that over the past five years their country has lost ground in achieving its objectives.

But, the Western European publics expect that over the next five years their countries will make progress and expect that they will make further progress in their own lives.

Evaluations of the State of the Revolution In Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Republics

In every Eastern European country, except Hungary, there is majority approval for the political changes that have occurred over the past few years.

In contrast, prior to the events of August the vast majorities of Russians and Ukrainians disapproved of the political and economic changes they experienced over the past few years. But, despite disapproval of the difficulties they endured, majorities applauded efforts to establish democracy and free market economies.

Lithuanians took a different view of the political and economic changes in their republic than did Russians and Ukrainians. Even in the face of economic hardships they
expressed approval of recent changes and optimism about the future because of their nationalistic aspirations.

Even though on balance Russians and Ukrainians show modest levels of support for a market economy, they are more likely than the Poles, Czechoslovaks and East Germans too feel that the transition to a market economy is moving too slowly.

The tie between approval of democracy and approval of capitalism is sharpest in troubled Hungary. It's most independent in Poland, where many people who disapprove of capitalism continue to show support for democracy.

Optimism about the future and support for the transition to a market economy are linked in each of the Eastern countries in which the survey was conducted. Notably, in Russia optimists out number pessimists two to one among people who support the market economy. Optimists and pessimist are equally prevalent among Russians who oppose the efforts to establish a market economy in the Soviet Union.

The Dynamics of Public Opinion About Democracy and Capitalism

Younger people in the East are more enthusiastic about capitalism and democracy than are older people. People 60 years of age and older show the most resistance, while people under 25 show the most enthusiasm for political pluralism and the efforts to establish market economies in their countries.

Generational differences are most extreme in the Russia, where the generation that came of age under Stalin, (70 and older) disapproves overwhelmingly of perestroika and
The young people of Germany are a stunning exception to this rule. Younger citizens on both sides of the old political divide have less in common, less mutual interest and are less supportive of unity than those over 60 who remember a united Germany.

In every former communist country the opinion leading elements of the society express more conceptual support for a market economy and democracy and hold more basic democratic and capitalist values than the population as a whole. Better educated people and people who live in the capital cities of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics studied more often say they approve of democracy and of a market economy than do less well educated people and people who live in smaller communities.

As with generation, differences between opinion leading and opinion following groups are more extreme in Russia and the Ukraine than they are in Eastern European countries. In many respects there are two sets of opinion within the Soviet republics...young, well educated, urban residents are pro democracy, pro market economy and see Russia or the Ukraine, not the Soviet Union as their country. At the other extreme, older, poorly educated people, who live in the villages are highly suspicious of both democracy and capitalism and continue to look to the Center.

The Soviet gender gap on democracy and the market economy is larger than in any other country. It is evident among all age groups, in major cities, as well as villages and
persists at all levels of education.
Economic Goals, Expectations and Attitudes

Although Eastern Europeans endorse efforts to establish market economies, they favor a socialist model of capitalism. One in four or fewer in each country in the survey favor a strictly capitalist approach. Solid majorities favor a more social democratic form of capitalism, such as practiced in Sweden.

Most Eastern Europeans and Soviets polled want some form of state involvement in media. Pluralities want both state controlled and private newspapers, while there is more support for the state alone to control radio and tv.

Despite four decades of propaganda to the contrary, pluralities of Poles, Hungarians Bulgarians and Czechoslovaks have favorable opinions about large companies, and about investors from other countries. Even majorities of Russians and Ukrainians support such capitalist notions as borrowing money to start up new business’s.

Opinion leadership groups, better educated and urban dwellers are even more enthusiastic than the average citizen toward corporations, Western investors and Western products. Western trade names such as McDonalds, Mercedes Benz, Coca Cola and Addidas evoke overwhelmingly favorable response among former Soviet Bloc peoples.

In just about every Eastern European and Soviet Republic covered in the survey, there was a close division of opinion on the question of limiting the profits derived from new business’s. Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were the exceptions – In Czechoslovakia no restrictions were
favored over restrictions by a 59% to 35% margin. In Bulgaria opinion divided 55% to 35% in the other direction.

Higher unemployment is more palatable than higher prices to the publics of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics. Broad public support for higher levels of unemployment for the sake of modernizing the economy exits in every country included in the survey.

In contrast, in most countries majorities opposed price increases for the sake of product availability. The exceptions to this were Russia and Ukraine where product availability is such a problem and in Poland where recent price increases have had a demonstrated positive effect on product availability.

There is no less admiration for people who get rich by working hard in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe than there is in Western Europe.

Religion

The impact of 40 years of communism on religious belief is quite apparent. Overwhelming majorities of the public in every Western nation, except France, say they never doubt the existence of God. In the East those who doubt God are as numerous as believers, except in Poland where religious convictions run very strong.

There is even more of a religious disparity between East and West regarding religious practice. One in 20 Russians go to church on a weekly basis. One out of three in Catholic countries such as Italy and Spain attend church weekly, as do one out of six in Protestant countries such
as the UK and the former FRG.

Religious belief and practice is especially low in the former GDR, where only one in four say they never doubt the existence of God. Russians and Ukrainians are far more religious than their former German allies.

There are as many atheists in France as there are in Russia.

Americans, rivaled only by the Poles, express more religious conviction than all of the other peoples surveyed.

Although Eastern Europeans and Soviet publics show only moderate levels of religious conviction, they believe that the church is having a positive influence on the way things are going in their countries. This view is most prevalent in Russia and the Ukraine, where seven in ten like the renewed role of the church in society.

Ironically, religious Poland is the only former Soviet bloc country that is troubled by the influence of the church.

While East Europeans like the influence the church is having on society, few want the church to play a greater role in the political life of the country. Seventy percent of Poles complain that the Church plays too great a role in that country's politics.

Although the publics in former communist countries are less religious than Western publics, belief in Judeo-Christian concept of right and wrong is shared equally on
both sides of the Iron Curtain. Indeed, belief in moral relativism is at **least** as extensive in Soviet Republics as it is in the United States.
Attitudes Toward Political Freedom and Freedom of Expression

People of the West are decidedly more supportive of personal freedoms than people living in former communist countries, but beliefs in political freedom and freedom of expression are not consistently greater in Western nations than they are in Eastern nations.

In every country surveyed, there is majority support for banning from school libraries books that contain dangerous ideas. Calls for restrictions on dangerous books are generally no greater in former Communist countries than they are in Western nations. The narrowest margins of majority support were found in Britain, the United States, Spain and Czechoslovakia. The most support for banning books was found in Germany, France and Hungary.

Similarly, there is not a clear East, West difference in levels of public support for political freedom. In the US, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia there is strong public support for allowing all political parties, even those that do not believe in the democratic system. Calls for restrictions on anti democratic political parties are greatest in Germany, Italy, Russia and Hungary.

The publics of the East and West divide more distinctly on the issue of personal freedoms. In every Western nation, except Germany there is majority opposition to denying freedom of speech to fascists. In every former communist nation there is majority support for not granting freedom of speech to fascists.

Similarly, the publics in every Western nation, including
Germany would not prohibit homosexuals from teaching school, while the publics in every former communist country, save the GDR would ban homosexuals from the school room.

In the West better educated people support personal political freedoms to a greater extent than do less well educated people. However, in former communist countries, level of education has no bearing on feelings about freedom of speech for fascists. This east-west difference is most evident in Germany, where well educated west Germans are considerably more tolerant than other west Germans, while east Germans are equally intolerant, irrespective of their years of schooling.

**Attitudes Toward Social Welfare**

Support for a welfare state, or at minimum a social safety net, runs nearly as high among the populations of major Western european nations as it does among Eastern European nations. Beliefs that the state should guarantee basic food and shelter or take care of the poor are as prevalent in Britain, France and Spain as they are in Russia, Poland or Hungary.

In this regard the publics of Western Europe appear nearly as socialist as the publics of former communist nations.

West Germans show relatively less support for social welfare measures than do other European publics. Given the amount of social welfarism that has was structured into the former FRG, this may represent change in public opinion reflecting West German unhappiness over the costs of unification.
Beliefs about Government

There is little public debate, either East or West about government inefficiency or wastefulness.

From the Atlantic to the Urals most people see government activity as inherently ineffectual. Six in ten Russians and six in ten Americans agree that when some thing is run by the state it is usually inefficient and wasteful.

**Exception** - (Germans were somewhat reluctant to describe their government's actions as inefficient or wasteful)

Similarly, large percentages of the publics of all nations, East, West and American see their lives as too controlled by the state. The extent of this perception bears little relationship to the relative amount of state control that exists in these societies. Americans and the French were more likely than Russians or the Bulgarians to complain about their lives being too controlled by the state.

Trust in government is generally greater in the established democracies of the West than in Eastern Europe. However, Germans and, especially Italians are less trusting that their governments are run for the benefit of all people than the publics of other Western nations.

Czechoslovaks and Bulgarians are more trusting of their new governments equanimity than the publics of other former Communist countries.

Beliefs about Democracy
Suspicion of the motives and intentions of politicians is widely evident in all of the societies studied. Americans and the British are more likely to think that their elected officials care what people think than are people from other countries in the survey. And Britain and Americans less often think that elected officials lose touch with their constituents.

Italians are distinguished from all other Western Europeans by their deep distrust of elected officials and government. Italians are as skeptical of the intentions of their political leaders as are the publics who have lived under communist rule.

The new democracies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union face electorates that are as distrusting of elected officials as the established democracies of the West. However, people in the East do not feel as empowered by voting as do people in the West. Compared to the West larger percentages of Russians, Ukrainians, Hungarians and Poles do not think that voting gives them a voice in how the government runs things.

The Czechs and the highly optimistic Bulgarians are more confident that voting empowers them than are other Eastern Europeans.

Another indication of the fragile embrace of democracy in Eastern Europe is evidenced by the fact that majorities of the public in most of these nations said that they are losing interest in politics. However, Czechs and East Germans did not share this view.

Women in Eastern European nations, who generally show
less of a commitment to democracy than men, were also more apt to say that they are losing interest in politics.

**Nationalism, Patriotism and Militarism**

An overwhelming majority of Western Europeans would like to see entry into their countries further restricted. Eastern Europeans concur, however opinions are not nearly as strong held as they are in the West.

Russians, Ukrainians and Bulgarians are relatively unconcerned about keeping out unwanted foreigners.

None of the publics of Europe match American feelings that military force is necessary to maintain world order. Americans and the British are also more ready to proclaim their patriotism than are other Europeans, save the Bulgarians.

Poles score relatively high on both patriotism and militancy ... much higher than other slavic peoples. The Russians and Ukrainians express muted patriotism and low levels of militancy.

Polish militancy and patriotism exist side by side with feeling that Poland has no natural allies and is surrounded by unfriendly neighbors.

Hungarians strongly believe that military force is necessary to maintain world order, but are among the least likely to say they would fight for their country.

**Beliefs About Work**

In most European countries people regard the legal and
medical professions as the most desirable occupation for a child to pursue. However, in Hungary, the former GDR and in Czechoslovakia people regard skilled work as the best pursuit for a child starting out today.

Generally, careers in engineering and science are less well regarded in the East than in Western Europe. Despite their distrust of and antipathy toward government bureaucracy, as many Italians would tell their kids to be clerks, as would advise a career in medicine.

Most East Europeans and Soviets express some degree of satisfaction with the work they do and with the organization that employs them. However, American workers are considerably more satisfied than Eastern Europeans with the work they do and with their employers.

Russians, Ukrainians and Poles register the most complaints about work. Nearly three in ten Poles and Russians are dissatisfied with their jobs. Among Ukrainians discontent is over 40%.

Most people in East Europe and in the Soviet Republics feel that the political and economic changes of recent years have had a bad influence on how hard people work. This opinion was especially prevalent in Russia and the Ukraine. In contrast, pluralities in Lithuania, the GDR and in Hungary thinks the changes have led people to work harder.

Eastern Europeans and Soviet workers say they are ready to work on a incentive system, that will allow them to earn more money, if they accomplish a lot. Western Europeans are not. They prefer a fixed wage, so as to
always know how much they will earn.

In contrast to Western Europeans, a majority of Americans workers say they would like to be paid on the incentive system, but even Americans are less enthusiastic than Eastern Europeans about the idea of incentives.

Trade Unions get a mixed review from the publics of Eastern Europe. Bulgarians and East Germans think that unions are having a positive influence on the way things are going in their countries. Czechoslovaks, Hungarians and Poles are divided in their opinions of unions.

**Women's Issues**

Men are thought to have a better life than women in every European society studied. East West differences in this perception were not material. Men and women shared this view in every country of Europe, except in Italy. Italian men see no difference in the quality of men and women's lives.

In the main, Eastern Europeans do not think that women will have more social and legal rights under the new regimes than they had under communist regimes. If anything, many Eastern Europeans believe that women will enjoy fewer rights. This is the overwhelming view in the former GDR.

Only in Hungary was there any significant hope that women would have more rights than they had under communist regimes.

As Eastern Europeans emerge from communist societies they look at marriage and the family very differently than do
Western Europeans. The ideal marriage for majorities of Eastern Europeans and Soviets is one where the husband provides for the family and the wife stays out of the work force to take care of home and children.

The vast majority of Western Europeans and Americans believe that the ideal situation is one where both husband and wife work and share responsibilities for the children and household.

**International Linkages, Security Issues**

Prior to coup and its collapse, the Eastern European publics of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary continued to think that the Soviet Union was having a negative influence on their country. Bulgarians, who have long thought of the Russians as allies, and east Germans did not share these feelings.

Eastern Europeans and the Soviet publics look favorably upon Germany and the United States. Both nations are thought to be having a good influence on the way things are going in each of the former communist countries surveyed.

Many Poles continue to see a potential threat from Germany, but nonetheless a plurality think that Germany is a positive influence on Poland today.

Few Russians or Ukrainians see the United States as an enemy. After 40 years of cold war as many named Japan as a threat to the nation as named the US.

The publics of most European nations, east and west reject the idea of being in the business of selling arms.
to third world countries. However, pluralities of Poles and Slovaks favor this measure.

The top international worries of Eastern Europeans and Germans is flood of refugees from the East, followed by related concern about the economic collapse of the Soviet Union.

Only in Bulgaria is there substantial public concern about the possibility of an attack by a neighboring country.

As they exit the Warsaw Pact, the publics of Eastern Europe do not have a clear vision of the best security arrangement for the future. Poles divide evenly between wanting to have some association with NATO and signing bi-lateral arrangements with their neighbors. Czechoslovaks and Hungarians show little interest in NATO but more affinity toward a regional defense association.
Many West Europeans have entered the last decade of the twentieth century free of old worries about politics. The era when Spain fretted over the fragility of its democracy, when France felt eternally divided, when Britain argued about its role in the old empire is over. Except in Germany, politics are not on the minds of most West Europeans. They sense a host of economic problems, especially unemployment, hovering over them.

This has put West Europeans in a self-centered mood. Unlike East Europeans, they can divide their feelings about themselves and their countries. The Poles, for example, feel that their happiness is linked to whether Poland can make a go of it in the tough years ahead. But West Europeans do not feel that way. Alienated from the government, many Italians, for example, feel pessimistic about their country (30%) but more feel optimistic about themselves (51%).

Perhaps this ought to be a more hopeful time for Western Europe. The Cold War and the fear of Soviet missiles have dissipated. West Europeans are, ostensibly, about to enter Europe '92 — the new adventure of a common market that will someday be as free of barriers as the states in the United States. But these
events have only made West Europeans uncertain.

Yet West Europeans are more optimistic than East Europeans. Asked to place their country on a ladder of life from 0 to 10, West Europeans rated their countries at an average 5.2, nearly two steps ahead of the low 3.4 assessment of East Europeans. West Europeans felt that they were better off five years ago (a 5.7 average) and just as many predicted an improvement five years from now (a 5.7 average) that would make up what their countries lost in the last five years. (East Europeans also felt that their countries would make up in the next five years what they had lost in the last five years.)

The destruction of the Berlin Wall still resonates with hopeful symbolism for some West Europeans. In Scotland, Anna Marie Murray, a 31-year-old unemployed and divorced mother in the Gorbals, one of the poorest neighborhoods of Glasgow, talked recently about what the fall of the wall had meant for her. "I couldn't believe it," she said. "I was just sitting in, watching TV that night, tears were running down my face. I couldn't believe the happiness on peoples' faces...There is always hope. I'm not a pessimist, although you may think so. I am an optimist, and I see something like that wall coming down, and I think there is hope, people can talk and get it together. It gives me a good feeling inside."

In November 1990, on the first anniversary of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Nuria Tey, an editor with a Barcelona publishing house, was attending the Frankfurt Book Fair in Germany. She and
other Spanish Catalans decided to help celebrate the anniversary. "We were all excited and went in front of the Frankfurt City Hall," she recalled recently. "But then we were so disappointed. The Germans really have a different temperament than we Spaniards. There were very few people there. The place was desolate. We, the Catalans, were enthusiastic, but the Germans..."

Spaniards are the most optimistic West Europeans. On the ladder of life, they felt they had improved from 4.9 five years ago to 5.3 now and would go on to 6.1 five years from now, an increase of more than a step on the ladder in a decade. French were the most pessimistic, feeling that they had declined from 5.6 to 5.1 in five years and would linger at 5.1 for another five years. The British and Italians were the most somber about their performance; both felt their country had declined by almost a full step in the last five years. The British thought they would make up all the lost ground in the next five years, but the Italians felt they would only make up about half. The Germans saw themselves in a slight decline that would be more than made up in the next five years. In fact, the Germans predicted a rank of 6.7 in the next five years, the highest in western Europe.

In Spain, Italy and France, younger people tended to be consistently more optimistic than their compatriots about the future of their country. Other demographic differences on this issue across Western Europe tended to be modest.

Except in Germany, political issues did not seem to trouble West Europeans very much any more. Perhaps that is only natural in
the midst of a worldwide recession. Economic problems could be so overwhelming that West Europeans do not have time and energy to fret over anything else. But it is also true that much of Western Europe is going through a period when old antagonistic political lines have softened.

In the era when Spain, for example, feared violent conflict, foreign newspapers and magazines brimmed with news about the country. But now the political news is dull. Noting that the Business Week correspondent in Madrid can no longer obtain more than three lines of space in the weekly magazine for dispatches about Spain, Amando de Miguel, the well-known Spanish sociologist, said, "We have become a three-line country. That's healthy for us."

As expected, Germans felt that the complications and costs of reunification posed the greatest problem to Germany. But the other West European countries fretted over more traditional woes. Asked to name the most important problem facing their country, 64% of the French, 60% of the Spanish, 39% of the British and 24% of the Italians listed unemployment. On top of this, 32% of the British, 19% of the Italians, 16% of the French and 12% of the Spanish listed general economic and industrial problems.

In an era when European companies are trimming their budgets and payrolls to prepare for the competition of Europe '92, these fears are logical. Unemployment is especially terrifying in Europe because workers there do not change jobs often. They usually expect to work at a single company for life. Unlike the American automobile industry, European companies do not lay off and rehire
workers with economic ups and downs. A European company generally does not lay off workers until it has decided to restructure its system of production. A laid-off worker does not expect to be rehired when a recession ends. Workers often look at unemployment as a permanent condition.

Political problems came nowhere near these economic issues on the list of the most important questions facing Britain, Spain, Italy and France. Only 11% of the French cited immigration, a growing political issue in France. Only 13% of the Italians mentioned bad politicians and government, even though alienation from politics is a major phenomenon in Italy.

A major social issue, however, did trouble Spain, where 36% listed drugs and 30% listed crime and violence as the major problems facing the country. This seemed to reflect dissatisfaction with the permissiveness and delinquency that has accompanied the Spanish transition from a police-controlled dictatorship to an open democracy. The concern over drugs was most marked among women and among the older and least educated Spaniards. To a lesser extent, Italians also shared these concerns, with 16% listing drugs, 14% crime and violence, and 5% the Mafia as the most important problem facing the country. Much as in Spain, the worry over drugs was most prevalent among women, older Italians and people of the Mezzogiorno. These issues hardly troubled Britain and France. No British mentioned drugs and only 6% crime and violence as a major problem. No French mentioned drugs and only 4% crime and violence as a major problem.
All these concerns generated less dissatisfaction with political leaders than might be expected. The British approved of the way Prime Minister John Major was doing his job by a margin of 56% to 30% while the Spanish and French approved of the performances of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez and President Francois Mitterrand by margins of 51% to 35%. The Italians, however, disapproved of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti's handling of his job by a margin of 52% to 32% while the Germans disapproved of Chancellor Helmut Kohl by 52% to 41%.

A More Cheerful Look at the State of Themselves

When asked to place themselves, rather than their countries, on a ladder of life, West Europeans were more upbeat. They put themselves personally at an average 6.1, about a step ahead of where they put their countries. They felt that they had personally improved in the last five years (from 5.8), unlike their declining countries, and they predicted substantial further improvement to 6.8 in the next five years. In short, they saw themselves gaining a step on the ladder in the decade. (East Europeans also saw themselves on a higher step on the ladder than their countries. But they still saw themselves in a decline that would not be made up in the next five years.)

Personal optimism reigned with optimists outnumbering pessimists by 51% to 12% in Britain, 51% to 17% in Italy, 46% to 12% in Germany, 42% to 19% in France, and 39% to 13% in Spain. Personal optimism seemed to bear little relation to optimism about
their countries. The British and Italians, the most pessimistic about their countries, were among the most optimistic about themselves. The Spaniards, the most optimistic about their country, were the least optimistic about themselves. The most politically active elements of society seemed the most optimistic about their personal future. Educated West Europeans and those under the age of 40 swelled the ranks of the optimists in Britain, Spain, France, and Italy. The affluent did the same in Britain, Spain and Italy.

Economics --- unemployment, financial stability for the family, general economic well-being --- ruled their personal hopes and fears just as it did their hopes and fears for their countries. Good health, however, was almost as important and, in fact, was cited as the greatest hope in Germany. Unemployment was a significant fear in all West European countries. Fear of war was a significant fear in all but Italy, poor health in all but Britain. Britain and Germany also worried about pollution, France about old age and Spain about drugs. Throughout Western Europe, young people, the most optimistic, were the most worried about unemployment.

The general personal optimism could be related to a general feeling of financial well-being in West Europe. The Germans, Italians, British and French expressed agreement with the proposition that they were pretty well satisfied with the way things were going for them financially (64%, 60%, 62%, 54% respectfully). The Spaniards, however, were divided almost in half (48% agree, 47% disagree). Asked if they often lacked enough money to pay usual expenses, the Germans (71%), the French (59%) and the
British (54%) disagreed. The Italians were divided almost in half (50% disagree, 49% agree) and the Spaniards agreed by 53% to 42%. It is obvious that the Germans, British, Italians and French feel in relatively good shape financially while the Spaniards are troubled.

Yet, under closer examination, a striking phenomenon emerged: there appeared to be no correlation between optimism about the future of a country and the feelings about personal well-being. Unlike the situation in Eastern Europe, optimism and pessimism did not generally depend on whether a West European felt pretty well satisfied with the way things were going financially or felt that he or she often lacked enough money to pay usual expenses. Personal finances made a difference --- and only a slight one --- in France. Among French who agreed that they often lacked money to pay expenses, 37% felt pessimistic about the future of their country while 32% felt optimistic. Conversely, among those who disagreed (in short, those who usually had enough money in their pockets) 33% felt positive about the future of France while 28% felt negative. Nowhere else did it make that kind of difference.

Spain, the most troubled country about personal finances, provided the most telling example. Spaniards who were pretty well satisfied with their finances felt optimistic about Spain by a margin of 44% to 13%. Spaniards who were not satisfied with their finances felt optimistic about Spain by a margin of 42% to 14%. In the same way, Spaniards who had enough money to pay usual expenses felt optimistic about Spain by a margin of 43% to 10%. Spaniards
who did not have enough to pay expenses felt optimistic about Spain by 41% to 36%. It simply made no difference at all.

There was a striking difference between Western and Eastern Europe in this regard. West Europeans, pessimistic about their countries, tended by and large not to carry their pessimism toward feelings about themselves. On the other hand, East Europeans pessimistic about their countries tended overwhelmingly to be pessimistic about themselves. A look at the extreme cases makes this clear. In Britain, 16% of the pessimists and 11% of the optimists about the country felt pessimistic about themselves. That was a difference of only 5 percentage points. In short, how a person felt about Britain barely mattered in determining how that person felt about his or her personal life. In Lithuania, on the other hand, 12% of the optimists about the country and a whopping 66% of the pessimists felt pessimistic about themselves. That was a difference of 54 percentage points. It definitely mattered how a person felt about Lithuania in determining how that person felt about his or her personal life. In Western Europe, the margin of difference ranged from the 5 percentage points in Britain to 16 percentage points in France. In Eastern Europe, the margin of difference ranged from the 54 percentage points in Lithuania to 36 percentage points in Poland. There is no doubt that West Europeans were able to separate their feelings about themselves and their countries; East Europeans not.

The Spanish optimism bemused some Spanish analysts who attributed it to a lottery mentality. "Why do Spanish people gamble
so much?" said Miguel, the sociologist. "Because they think they are going to win. They are stupid. It is like blindly believing that although things are bad now, they will get better." José Antonio Martínez Soler, one of Spain's most admired television journalists, elaborated on this idea. "Our culture believes in luck, in providence, in predetermination, in an outside force rather than in free will," he said. "...Since they (the Spaniards) do not consider themselves responsible for their own actions, they believe that there is something or someone who is responsible for providing them with money or whatever they need in order to survive. It is a fatalistic attitude...an Arab rather than a Protestant attitude."

A large number of West Europeans reported that they would like to settle in another country if they had the chance: 36% of the British, 30% of the French, and 24% of the Italians. These attitudes were especially surprising in Britain and France, two countries not noted as founts of emigration. But it is not clear what to make of these results. A positive answer, at least in some cases, may have reflected a yen for adventure far more than pessimism and alienation. The survey results, particularly in the case of France, appeared to point in this direction.

The French who liked the idea of going elsewhere did so without regard to whether they were optimistic (35%) or pessimistic (33%) about France. The most adventuresome elements of the population --- those under 25 (54%), the college educated (49%), and the Parisians (42%) --- were more likely than other French to
talk of settling in another country. The young wanted to go to Australia (10%), the educated to Canada (10%), and the Parisians to the United States (8%). Germany also was high on the list of countries to settle in.

The problem seemed more acute in Britain. Pessimists were more likely than the rest of the British to talk of settlement elsewhere (51%). Moreover, they included elements of the population that would be regarded as more stable than adventuresome. Not only did youths below the age of 25 (57%) want to leave Britain in numbers larger than the norm but those between the ages of 25 and 39 as well (47%). Not only did college educated Britons (46%) want to leave but high school graduates as well (44%). And more of the affluent were among those talking about leaving Britain (45% vs. 33%). Australia (10%), the United States (16%) and Canada (4%) were the countries that most attracted the British.
The Common Market

Enthusiasm and Expectations

West Europeans have more enthusiasm for the Common Market than expectations. Despite some concerns about how their economies will fare in the integrated common market that goes into effect after 31 December 1992 --- what is known as Europe '92 --- Europeans overwhelmingly believe that the idea is a good one. This makes it evident that there is some kind of concept or idea of Europe that is more important than the reality of the economics. As Claudio Demattè, professor of international finance markets at Bocconi University in Milan, put it in a recent interview, "To be European is a value."

This can be seen most clearly by analyzing the enthusiasm of the countries separately. In Italy, 77% looked on Europe '92 as a good idea while only 10% regarded it as a bad idea. But Italian estimates of how their economy would fare did not match this enthusiasm. Asked how the Italian economy would be affected by Europe '92, 43% said it would be strengthened while 32% said it would be weakened. Political analysts believe that the enthusiasm evidently stems from a widespread belief in Italy --- encouraged by politicians --- that an integrated common market will impose "a European discipline" on an Italian society that sorely lacks one. The need for the discipline, according to the analysts, is more important for many Italians than the concerns about the economy.

Spain is a similar though even more dramatic case. Its
enthusiasm (70% think Europe '92 a good idea while only 10% think it a bad idea), second only to Italy, was greater than its expectations (53% think the Spanish economy will be strengthened while 18% think it will be weakened). Yet even its expectations seem rather high. No other people, not even the Germans, believed their economies would benefit as much as the Spaniards did.

These expectations may be fanciful. A recent study cited in the newspaper *El País* ranked Spain near the tail end of a scale in competitiveness, ahead of only Portugal and Greece in the European Common Market. Amando de Miguel, the Spanish sociologist, described the Spanish attitude toward Europe '92 as "an irresponsible optimism." So long outside the mainstream of Europe --- its dictator, Francisco Franco, was a pariah for most of four decades until his death in 1975 --- the Spaniards have taken to Europe, in Miguel's view, "with the enthusiasm and faith of the convert." None of the enthusiasm surprises Angel Viñas, the Spanish historian who will soon head the European Economic Commission mission to the United Nations. "Spain has been trying to become part of Europe since the 17th century or, at least, for the last two hundred years," he said in Brussels. Spaniards are trying to shake off the old joke that Europe stops at the Pyrenées.

Perhaps the nature of this enthusiasm --- based more on history than reality --- is what rankles the small minority in Spain that opposes the Common Market. In a series of interviews in Spain, those opposed to the market were far more vociferous in denouncing it than the majority were in praising it. "It is going
to be a disaster," said Maite de Guindos Latorre, a 30-year-old Madrid lawyer. "...Spain is different, distinct, and we are not prepared for anything." She described Spain as a country of low cultural level, a country of "paella, torero and olé." And she saw little preparation for Europe in a country that opened its bars at 6 a.m. and ate dinner after midnight. "Here in Spain life goes on at night, and we walk around like zombies during the day," she said. Her comments, of course, reflected the basic notion that Spain is still not a part of the culture of Europe. In short, Guindos also looked on Europe as a value. It is a value that made most Spaniards enthusiastic about coming closer to Europe. It made her pessimistic, but she still shared the idea that taking part in Europe is a cultural issue, not an economic one.

In France, the difference between expectations and enthusiasm was most marked, for it was the only country where more people expected the economy to weaken than expected the economy to strengthen in Europe '92. While a plurality of 44% thought that France would be weakened, a majority of 66% thought that Europe '92 was a good idea. In fact, France had the greatest margin of difference between expectations and enthusiasm in Europe --- 35 percentage points between the 31% who thought France would be strengthened by Europe '92 and the 66% who thought it was a good idea. Italy was next with 34 percentage points, followed by Germany with 19 points, Spain 17 and Britain 14, all significant margins of difference between enthusiasm and expectations.

Although a majority of 58% in Britain reported Europe '92 as
a good idea, it had the largest percentage (28%) that regarded it as a bad idea. This evidently reflected the insular nature of Britain and the recent campaign launched by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher against integration of the Common Market. Thatcher, while denouncing economic projects like a joint currency, has been using a powerful emotional argument as well: She insists that she fears the English Parliament, the mother of parliamentary democracy, will be diminished by the unity of Europe. But Thatcher is not persuasive to all British ears. In the Labor Party stronghold of Glasgow, Scotland, Anna Marie Murray, describing the number one problem of Britain as "getting rid of Thatcherism and the Tories forever," summarized her feelings about an integrated common market in a simple sentence: "If the Tories don't want it, then I want it."

There is an added bit of evidence that the view of Europe '92 was more of a political and cultural issue than an economic one. Although, in general, more affluent and better educated Europeans tended to look more favorably on the Common Market than poorer Europeans, personal financial problems did not seem to affect opinions about Europe '92 very significantly. In both Italy and Spain, people who said they "often (didn't) have enough money to pay (their) usual expenses" looked on Europe '92 as a good idea in about the same proportion as the rest of their compatriots (Spain - 71% vs. 70%, Italy - 74% vs. 79%). In France and Britain, those without enough money were slightly less enthusiastic than the others (France - 60% vs. 71%, Britain - 52% vs. 63%).
The political euphoria over Europe '92 could be undermined in the future by the reality of the economics. When asked to look at the economics in specific terms, many Europeans revealed that they were troubled. On balance the Germans (60%), the French (56%) and the British (48%) all expected their agriculture to do poorly in an integrated Common Market. Although pluralities of Spaniards (48% vs. 39%) and Italians (47% vs. 45%) thought their agriculture would do well, farmers in both countries obviously did not agree. Residents of the rural areas of both Spain (49%) and Italy (50%) expected their agriculture to do poorly.

Many farmers believed that their troubles had already begun. In Normandy, Georges Lefevre, a 47-year-old farmer, did not hide his anger over what he called the "aberrant" and "dizzying drop in prices." Sitting in the living room of his old farmhouse in Gefosse-Fontenay near Isigny-sur-mer, Lefevre said that the French farmers had become "tributaries of Europe from the point of view of price, and we have been taken to the cleaners." He accused Britain and East European farmers of dumping their meat on the French market at ridiculous prices. The East European meat, he said, was coming across the frontier illegally. "We are importing meat from East Europe and especially from East Germany since the fall of the Berlin Wall," he said, "and we now have meat at half price on the French market."

Europeans were divided about how well their manufacturing would do in an integrated Common Market. While Germans (64%), Italians (58%) and Spaniards (46%) had higher hopes for the sales
of their manufactured products, the French and British divided almost equally between those who thought their manufacturing would do well and those who thought it would do poorly (Britain - 44% well vs. 47% poorly; France - 44% well vs. 44 poorly).

All of Europe expected that their high-technology industries would do well after 1992, especially those polled in France (71%) and Germany (66%), the two countries that have been in the forefront of pushing European-wide technological projects like the Ariane space program and the manufacture of Airbus planes. Europeans logically expected that tourism would benefit from Europe '92 when Europeans will be able to travel freely across borders without stopping for frontier formalities. Tourist centers like France (86%) and Italy (80%) had the most expectations about this while a country like Germany (65%), never as popular for tourists, had fewer expectations.

**Germany and Eastern Europe**

Many Europeans believed that Germany, the strongest economy, would dominate the integrated Common Market. That is not surprising. What is surprising, however, is that just as many and, in some countries, even more believed that all countries would have about equal influence in Europe '92. This lack of fear of German domination obviously contributes to the enthusiasm for the Common Market.

In Britain and Italy, more than half of those polled believed that one country, almost certainly Germany, would dominate Europe
'92. On the other hand, pluralities in France (45% to 43%), Spain (41% to 36%), and Germany (44% to 17%) believed that all countries would have about equal influence. Leaving aside the probably disingenuous replies from Germany, Spain showed the greatest refusal to accept the notion that Germany would dominate Europe '92. Only 12% of Spaniards thought this would happen.

For the most part, West Europeans, in a series of interviews, showed very little resentment of Germany even when they predicted probable German dominance. They tended to belittle their own national qualities in comparison with those of Germany. Germans worked hard and therefore deserved their strong economy. "We're a lazy nation," said 35-year-old Anne Maria Boomer, who runs the Swag & Tails wine bar in London's Knightsbridge neighborhood. "In Germany they work really hard, and the standards are really high. Britain's not exactly known for really high standards...I hate to say it, but I think we will (have trouble competing). British people don't like to work."

Resentment surfaced mainly in one interview in Spain. After José Paniagua, the owner of an auto sales and repair shop in a suburb of Madrid, berated Spanish workers ("The Spanish worker does not like to work. All he cares about are bars and running after women."), his wife, Isabel Conesa, expressed her feelings about the Germans quietly. "The Germans work very hard," she said. "I admire them. But deep down, I am afraid of them. If they want to dominate, all right, so long as they leave us alone. But I don't want them to try to make us tall and blond."
The West European attitudes toward Eastern Europe do not seem clear cut as yet. There was substantial support for the consideration of the entry of East Europeans into the Common Market. Germany, which is already experiencing difficulty in the absorption of East Germany, was most ambivalent about considering other East European countries for entry. Only 53% approved (though only 15% disapproved while 32%, the most in all of West Europe, did not know). The disapproval was expressed dramatically by Martin Haushofer, a 55-year-old CSU member of the Bavarian state legislature. "They are incomparable," he said, speaking in the living room of his home on the family farm in Ammersee. "They are like day and night. If you take Czechoslovakia, how do you not take in Hungary? They will all want to come in. At the end, it's going to be sort of a mini-United Nations, and you can't govern. You have nothing. It's like the Tower of Babel."

There seemed to be a good deal of ignorance or apathy or belittlement in the attitudes toward Eastern Europe. Asked which East European came closest to their own country in spirit and outlook on life, 80% of the Spaniards, 62% of the British, 60% of the Italians, 39% of the French and 37% of the Germans replied that they did not know. Of those that did know, Germany and Italy selected Hungary, France and Britain selected Poland, and Spain selected Yugoslavia. The Spanish vote for Yugoslavia --- it was selected by a meager 8% --- evidently reflected those Spaniards who look on Spain as a country of regions, especially Catalonia and the Basque provinces, seeking ever more autonomy and even independence.
On the question of which countries should be the first and second allowed into the Common Market, the Soviet Union was the first choice of two (Spain and Italy) and the second highest first choice of two (France and Britain), Poland the first choice of two (Britain and France) and the second choice of two (Spain and Italy), Hungary the first choice of one (Germany), and Czechoslovakia the second choice of one (Germany).

**Hopeful Demographic Signs**

Boosters of a more united Europe could probably find hopeful signs from the significant differences that income, education and age made in the way those polled in Britain, France, Italy and Spain looked on the Common Market. The elites and the young liked the idea of Europe '92.

In Britain, where former Prime Minister Thatcher has been whipping up fears of a loss of national identity in the future common market, S. A. Murray, a 35-year-old officer in a London bank, thought that these fears would make little impact on the young. In fact, he himself did not feel worried. "There is obviously something which is going to be lost," he said. "That will be forever more England, as the saying goes, may not forever more be England. But I think it is the 1990s now and not the 1890s when that was probably a bit more important. I think the younger generation, particularly my own kids, who are nine and six at the moment, see themselves principally as Europeans."

Better educated and affluent Europeans in all four countries
responded more positively than their compatriots to either or both of the two key questions on Europe '92: Did they think their economies would be strengthened by European integration and did they think the integrated common market was a good idea. In all the countries except Britain, those under the age of 25 were more positive about both questions than the rest of those polled.

There was another major demographic difference that hinted at a basic conservatism in women. Men in Italy, Britain, and Spain were more likely than women to think that Europe '92 was a good idea. Gender made no difference in France (66% for both men and women).
The Specter of Racism

**Gypsies, Arabs and Immigration**

Western Europe has not shaken off the incubus of race hatred. If there is anything that unites Western and Eastern Europe, in fact, it is contempt for Gypsies. In every country that the question was asked --- Spain, Germany (59% vs, 19%), Czechoslovakia (91% vs. 6%), Hungary (81% vs. 14%), and Bulgaria (71% vs. 21%) --- those polled stated by overwhelming margins that they had an unfavorable impression of Gypsies. The margin was somewhat closer in Spain (37% favorable, 50% unfavorable). But there is little doubt that pockets of race hatred persist in western Europe.

Yet most West Europeans, when talking about Gypsies or other despised groups in their midst like North Africans, insist that they are not racist.

"I don't like the Gypsies at all," said Maite de Guindos Latorre, the 30-year-old Madrid lawyer. "There are some good individuals among the Gypsies, and I always say so, like among all people, there are good people. It is a separate race. Besides they want to be a separate race. They wouldn't mix with the non-Gypsies even if they had to die for it..."

"They are people of bad habits," she went on. "...Come on, speaking frankly, they are all thieves. They have it in their blood, and they can't help it. I am sure of it. They pass by here, and see this [she held up a cigarette lighter], and they take your lighter. Although there are some that are more civilized. But not
really, in my view. I tell you frankly, I see a Gypsy, and it
doesn't please me. And I don't consider myself a racist."

Yet those who know the Gypsies best evidently like them best.
Most Spanish Gypsies live in Andalusia, where their contribution to
local traditions and culture are well known. Flamenco dancing, for
example, is rooted in Gypsy culture. In almost a mirror image of
the rest of Spain, Andalusia was the only region that looked on the
Gypsies favorably, by a margin of 59% to 31%.

Intolerance has deep roots in Spain. José Antonio Martínéz
Soler, the Spanish television journalist, traced the intolerance to
the defeat of the Muslims by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabela in
1492. "Intolerance, persecution, and racism, those were the typical
values of Christian Spain, those that triumphed over the Jews and
the Moors and who expelled them and destroyed all of their
heritage," he said. "...It has been five hundred years living off
of persecution, intolerance, civil war. Intolerance, that is our
essence. The images of Goya in which human beings are buried up
to their waist in sand. That is Spain."

Since the Gypsies have lived in Spain for centuries and the
present democratic government accepts and protects ethnic
diversity, there is little that Spaniards can do about the Gypsies
except grumble at them and turn their backs on them. The Gypsies
are not a political issue in Spain.

In France, however, the presence in relatively large numbers of
another ethnic minority --- the North Africans --- has become a
major political issue for almost a decade.
According to the Times Mirror poll, 49% of the French looked favorably upon North Africans while 42% looked on them unfavorably. That may sound somewhat positive but, in fact, it was the most negative ranking for any ethnic group in Europe save for Gypsies throughout the continent and Turks in Germany. Moreover, 11% of the French listed immigration as the most important problem facing France (making it the third most cited problem in this open-ended question) and 5% said that the prospect of France turning into a nation of immigrants was one of their fears for the future (the 10th most cited fear).

Yet France has often prided itself on its assimilation of immigrants. The Ministry of Interior reports that France now has 4.5 million legal foreign residents, 2.5 million foreign-born French citizens who were nationalized during the last 20 years, and perhaps 1 million clandestine foreign residents, a total of 8 million immigrants. Of these perhaps a third --- 2.6 million or almost 5% of the total population --- are from North Africa, the former French-run colonies and protectorates of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Almost all the enmity is directed at them, not the other immigrants, who are mainly from other European countries like Portugal, Spain and Italy. The French do not believe that they can assimilate the North Africans the way they have assimilated other foreigners over the years.

In Amiens, a town of 150,000 an hour's drive north of Paris, four taxi cab drivers, all independent owners of their cabs, met with members of the Times Mirror survey team one morning in a small
Discussing the problems of France, they soon launched into a tirade against the North Africans, almost competing to vent their anger. Words of fury cascaded upon each other:

"There are too many foreigners ... above all of a certain race. When foreigners bring something with them, so much the better. But the ones we are talking about are those who bring nothing with them ... who bring nothing and cost us plenty. They cost us plenty because they arrive with several wives, several children, and then they draw the money, draw the money ... The arabs, the arabs, the arabs ... They bring crime, they bring many things, they make the system rotten ... You build apartments for them, and they ruin the apartments completely ... These North Africans want to impose Islam in France, they do not want to submit to French law ... They do not want to integrate ... When you are a foreigner, when you are in another country, you have to follow the laws of that country. If a Frenchman goes to America, the Frenchman must follow American laws. That's completely normal. And they refuse to do that, they refuse ... They write on their walls, 'Islam will triumph.'"

All four insisted continually that they were not racist. Black immigrants, for example, did not bother them. The Black Africans assimilated easily. Gilbert Flagothier, 38, a slight man with a moustache, said, "In France, you can't say anything you want on this subject because suddenly it's misinterpreted." A colleague interjected, "After you do, they say you are a racist."
Reflecting such sentiments, 86% of the French, the highest percentage in all Europe, told pollsters that they agreed with the statement, "We should restrict and control entry into our country more than we do now." Only 11% disagreed. The rest of Western Europe was not far behind the French. Italy supported more immigration controls by a margin of 84% to 9%, Britain by 79% to 17%, Germany by 70% to 23%, and Spain by 66% to 18%. What impact such feelings may have on a European Community about to lower immigration barriers is yet to be seen.

Except for Russia, the Ukraine, and Bulgaria, Eastern Europe supported immigration controls as well, though by lesser margins.

Despite all the support for immigration controls, the issue of racism is not easy to sort out. But there may be some clues in the extent of anti-semitism, the traditional barometer in Europe for measuring the ethnic and racial prejudice of a society. Asked their opinion of Jews, 72% of the French said they looked on them favorably, the highest percentage to do so in any country except Lithuania (81%). Yet, in an era when young French historians are sifting through the shame of Vichy France's behavior in World War II and after all the publicity over the trial of the Nazi Gestapo officer Klaus Barbie in Lyon just a few years ago, some analysts might find the 14% who looked on Jews unfavorably a rather large hangover from the past. (In Germany, the 52% favorable and 24% unfavorable rating for Jews seemed even more ambiguous.)

A correlation of the French attitudes toward Jews and North Africans was revealing. More than 11% of the French had unfavorable
opinions of both Jews and North Africans. These French tended to be male and older, poorer, less educated and more rural than their compatriots. They clearly represented the traditional extreme right, anti-semitic, racist minority in France. But, far more significantly, another 31% of the French, who looked favorably on Jews, looked unfavorably on North Africans. Their demographics did not fit any traditional racist pattern: whether they had college education or little education, for example, the same percentage of French who looked favorably on Jews disliked North Africans. On top of this, a higher percentage of the affluent (43%) fit this favorable Jewish unfavorable North African pattern. All this creates a difficult problem for French politicians: the anti-North African sentiment went far beyond traditional extreme-right, anti-semitic circles. In deed, the great historian French social history, Ferdinand Braudel, wrote before his death, "when I see their mosques I know they will never be French."

In a measure of tolerance and acceptance of other ethnic groups, all Europeans were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement, "I don't have much in common with other ethnic groups and races." Disagreement could be interpreted as an indication of tolerance and acceptance. In every West European country, more disagreed than agreed. But the difference was not always significant. France and Germany showed the most disagreement in Western Europe, 61% disagreeing and 34% agreeing in both cases. But the margins in the rest of Western Europe were meager: the British disagreed by a margin of 50% to 45%, the Italians by 48% to
47%, and the Spanish by 45% to 41%. No West European country came close to the high American rate of disagreement of 72% (nor to its low American rate of agreement of 24%). But neither did any West European country come anywhere close to the low level of tolerance of Poland where far more of those polled agreed with the statement than disagreed (73% vs. 22%).

There are some significant demographic differences in West European attitudes toward other ethnic groups. In general, the young, the educated, the affluent and the residents of the great metropolises tended to be more tolerant and less restrictive of other ethnic groups than their compatriots while the elderly, rural and small town residents, and those who live in the secondary large cities tended to be less tolerant and more restrictive. [The difference between people who live in the metropolises and the citizens of the secondary large cities made sense since the numbers of a disdained minority like the North Africans are more noticeable in a large city like Marseille than in a great metropolis like Paris.]

But these differences must not be overdrawn. Support for restrictions on immigration are so widespread that they make the demographic differences seem politically unimportant sometimes. In Italy, for example, a significantly higher proportion of university educated respondents (18%) completely disagreed with the proposal to tighten restrictions than did Italians as a whole (10%). Yet 78% of the university educated still called for more controls. That was not as high as the 83% of all Italians who wanted the restrictions.
But, for politicians who have to respond to such pressures, it was high enough.

Immigration, in fact, may pose an implacable problem for Europe in the next decade or two. Most analysts say they are not worried about workers coming from Eastern Europe, believing that they will stay only temporarily like many of the Spanish and Portuguese workers in France and Germany. But as Europe gets richer and the Third World poorer and more populous, some West European analysts believe that North Africans will manage to avoid impoverishment and even starvation only by fleeing northward in search of a permanent home. "The invasion from the South is something unstoppable," said José Antonio Martínez Soler, the television journalist. Joaquin Estefania, the editor of El País, Spain's most influential newspaper, agreed with him. Using the Mexican name for the Rio Grande, Estefania said, "The Mediterranean will become a kind of Rio Bravo."

Nationalities and Terrorism

One of the most surprising results of the poll is the evident lack of concern in Western Europe over nationalist movements and secessionist terrorists, especially in a Britain troubled by Irish terrorism and a Spain troubled by Basque terrorism. The enmity toward unassimilated foreigners evidently does not extend to compatriots who continuously assert their ethnic differences and demand autonomy for themselves.

No one in Spain or Britain, or, for that matter, any other
country in West Europe, volunteered domestic terrorism as a major problem or worry. Moreover, Europeans tended in general to look favorably on the ethnic groups that had spawned the terrorists.

In Britain, 73% had a favorable opinion of the Irish while 21% did not. That was not as high as the favorable/unfavorable ratios for the Scotch (88% to 6%) and the Welsh (81% to 13%), but it was, considering the circumstances, way up on the tolerance scale.

In Spain, a country in which ethnic tensions have been sharply underlined by the persistent terrorism of the Basque separatist organization ETA and its threats to shut down the 1992 Barcelona olympics in turmoil, the poll reveals relatively little anti-Basque prejudice. Basques were looked on favorably by 61% of Spaniards and unfavorably by only 26%. This was not much different from the approval of Basques in France. The French Basque departments, while adjacent to the Spanish Basque provinces, have not been the scene of ETA terrorism. The French looked favorably on Basques by a margin of 65% to 15%.

Although commentators often talk about Spanish resentment over the attempt to diminish the use of Spanish and entrench the use of Catalan in the region of Catalonia, this resentment did not show up in the poll. Spaniards looked favorably on Catalans by a margin of 68% to 22%.
The Individual and Society

Attitudes Toward Government and Democracy

By most measures, the citizens of the West European democracies feel somewhat alienated from their governments. The feeling is general though Italians are the most alienated and Germans and the French the least. West Europeans also vary widely in their views about the needs for some constraints on liberties within a democracy. Though there is some ambiguity in the responses, Spain is probably the most permissive.

The Italian alienation is marked. Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti received less approval (32%) than any other West European leader. Italians led all other West Europeans in agreeing that elected officials lose touch with the people pretty quickly (87%) and that they, the respondents, were losing interest in politics (73%). On top of this, they disagreed more than any other West Europeans with the propositions that elected officials care what ordinary people think (83%) and that voting gives people some say about how the government runs things (47%).

This alienation is rooted in the Italian parliamentary system that has produced a succession of 50 coalition cabinets since it was founded in the wake of World War II. Although governments have fallen at a rate of more than one a year, the new governments have often amounted to reshuffles of the same old political faces. That has produced a stability in the midst of seeming instability, but it also has made Italians feel that no matter what happens, the
same crowd rules the country. That feeling engenders a mood of impotence.

Sitting in his quiet Milan office decorated with tasteful, black and white prints, Giorgio Alpeggiani, a 52-year-old corporation lawyer, was asked if he felt he had any influence on the government. "No, absolutely not," he replied in English, raising his voice. "I am so angry with the government. I do not know what to do. My stomach is like this." He churned his hands to illustrate his inner turmoil. "I do not know what to do to protest against it." He said he had considered voting for the Legghe party headed by Umberto Bossi, an extremist who is preaching secession of the northern provinces from Italy. "The only vote of protest is the Legghe," Alpeggiani went on. "But I can't vote for somebody like Bossi. He is a stupid and uncultured man. Really, I see myself absolutely impotent, powerless. I can't know what to do."

The same question --- as a citizen, did he feel he had any influence on what the government does --- was asked a few hours later of Riccardo Terzi, a Milan union leader and a member of the Democratic Party of the Left, the former Italian Communist Party. As he listened to the interpretation into Italian, Terzi wrinkled his face into a great grin and then started to laugh, almost unable to reply to what he obviously regarded as a ridiculous question. "Very little," he said after his laughter subsided.

Italian alienation ran across all demographic lines. But, on the key question of whether voting gives people a say in how the government runs (which split Italians almost equally, 49% in
agreement and 47% in disagreement), a significant number of the educated and urban were even more alienated than other Italians. In short, a large number of the most politically influential elements in Italian society did not even have faith in the power of the vote.

Although alienation was strong in Western Europe, there were some marked differences among countries. Voting, of course, is a key element of democratic government, and, even in the United States, where only 53% of the voting age population voted in the last presidential election, respondents agreed by a margin of 73% to 25% that voting gives them some say in how their government runs. The agreement is even more pronounced in France (76% to 21%) and Spain (73% to 20%). But the results were far more ambivalent in Britain (55% to 43%), Germany (53% to 40%), and, of course, Italy (49% to 47%).

Asked if he had any influence on the government, Georges Lefevre, a Normandy farmer, said, "We are simple citizens. We have no power...Of course, we are in a free country. We can make our demands. But to be listened to, that's something else." Ironically, Lefevre spoke for a minority in France but a majority elsewhere. The French, in general, disagreed with the premise that ordinary people don't have any say in what the government does. France was the only country to reject the proposition (38% agreed while 61% disagreed). Spain agreed narrowly (50% to 45%). But Germany (70% to 27%) and Britain (60% to 37%) accepted it by wide margins. Americans agreed with this proposition by 57% to 42%.
Yet the French showed a good deal of alienation when asked if they agreed that they were losing interest in politics. Much like the Italians (73% agree, 24% disagree), the French agreed by a margin of 72% to 26%. The Spanish (55% to 34%) showed less agreement and the British (50% to 48%) showed ambivalence. The Germans, caught in the throes of their reunification, did not accept the proposition at all (23% agreed while 73% disagreed).

West Europeans also trumpeted their alienation when asked if they agreed that elected officials care what ordinary people think. All disagreed, the Italians by 83% to 14%, the French 70% to 27%, the Spaniards 67% to 26%, the Germans 63% to 30% and the British 61% to 35%. Americans, though skeptical of their elected officials, were not as alienated as West Europeans (disagreeing by 53% to 44%).

On issues of civil liberties, Spain demonstrated more democratic attitudes than the other West European countries. More Spaniards (65%) than other West Europeans rejected constraints on newspapers and more Spaniards (57%) accepted the proposition that nude magazines and explicit sex movies were harmless. This is not surprising. It has only been fifteen years since the transition from fascism to democracy in Spain. Most Spaniards remember the era of fettered newspapers and banned movies and do not want to experience anything like it again. In the Franco era, Spaniards had to travel to France to see movies like Bernardo Bertolucci's "Last Tango in Paris" and even Charlie Chaplin's "The Great Dictator." When the latter film did play in Spain after Franco's death, the
In fact, it is interesting to note that Spain's permissiveness was exceeded only by that of several East European countries and Soviet republics, where the experience of censorship is even fresher in everyone's mind. The areas that disapproved of constraints on newspapers even more than Spain were Czechoslovakia (74%), Ukraine (70%), Poland (66%), and Lithuania (66%). Those that agreed even more than Spain that nude magazines and sexually explicit movies were harmless included Poland (73%), Lithuania (72%), Czechoslovakia (71%), and Hungary (61%).

A few other measures of democratic attitudes offered different variations. Asked whether all political parties should be allowed or some outlawed, only the French believed overwhelmingly in allowing all, by a margin of 67% to 28%. The Spanish (48% to 40%) and the British (47% to 43%) agreed but not by much. The Americans (57% to 32%) were somewhere between the French and the Spanish-British levels. But both the Germans (62% to 28%) and the Italians (55% to 39%) approved of the banning of some parties. This fit their political reality, for the two countries, relatively new democracies, have banned the Germany Nazi Party and the Italian Fascist Party that led them to disgrace, humiliation and defeat in World War II.

In another variation, constraints on newspapers, although rejected overwhelmingly by Spain (65% to 25%) and Germany (58% to 30%) and marginally by France (49% to 45%), were accepted by both Britain (54% to 40%) and Italy (52% to 42%). Western Europe also
split on the proposition that books dangerous to society should be banned from public school libraries. Only Britain (47% in favor, 49% against) disagreed. The rest accepted the idea: Germany (72% to 22%), France (62% to 33%), Italy (56% to 39%), and Spain (51% to 39%). Since several European countries have laws that ban anti-semitic and other books that calumny ethnic groups, these results were predictable. Even the United States agreed with the proposition, by a margin of 50% to 45%.

On this question, the educated, the affluent, the young and the residents of the metropolises Paris and Rome tended to disagree in a significantly higher percentage than most other Europeans. Education and affluence, in fact, appeared to correlate, in general, with democratic attitudes on many questions. A good example of this was the proposal that freedom of speech not be granted to fascists. While most Europeans, save for the Germans, disagreed with this, disagreement --- a reflection of democratic attitudes --- was most pronounced among the educated and affluent. On the issue of newspapers, better educated and affluent West Europeans also were more likely to disapprove of constraints than their compatriots.

**Attitudes Toward the State and Social Welfare**

Although alienated by politics, West Europeans held strongly to the view that the state has a responsibility for the social welfare of its citizens. The idea of the welfare state was unshaken in Western Europe; it prevailed in every country. This put Western
Europe into sharp contrast with the United States which still championed rugged individualism. For the most part, East Europeans agreed with other Europeans, suggesting that the welfare state of Western Europe, rather than the unfettered free market of the United States, is likely to serve as the model for an Eastern Europe in feverish transition.

As asked to choose whether it was more important that everyone be free to pursue their life's goals without interference from the state or whether it was more important that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need, 52% of Americans chose the first concept. Every West European country except West Germany opted differently, choosing the state's guarantee against need by a majority of 64% in Italy, 59% in Britain, 57% in Spain, and 51% in France. The West Germans, however, chose the first concept by the same percentage as the Americans. In the East, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Lithuania agreed with most West Europeans while Czechoslovakia agreed with the United States.

All countries, including the United States, agreed that the state had a responsibility to take care of the very poor who could not take care of themselves. But the American support for this idea was tepid. Although the Americans agreed by a margin of 67%, it was the only country where less than half --- 23% --- were in complete agreement. Complete agreement came from 71% in Spain, 66% in Italy, 62% by France and Britain, and 50% in Germany. Eastern Europe had similar percentages in complete agreement. American disagreement
with this idea was just as notable: 29% of Americans disagreed with the proposition. In all of Europe, only France had as much with 10% disagreement.

A similar picture emerged on the issue of whether the state should guarantee every citizen food and basic shelter. All countries, including the United States, agreed. But only 27% of Americans agreed completely with the proposition, the smallest percentage of all those polled. The United States also had the highest percentage of those in disagreement --- 34%. On another question, all countries including the United States agreed by overwhelming margins that society should do what is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed. The United States was thus more inclined to provide equal opportunity (91% agree) than equal care (62% agree).

The hold of the welfare state could cause difficulties in Europe '92. Some Europeans fear that the countries where business is taxed least for welfare will have a competitive advantage, attracting more investment than the others. The Common Market bureaucracy is trying to persuade member countries to harmonize their welfare systems. But some workers worry that there will be more pressure to take away benefits in the stronger welfare states than to add benefits to the weaker welfare states. In Paris, Gilbert Louveau, a 52-year-old trade union official in a plant manufacturing railroad equipment, warned, "The rights we have struggled for years to acquire will be lost in the New Europe...The things that we have achieved in the areas of social benefits and
protection are in jeopardy."

Some French feel some cutting may be necessary after Europe '92. Pierre Garenne, a 33-year-old pastry chef and pastry shop owner in the town of Doullens in the region of Picardy, said, "France has social benefits that are very, very well established, even too well established ... French enterprises are going to have a lot of problems trying to maintain these benefits in the face of competition from other countries." Yet Garenne did not want French benefits reduced to those of the United States. "What frightens me," he said, "is that we might fall into the American system afterwards. Of that, I'm afraid." Under the American social system, he explained, the United States did not take care of its people. "That American social system appalls me a little," he went on, speaking politely in an understated way. "I think we ought to do somewhat less in France, but the United States should do somewhat more."

A key difference in self-image probably explains why Europe differs so much from the United States in its attitude toward social welfare. Americans still believe, like the 19th century British poet William Ernest Henley, "I am the master of my fate; I am the captain of my soul." But the Europeans do not. Asked if success in life is pretty much determined by forces beyond our control, 57% of Americans disagreed. But majorities in all European countries agreed. In much of the West, the fatalist margins were substantial: Italy (64%), Germany (59%), France (57%), Spain (56%) and Britain (51%) all agreed that success was beyond their control.
In much of the uncertain East, fatalism was even more marked: Bulgaria (73%), Hungary (67%), Poland (66%), Ukraine (65%), Lithuania (64%), Russia (59%) and Czechoslovakia (55%) all agreed.

Yet, although Europe obviously liked the benefits of the welfare state, there was little admiration for the state itself. Most Europeans, like Americans, agreed that things run by the state were usually inefficient and wasteful. In West Europe, 74% of the Italians, 58% of the French and 57% of the British stood alongside 67% of the Americans in their negative characterization of state-run enterprises. The Germans disagreed by 47% to 41%, and the Spaniards were divided, 44% agreeing that state-run enterprises were inefficient and wasteful, 42% disagreeing. In East Europe, with its wide experience of state-run enterprises, all agreed except Bulgaria, which was divided like Spain, and Czechoslovakia, which joined Germany in disagreement. The young in Spain, Britain and Italy and the better educated in Spain and France tended to hold state-run enterprises in higher esteem than their compatriots did.

There seemed to be some resentment in Western Europe about the state meddling in private affairs, but views differed. Like most Americans, 69% of the French, 62% of the Spaniards and 54% of the Italians agreed that the state controlled too much of their daily lives. But 52% of the British and 54% of the Germans disagreed. There were similar differences in Eastern Europe. Even wider variations were produced when Europeans were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the proposition that the state is run for
the benefit of all the people. But this may have been caused by confusion over whether the statement was describing an ideal or the actuality.

**Attitudes toward Patriotism and Militarism**

Ultra nationalism and militarism are out of fashion in Western Europe. On all measures, West Europeans tended to be less patriotic and more pacifist than Americans. Even a country like France, where the glory of the nation is celebrated and promoted continually, patriotism tended by American standards to seem tepid.

Britain seemed most like the United States in both patriotism and attitudes toward militarism. France, while not among the most patriotic countries, was among the most militarist. Spain was just the opposite: patriotic but pacifist. Italy tended in the same directions as Spain while Germany seemed pacifist but ambiguous about patriotism.

The relative lack of French patriotism was noted by one of the Amiens taxi drivers who, trying to explain why Germany will do better than France in the integrated common market, said, "Germans are more patriotic than we are. They are very disciplined, very disciplined...We are too cool in France, too relaxed."

While 88% of Americans described themselves as very patriotic, 72% of the British, 72% of the Germans, 70% of the Spaniards, 69% of the Italians and only 64% of the French described themselves that way. While 55% of Americans said they would fight for their country, right or wrong, only the British (56%) agreed. Most of the
other West Europeans disagreed --- Germans (64%), the French (58%) and the Italians (58%) --- while the Spaniards divided almost evenly on the issue. [In Eastern Europe, the Poles and Bulgarians said they would fight for their country, right or wrong; the others said they would not.]

Irredentism was not very strong in Western Europe. Only Spain, like most of Eastern Europe, agreed with the proposition that it had a rightful claim to parts of neighboring countries (48%). The Spaniards, of course, believe that the British-ruled colony of Gibraltar is really part of Spain. Even a majority of 51% of the Germans, who lost slices of territory after World War II, disagreed with the proposition.

On the issue of militarism, all of Europe except Spain substantially agreed with the proposition that it was sometimes necessary to use force to maintain order in the world. In Western Europe, the extent of agreement ranged from 84% in Britain and 77% in France to 52% in Germany. Spain divided on the issue almost half and half. To a large extent, these results echoed the findings of U.S. Information Agency polls on support for the American-led military onslaught against Iraq during the Gulf war. American military and economic aid to Francisco Franco during his decades of dictatorship is still a festering grievance of Spaniards, and this colored their view of the Gulf crisis.

In Britain and France, however, there seemed to be a good deal of pride in their participation in the war. The British "did what they had to do, it was as simple as that," said John Reid, a 45-
year-old unemployed painter in Glasgow. Asked about France's role in the war, Georges Lefevre, the conservative Normandy farmer, said, "I think that it was necessary to go there. For one time, I agreed with Mitterrand."

In perhaps a surer measure of militarism, all of Europe except the Poles disagreed with the 52% majority of Americans who believed that the "best" way to secure peace was through military strength. In Western Europe, Italy disagreed by a majority of 73%, Spain 68%, Germany 60%, Britain 54% and France 53%. Since both Britain and French have nuclear arsenals, it was not surprising that they were the least pacifist West European states. But it surely was surprising that they disagreed, even by small majorities, with the idea that military strength secures peace.

There was one sharp disagreement between Western and Eastern Europe on military issues. West Europeans, even the French with their extensive arms trafficking, rejected the continued sale of weapons to Third World countries. The rejections were emphatic: 88% of Italians, 83% of Spaniards, 80% of Britons, 78% of French, 78% of Germans. In economically-strapped Eastern Europe, however, the Poles accepted continued sales and the others rejected the idea mainly by limp pluralities.

The trend for the future seems clear. On almost every measure of militarism and patriotism across Western Europe, the young, the best educated, the affluent, and the residents of the great cities like Paris, Rome and Madrid were consistently more pacifist and less patriotic than their compatriots. On the other hand, the
elderly were just as consistently more militarist and patriotic.

Attitudes toward Women and the Family

How do women fare in Western Europe? Men and women come up with far different assessments. Asked whether men or women have a better life, West European men tended to reply that it was all the same. Women, on the other hand, were far more persuaded that it was a man's world. Ironically, the men in the societies long regarded as the most macho --- Spain and Italy --- professed to see the least advantages for men.

A myriad of variations emerged --- though the two macho societies showed similarities. In Italy, a strong plurality of the men (47%) said life was the same for men and women while only 25% thought life better for men and an astounding 25% thought life better for women. Women divided almost evenly over whether life was the same for both (44%) or better for men (41%).

In Spain, the differences in viewpoint of men and women followed the Italian pattern somewhat. A majority of the men (51%) said life was the same for men and women while only 25% thought life better for men and 18% thought life better for women. Women divided almost evenly over whether life was better for men (45%) or the same (44%).

In France, a plurality of 48% of the men said life was the same for men and women while 35% believed life better for men. A majority of 52% of the women, however, insisted that life was better for men while 40% said it was the same.
In Britain, there was general agreement on a preferred status for men. A plurality of 46% of the men believed that men had a better life while only 32% said that life was the same. A strong majority of 60% of the women said that men had a better life while only 26% said life was the same.

The views of the population as a whole --- combining the opinions of the men and women --- created a crazy quilt pattern across Europe. A majority of the people of Britain (54%), East Germany (59%), Czechoslovakia (53%), Russia (64%), Ukraine (73%) and Lithuania (69%) said that men had a better life than women. A plurality in Poland (48%) and Bulgaria (42%) agreed. The French and Hungarians, however, were split over whether men had a better life (France - 44%; Hungary - 41%) or both had the same kind of life (France - 44; Hungary - 43%). And a plurality in Spain (47%), Italy (45%) and West Germany (45%) believed that life was the same for both.

The conflicting perspectives of men and women were underscored in some of the conversations in Spain. Joaquin Estefania, the editor of *El Pais*, said, "Spanish men have the complex of being macho, of being chauvinists, and this actually leads them to be more tolerant with women. So women in Spain actually have it better than in Northern European countries. I am almost certain that women hold better positions here."

But Maite de Guindos, the Madrid lawyer, insisted that some men refuse to deal with her even though she is in charge of her law office. Instead, they prefer to talk with her brother or an
economist who works in the office. "I am the one who is supposed to make all the decisions here," she said. "But they want to talk to the other guy. So then the other guy has to tell me everything so that I can make the decision before he gets back to them. But they are satisfied because they are talking to a man. It is ridiculous, it is absurd, completely ridiculous."

Adriana Alcalde, who described herself as the first woman to work in the advertising field in Spain, said, "If you look at high and medium rank positions, women are still discriminated against, even though there has been great improvement during the past years." But she said that women, once hired, have an advantage over men in an office. "They are less conflictive and work much harder," she said.

But José Paniagua, who owns a car agency and repair garage in the suburbs of Madrid, said, "I don't like women at work, at least in my business. Because they are always asking for time off. And in reality, it is always the woman who carries the housework burden. If the child get sick, she is the one who ends up staying home to take care of the kid because the husband isn't going to do it."

An East-West split developed when Europeans were asked whether they preferred a family situation where the husband worked while the wife stayed home to take care of the house and children or a family situation where both had jobs and shared responsibility for the home and children. All of Eastern Europe except Bulgaria opted for the wife at home scenario while all of Western Europe opted for the both at work scenario. A wife staying home evidently struck
many East Europeans as a welcome novelty after so many decades under the Communist system with assigned jobs to all.

In Western Europe, older and less educated people tended to prefer the wife at home while younger, better educated, affluent and big city residents tended to prefer both at work. A gender gap was evident. Women preferred both at work in significantly larger numbers than men in Italy (685 to 55%), Spain (73% to 61%) and, to a lesser degree, France (67% to 60%). In Britain, the preference of men and women was largely the same (men - 65%; women - 63%).

The changing attitudes manifested themselves in a discussion with 33-year-old Pierre Garenne and his wife in the apartment behind their pastry shop in Doullens in France. He explained that he had not asked his parents for funds to help buy the shop because he wanted independence from them. "This shop, it is mine," he said. "I have earned it." His wife interrupted, "It is ours." He nodded and agreed, "It is ours." "Anyway that's the truth," she said. "Yes," he agreed, "that's the truth." "We have built this together," she said. He nodded his approval.

Both West and East Europeans maintained by overwhelming majorities that they have traditional values about family and marriage. The largest percentages of disagreement come in West Germany (22%), Spain (20%) and France (19%). As might be expected, older Europeans tended to agree more than their compatriots while younger Europeans tended to disagree in greater numbers than the others. There was little difference between men and women about traditional values though women in Italy (women - 94%; men 90%) and
Spain (women - 81%; men - 75%) tended to be somewhat more traditional than men while men in France (80%) tended to be somewhat more traditional than women (76%).

Despite this family orientation, few Europeans cited family matters when asked to describe their personal wishes and hopes for the future. Only a substantial number of the French included the well-being and happiness of their family (23%) and the financial stability of their family (18%) their wishes and hopes. In Western Europe, it tended to be the young and the educated who were most concerned about family well-being.

Both West and East Europeans supported the right of abortion by substantial majorities. Only the Catholic countries of Spain (52%) and Italy (53%) had smaller percentages supporting abortion than the United States (62%). In fact, every other country except Poland (67%) and Germany (65%) agreed that women should be allowed an abortion in the first three months of pregnancy by majorities in percentages in the 70s and 80s.

In Spain and Italy, it tended to be the young and educated and the residents of Madrid, Barcelona and Rome that supported choice most strongly. Older people disapproved in larger numbers than their compatriots. Men and women looked at the issue no differently in Spain (52%) France (74%), but men tended to be more pro-choice than women in both Italy (men - 56%; women - 49%) and Britain (men - 78%; women - 72%).

Religion and Egoism
By almost every measure, West Europeans revealed themselves as less religious, less moralistic, and less traditional in their values than Americans. But West Europeans differed sharply among themselves: Italy and Spain proved the most old-fashioned in their acceptance of religious and ethical beliefs, France the most alienated from these traditional beliefs.

There was an obvious generational conflict within Western Europe. On almost every question touching religion or ethical values, older West Europeans tended to accept the values while the young tended to reject them. The educated, the affluent and those who lived in the great international cities generally joined the young in turning away from old-fashioned values.

Religious beliefs made the distinctions among countries clear cut. Italians, Spaniards and, to a lesser extent, West Germans said that prayer was an important part of their daily lives, that God played an important role in their lives, and that they never doubted the existence of God. The British rejected prayer, never doubted God and split evenly on the role of God in their lives. The French rejected all three propositions.

In Eastern Europe, only the Poles accepted all three religious propositions. The Lithuanians and Ukrainians said that God existed and played an important role in their lives but prayers did not. The Bulgarians and Hungarians accepted the existence of God but denied that either God or prayer played a role in their lives. The East Germans, Russians and the Czechs rejected all three propositions.
These beliefs correlated with church attendance. As many as 70% of the Poles, 39% of the Italians and 32% of the Spanish said they attended church at least once a week. In France, although 64% of the population identified itself as Catholic, only 10% said they attended church at least once a week.

To a large extent, these religious beliefs carried over to ethical questions. The Times-Mirror survey asked Americans and Europeans whether they agreed with the proposition that hard work offers little guarantee of success. The proposition turned the Protestant work ethic upside down and, as might be expected, was rejected by 63% of Americans. It was rejected as well in Western Europe by slim margins of 51% in Italy and 50% in Spain and in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. by an impressive 67% in Lithuania.

But every other country in Western and Eastern Europe accepted this denial of the Protestant Ethic. Even the Germans, known throughout Europe as the prime example of a people who have gained success through hard work, accepted the proposition by 56% to 38%. (But this may have been a disingenuous reply. It was not the first time that the Germans had tried to knock down cliches about themselves: Although most Europeans expect Germany to dominate the Common Market, the Germans insisted that they believed all countries would share power equally.)

When the idea contained in the proposition was turned around and altered somewhat, both Americans and Europeans agreed, by overwhelming margins, that they admired people who became rich by working hard, a strong affirmation this time of the Protestant
Ethic. Yet, when the statistics for agreement were separated into those who completely agree and those who mostly agree, it turned out that only 34% of the Germans completely agreed, the lowest level in all Europe. Again, the Germans may have had difficulty embracing a cliche about themselves whole.

Some moral issues divided the line between West and East very clearly and somewhat between American and Europe as well. Asked if AIDS might be God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior, Americans disagreed, but only by a tepid 52%. West Europeans, far less moralistic, rejected this proposition soundly, France by 82%, Britain and Italy by 74%, Germany by 71% and Spain by 70%.

In Eastern Europe, however, Russia (45%), the Ukraine (46%) and Lithuania (52%) accepted the thesis that AIDS might be God's punishment. Czechoslovakia (63%), Hungary (65%), Poland (59%) and Bulgaria (42%) rejected the notion, though not as emphatically as Western Europe.

The issue of homosexuality divided East from West as well. Americans and West Europeans strongly rejected any ban on homosexuals teaching school. In the East, however, all except East Germany accepted the ban. Yet, despite the emphatic rejection in the West, strong demographic differences emerged there as well. Older and less educated West Europeans tended to support the ban more than their compatriots while younger, better educated, and more affluent West Europeans, as well as those living in the great cities, tended to oppose the ban more than their compatriots.

One nettlesome issue arose. Many Europeans did not trust their
own people: 64% of the French, 63% of the Italians and 50% of the Spaniards (as well as 68% of the Hungarians) did not believe that most people in their societies were trustworthy.

This coincided with a theme that cropped up again and again in conversations with West Europeans. Many people fretted about an "egoism" that had crept into their societies, a modern tendency of people to care only about themselves and turn their backs on their neighbors. "People only want to look at their own navels," said Alfons Quinta, a well-known journalist in Barcelona. "Life has changed: the sense of the common good is lost," said Girogio Alpeggiani, the Milan lawyer. "Now, we act for our personal self. We have fallen down." "All people care about is me myself, nothing else," said Maite de Guindos, the Madrid lawyer. If you feel that the people around you care only about themselves and not about the good of all, you cannot count on them or trust them.

**A Final Word**

Western Europe is entering a significant moment in history in calm and relative quiet. It's mood is as far from the thunderous turmoil of the former Soviet Union and the desperate thrashing for new ways in Eastern Europe as can be. Only Germany, by absorbing East Germany, has felt tremors from all the fever in the East. Waves of euphoria and disappointment have coursed through the newly unified Germany. Yet even the Germans, especially the West Germans, are not caught in an emotional binge. By and large, West Europeans
are going about their business in a businesslike way.

The mood augurs well for Europe '92 or, as it probably should be called, Europe '93 --- the new era when the countries of the common market will deal and trade with each other without restrictions much as the states of the United States do. Europeans are very enthusiastic about this. In fact, in some cases like Spain and Italy more enthusiastic than realistic. But, by and large, West Europeans, while somewhat uncertain, while fretting over economic problems, are entering their new Europe with some confidence.

Yet some knotty problems loom. One is immigration, both from North Africa and Eastern Europe. The presence of several million Mahgrebians has become a sensitive political issue in France and is likely to trouble other countries as well in the near future. Unless East Europeans manage to whip up their economies swiftly, Western Europe may also find waves of East Europeans crossing the borders. Italy already has embarrassed itself with its panicky machinations to keep out Albanians.

The issue of immigration is coming to the fore even while Western Europe feels unsure about asserting itself as a political community. Western Europe needs to work out a joint policy on immigration, a program for aid to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a coherent and realistic policy on the admission of East European countries into the Common Market, and a host of other problems. Yet, while the idea of Europe has taken hold among West Europeans and while there is a healthy tendency among the young to turn from chauvinistic patriotism, the Times Mirror survey also
showed that West Europeans have become bored and alienated by politics and politicians. This may be a difficult time for West Europeans to think clearly about the kind of political shape they envision for their economic community.
A Times Mirror survey of The New Germany shows that nearly a year after unification, Germans feel confident about the strength of their democracy, but are torn by deep internal divisions that are straining the country's social cohesion and are likely to slow economic recovery in the former communist east.

In many ways, the poll results document what German political leaders are only now coming to realize: that 40 years of political division and radically differing experiences have left east and west Germans as 2 very different people - different in outlook, expectations, values, and psychology.

Less dramatic, but significant generational splits are also evident in the way Germans view unification. The survey finds that younger citizens on both sides of the old political divide have less in common, less mutual interest and are less supportive of unity than those over 60 who remember a united Germany.

The Times Mirror survey results sketch a west German people upset with the cost of unity, impatient and estranged from their eastern cousins. Conversely, it shows an east German people eager to accept political pluralism and the free market economy that unification has brought, yet resentful of being accepted as second class citizens within a country their revolution helped unite. A weight of anecdotal evidence also shows east Germans are often disoriented by the extent and pace of change inherent in the
present transformation.

"We were used to working for one company until retirement...now we never know what's going to happen the next day," summed up an east Berliner interviewed in connection with our survey.

The results of the Times Mirror Poll identify a complex of political and social problem areas greater than most had expected during Europe's euphoric autumn of 1989. Collectively, they provide a major challenge to the nation's political leadership.

Some polling results suggest that these differences separating east and west Germany may apply to at least some extent, to Europe as a whole. If so, it would raise the prospect of a continent divided by subtle, yet important sociological differences along the same political fault line once defined by barbed wire and watch towers.

In Germany, data gathered from 1,480 individual interviews conducted earlier this spring in east and west, the comments from 4 separate group meetings, called focus groups, held in east Berlin and Dresden earlier in the year, plus additional interviews and anecdotal evidence also provided other important results.

Among them:

- Eighteen months of mixing together after the collapse of the Berlin Wall has created a widespread awareness of the differences between the 2 German people. So far, this contact appears to have acted to drive them further apart, rather than bring them together.

- While east German factories continue to close with a depressing regularity and unemployment in the east climbs, the
Times Mirror survey shows eastern Germans expressed remarkably little concern about their current financial plight and continue to demonstrate an almost surreal optimism about their longer term economic future.

Our results indicate that, as individuals, east Germans are easily the most rosy-eyed people of the former Soviet Bloc. They are also far more optimistic about their country's future than their western German cousins, who are convinced that the best of times are already behind them.

This economic optimism coexists with a larger discontent among east Germans about the broader results of unification. It is a discontent that seems to have far less to do with the region's economic upheaval than with a powerful sense of social and psychological loss — a loss of dignity, status, lifestyle and country.

Our survey shows this loss hurts.

Seven out of ten of those eastern Germans interviewed said they viewed unification as little more than a west German takeover. A whopping 85 percent of those questioned in the east expressed some degree of resentment about this. Women in the east especially feel they have lost in the transition, with an overwhelming majority of those questioned believing they enjoy fewer legal and social rights today than before unification (71%).

These factors are quite probably linked to another of the survey's important findings: the emergence of a powerful sense of separate identity among east Germans that 40 years of communist
propaganda failed to achieve. Six months after unification, a clear majority of those questioned (58%) said they "most often" thought of themselves as east German rather than German. Among younger east Germans the figure was still higher - 65%.

Corresponding figures in western Germany were far lower.

This strong feeling of a separate eastern identity has emerged at a time when there is virtually no credible, influential east German voice on the national landscape - either in Government, in parliament or in the media - that can speak for the region as a whole.

- In sharp contrast to the tumultuous changes in the east, a majority of western Germans questioned in our survey - 70% - said they felt their lives had been unaffected by unification.

- While there is no pronounced longing among east Germans for a return to the centralized state power wielded during the communist era, our survey found that 40 years of marxism has left them with both a greater affinity for socialist values than their western cousins and a greater willingness to accept state intervention in certain areas. Collectively, these values would seem to make eastern Germany fertile ground for Germany's main opposition Social Democrats in future elections if Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Christian Democratic Union fail to recover the popularity they enjoyed there during the first euphoric weeks of unification. Any such fundamental shift would be enough to provide the Social Democrats a mandate to rule.

- The Times Mirror poll ran in line with other, more recent
opinion surveys conducted in Germany showing that Kohl's personal popularity and that of the Christian Democrats have plummeted in both parts of Germany since a landslide election victory last December propelled him into a third 4-year term as chancellor. The survey also showed Kohl's problems were especially acute with young voters. Among east Germans under age 25, for example, only 11% said they would vote for Kohl's Christian Democrats.

- There is also evidence of a strong pacifist overlay in east German society that could add to Germany's reluctance to assume any military role outside the immediate central European region - a reluctance so vividly demonstrated during last winter's Gulf War. East Germans gave less support than any other European population group in our survey to such ideas as the need to use force and the selling of arms to the Third World. They also gave the military a conspicuously low popularity rating.

- The survey showed a mounting concern about the influx of ethnic minorities into Germany, with 43 percent of those questioned listing as their primary fear, "a flood of refugees coming into our country." The figure was nearly 3 times that of the next 2 largest concerns - a general economic decline and the economic collapse of the Soviet Union (both 14%).

Generally speaking, our survey showed east Germans as slightly less tolerant than west Germans toward minorities, although anti-semitism was less pronounced in the east - possibly because only a few hundred east Germans profess Judaism (compared to about 30,000 in west Germany). East German communist state doctrine also
made no direct link between east Germans and the Holocaust.

- Despite the strains of unity, the poll painted a united German state that seemed secure both within itself, with those questioned in both east and west rejecting the prospect of internal instability as a potential danger and feeling only marginal external threats. More than other Europeans, Germans were hard-pressed to name a country that posed "the greatest threat in the future." Perhaps even more encouraging for German democracy, east Germans questioned expressed stronger support, both for the shift to a multi-party political system (91%) and the free market economy (86%), than other east Europeans.

At the same time, however, conspicuously strong support for banning "dangerous books" (72% agree) and limiting free speech to fascists (63% agree) point to a feeling among Germans that they see a certain fragility in their democracy that doesn't exist among Germany's closest western allies, such as France, Britain and Italy.

- In foreign relations, the survey shows that, despite long years in bitterly opposed alliances, east and west Germans share remarkably similar views regarding which countries are their most dependable allies and which global personalities and institutions they respect most.

There is also evidence in our survey that Germany has shaken much of the lingering suspicion and hatred in Eastern Europe resulting from Nazi era atrocities and the horrors of World War II. Those polled in Russia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Bulgaria cited Germany more often than any other European country in response to the question, "what country can you most rely on as dependable allies in the future?" Only in Poland, where Germany received a very low rating, were these memories of the past clearly apparent.

**UNITY - DIVISIVE VIEWS.**

Those who last summer negotiated the conditions of German unity anchored their ideas on two basic premises - that east Germans were essentially west Germans who had been denied the opportunity to succeed, and that the most remarkable feature of the East German Communist state was that it had disappeared virtually without trace.

The Times Mirror poll provides evidence that, across a remarkably broad spectrum, both these premises are seriously flawed.

Indeed, of all the survey's findings, none were more strikingly clear or heavier with long-term significance for the future of Germany and Europe than those which provided a glimpse of the psychological, political, and social distance that today separates east German from west German.

Nowhere are these differences are more vivid than on their views of unity itself.

While both east and west Germans expressed undisputed approval for the country's unification (east Germans had a 90% approval rating, the west Germans 79%), our survey shows they did so for
The most frequently cited west German reply (25%) to the question of what they liked most about the changes since unity was that "the Germans were all together now ..." This reason was mentioned by only 3.8 percent of east Germans. At the same time, the prospect of the east's rising standard of living, mentioned by 47% of east Germans, was listed by 2.2% of western Germans.

The Germans are equally divided on their dislikes about what unity has brought.

For westerners, it was the billions of dollars - much of it in higher taxes - required to rebuild the shattered eastern economy that was least liked. A total of 47 percent of west Germans questioned gave this response compared to only 8% of easterners. For those in the east, unemployment was the toughest pill to swallow.

Our survey suggests the much-heralded German national family reunion has been largely over-rated. While just over 42% of all east Germans questioned listed "freedom for travelling now" as unity's most important benefit, only 3% also counted "family visits in the other part of Germany" on the same list. For west Germans, the figure was somewhat higher, yet still a modest 11%. (A German tourist industry survey found that during the first full year of free inner-German travel, less than 3% of west Germans spent more than a couple of days in the east.)

There has been such a dearth of contact across the old inner-German frontier that the president of the federal parliament,
Rita Suessmuth, recently found herself compelled to urge west Germans to take a greater interest in the east. She urged they spend vacation time discovering eastern cities such as Leipzig and Schwerin rather than London or Paris.

Evidence in our survey pointed to an even deeper estrangement among younger Germans. Of the east Germans under 39 years of age questioned in the poll, only 1% listed "family visits in the other part of Germany" among the things best liked about unity. About 8% of west Germans in the same age group responded positively to the family visits question.

These figures reflect part of a generation gap that has cut through west German society on questions of nationhood, identity, patriotism and relations with the east, since the first post-World War II babies came of age in the 1960s. The fall of communism has revealed a similar split among east Germans. It is hardly surprising that the strains of unity have only highlighted these differences.

Confided a young press spokesmen at the Munich headquarters of the large German auto manufacturer, BMW, "The other week an Australian journalist came into my office and I felt closer to him than to an East German."

In virtually every question posed to test backing for unification, younger Germans on both sides of the old divide were shown to be less supportive of the idea.

West Germans under 25, for example, registered significantly higher dislike about the cost of unity (57% compared to the 47%
among all west Germans) and, when asked directly whether unity was worth the economic costs, 51% of west Germans in this age group answered, "no." The poll showed that more than twice as many easterners under 25 (25%) as those over 60 (11%) also felt unification wasn't worth the economic cost.

East Germans under 25 also expressed a stronger dislike about the wave of unemployment that unification has brought to the east. For older Germans, blocked for so long from visiting friends and close relatives "on the other side," the turmoil that has accompanied unity has been mitigated by the blessing of renewing old personal bonds. This, to a significant extent, explains the consistently higher approval ratings for unification in both east and west Germany among those over 60 years of age. (Our survey found overall approval for unity was highest (86%) among 50-69 year olds and lowest (73%) among those under 25.

For many Germans under 50, these personal bonds were frequently more duty than pleasure, pen-pal relationships enforced on youngsters by well-meaning parents, desperate not to let the family ties go forever.

The results of our survey would appear to support a wide sampling of anecdotal evidence that many of these "artificial" relationships, carefully nursed through a second, sometimes third, generation, have not survived unity well.

One young east German woman for years nurtured a gratitude for western relatives who had regularly sent her food and old, but usable clothing, only to find herself the object of a stern lecture
about sloppy eastern work habits on their first meeting. She was also devastated to learn that all the packages she had so carefully thanked them for each year, had brought the western family lucrative tax deductions along with the joy of giving.

The woman said no return visit was planned.

Our survey carries indications that the months of mixing together since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the greater-than-expected difficulties connected with unity have left both east and west Germans unsettled by the realities of unification.

Among west Germans, backing for unity, seemingly strong when asked straight-forwardly, seems far less certain when connected with other issues.

By a margin of 47 to 45%, for example, western Germans interviewed said they believed unity was not worth the economic costs. This opinion came before the 7.5% income tax increase pushed through to help finance unity took effect July 1st, before a 50 cent/gallon gasoline tax hit and before announcements of the first unity-linked job losses in the west.

On a list of 11 items including such subjects as family values, law and order and public morality, west Germans believed unification has had an overall bad effect in 5 of the categories (law and order, caring about others in society, standard of living, public morality, and relations between Germans and other ethnic groups in Germany).

On the same list, a majority of east Germans believed unity had
exerted an overall positive effect in only 3 categories: the standard of living, civic pride and on how hard people work. Conversely, at least 2 of every 3 east Germans said unity has had a bad influence on public morality, on how well people get along with one another, on law and order and on caring about other people in society. Responses were split evenly on the issues of spiritual and family values. A clear plurality (48%) believed unity had a negative influence on "how you think about things."

These responses in part help define the general sense of loss and diminished quality of life felt by east Germans in the wake of unity despite greater personal freedom and access to a better selection of consumer goods. Many east Germans, for example, agonize that life has become so hectic and confused that they no longer have time to keep up friendships.

On balance, however, nearly twice as many east Germans questioned said they felt themselves better rather than worse off because of unification (48% vs. 23%). One in 4 considered themselves unaffected.

The feelings of disillusionment among many eastern Germans that unity had effectively brought gains in personal freedom and opportunity, but at a cost of a reduced quality of life, came through strongly in personal interviews and focus groups.

One participant in an east Berlin focus group said he felt he was in a dream the first time he crossed freely into the western part of the city.

I said, "'I'm frightened to wake up'... meanwhile, I did wake up
and I have to say, disillusioned."

During a second east Berlin focus group meeting, one participant spoke of "drastic negative changes in social relations" and an "unbearable social climate" where the make of car one drove suddenly mattered.

But underscoring the counter currents within east German society as a whole, this assessment was challenged by another participant who argued it would be much better to focus on opportunities that have come with the changes. This person claimed that some people believed things were better in the past only because they were unable to deal with the new situation.

While east Germans count the rise in living standards as unity's biggest plus, our survey found that a majority of west Germans see unification as an economic watershed that signals the end of the times of dramatic growth and steadily increasing affluence - at least for a while.

While nearly 7 of every ten west Germans questioned said their lives had so far been largely unaffected by unification, more than 7 out of ten (74%) believed unity would leave their lives either worse or no better off in 5 years. Only one in four (27%) west Germans believed unification would have a positive effect on their standard of living.

By contrast, nearly 8 out of 10 east Germans surveyed believed unity would leave them better off in 5 years - one of a series of results that gave the east Germans the highest expectations of any nation surveyed.
For German policymakers, this optimism is a 2-edged sword: it is a steadying influence providing hope in a region filled with uncertainty, but if these expectations remain unfulfilled, the intensity of disappointment could be considerably higher in east Germany than elsewhere in the region.

One explanation of this optimism is that liberal government retraining schemes and jobless benefits have so far been an effective safety net in a period a majority of east Germans still view as a relatively short transitional phase to a flourishing market economy.

Despite the economic problems, for example, a greater number of east Germans interviewed (64%) described themselves as standing either high or about average on the so-called "ladder of life" than did so 5 years ago (60%). An even greater number (74%) said they expected to stand either high or at average levels on the same "ladder of life" within 5 years.

Just under half (46%) of all east Germans questioned described themselves as "satisfied financially." This figure is significantly below the 69% satisfaction rate found among west Germans, but it must be considered remarkably high in the context of the east's present economic crisis.

Perhaps of equal importance, our survey indicates that east Germans are willing to be patient - reconciled to a long wait in order to achieve a living standard equal to that of their western cousins. Some 49% of those questioned estimated an equality of living standards would require "around 10 years" to achieve.
Still, for a majority of east Germans, the free market can't come quickly enough.

While a majority (54%) of east Germans polled believe unification occurred too quickly, a similar majority (56%) believe the region is moving either too slowly or about right in the direction of a free market economy.

**GERMANY - ONE NATION, 2 WORLDS**

The Times Mirror Poll shows east and west Germans view each other as clean, honest and efficient. They give each other higher approval ratings than either east European ethnic Germans or any foreign groups. They also share some similar experiences. Both, for example, are satisfied with their work, admire those who get rich by working hard and believe good political leaders should make compromises to get the job done. They share a skepticism about elected officials and their ability to keep in touch with those who elected them, and look on many of the same countries as their most reliable allies.

On the other hand, however, our survey shows that 40 years of communism have left east and west Germans with deep differences - differences in values, desires and views on such fundamental issues as the role in society of the individual and key institutions such as the police and the army. These and a myriad of other distinctions help explain the names "Ossie" and "Wessie" that have come into the language since the fall of the Berlin Wall to describe east and west Germans respectively.
In many instances, our survey provides statistical evidence for what those who live along the old political divide have discovered in their daily lives.

For example: one in 4 east Germans questioned felt 4 decades of modern capitalism had left their western cousins less German in values and outlook than they themselves were. Conversely, roughly an equal number of west Germans (24%) believed 40 years of communism had eroded the "Germanness" of those in the east.

While our survey found that east Germans most preferred their children to take up a skilled, blue collar trade, west Germans wanted their offsprings to become engineers, scientists or doctors. East Germans said they worried most about unemployment and a lack of financial security, whereas west Germans cited poor health, a general fear of war and pollution as their biggest worries about the future. East Germans described those in the west as clean, sophisticated, shrewd, independent, honest, but also as aggressive and selfish. West Germans judged easterners as clean, disciplined, intelligent, sophisticated, but naive and selfish.

There was evidence of Germany's old historic divisions in these prejudices, with responses from Bavaria and the southwest generally giving poorer opinions of east Germans - many of whom come stem from the old Prussian heartland.

On a list of democratic institutions, easterners rated environmentalists, trade unions, churches, television and newspapers as having the most positive influence on the nation's affairs, while west Germans rated the police and the army second
only to environmentalists - institutions largely mistrusted in the east.

Our survey also shows east and west Germans differ strongly on other fundamental issues such as the importance of prayer, of God, the treatment of homosexuals, the limits of free speech, the relation of the individual to the state, the degree of state involvement in public life, attitudes toward war, trade unionism, immigrants and ethnic minorities, AIDS, abortion and the role of women.

"One nation, two different worlds," commented Wolfgang Roth, deputy parliamentary floor leader of the main opposition Social Democratic Party in a recent discussion about the east and west Germans.

Noting the Aug. 13th, 30th anniversary of the construction of the Berlin Wall, an east German coalition of citizens groups declared, "the wall in our heads is higher today than ever."

Differing views of unity-related events have acted only to widen rather than close the gap between east and west Germany, our survey finds.

Data from the Times Mirror survey sketches a west German population that has an overall equivocal impression of east Germans and believes it stands little to gain and possibly something to lose from the unification process.

Bad feeling among east Germans for the actions of west Germans is both stronger and easier to quantify.

Our survey shows a majority (71%) of east Germans believe they
have been taken over by their western cousins, not unified with them. It also indicates easterners believe western politicians care little about what goes on in the east (51%) and that easterners have little influence over the events swirling around them.

So strong are these emotions that a very large minority (43%) of east Germans expressed dissatisfaction with unity as it has transpired - saying instead they would have preferred living in a reformed east German state with at least some independence from the west.

Among east Germans under 25, a clear majority - 56% - of those questioned said they felt that way. The fact that east Germans over 60 clearly rejected the idea of at least limited independence by a factor of nearly 2 to 1, is merely one more example of the generation gap that so divides the Germans on the unification issue.

However, a resentment among east Germans about the way they have been treated since the unity process began is something shared by all age groups. The Times-Mirror survey found that a clear majority of 71% of east Germans questioned believed their country had been "overwhelmed and taken over by West Germany in the process of unification" and that an even larger majority - 85% - resented this fact, either "a little bit" or "a great deal."

The resentment factor grew to 92% among east Germans in the formative years of their working lives - those between 25 and 39.

Two clear strands in this resentment were also identified by the poll.
Just over 80% of those east Germans questioned said they felt like they had become second class citizens in the newly united country - an emotion that again was expressed more strongly among younger than older east Germans. (88% of those under 25 questioned said they felt either often or sometimes that they had become second class, while only 70% of those over 60 years of age said they felt that way.)

(Since much of the friction between "Ossie" and "Wessie" in the eastern region relates in some way to the work place, it is hardly surprising that those near or past retirement age would feel badly treated less often. This age group also has stronger family ties across the old political divide that are less likely to be affected by economic strains.)

The lack of experience among easterners in the cut and thrust of a parliamentary democracy, the fact that east German MPs are functioning in a social and legal framework they barely understand, and a serious miscalculation by those who negotiated the conditions of unity, have combined to leave east Germans with virtually no real influential voice in Germany's first post-unity government.

Among Chancellor Helmut Kohl's 52 cabinet ministers and ministers of state, only 7 come from the east. Only 1 of the Bundestag's influential standing committees is chaired by an easterner and, within the country's 2 largest political parties, not one eastern MP serves as the primary spokesperson on an important issue.

Because the western architects of unity - led by Kohl himself -
were convinced by the decades of conventional wisdom, namely that Germans east and west remained basically the same people and that east Germans were merely west Germans without opportunity, there was no attempt to establish either a ministry for eastern affairs or parliamentary committees to concentrate on the problems of eastern Germans.

The attitudes reflected in our survey are likely to harden further unless easterners begin to see themselves and their interests better represented at the highest decision-making levels, political analysts predict.

Our survey also shows that, collectively, these developments have generated a powerful sense of "separateness" - a distinct feeling of east German identity that doesn't exist in the western part of the country.

It is one of history's powerful ironies that the frictions of unity have forged a sense of separate identity among east Germans that 4 decades of communist propaganda failed to achieve.

It is an identity, a solidarity forged by a sense of common destiny not dissimilar to that which has linked the 11 former confederate states in the wake of the American Civil War.

A grocery store in Bernau, northeast of Berlin, for example, recently erected a sign advertising, "food and drink from our states". The sign was decorated with the coats of arms from the 5 federal states that comprise east Germany.

A clear majority (59%) of those questioned in the east said they most often felt themselves east German rather than German. Roughly
2 out of every 3 working age east Germans (those under 60) said they felt more east German than German. In another demonstration of the generation gap, the exact reverse was true for those over 60 (38% say they feel more east German). Those east Germans old enough to have experienced the final days of the Third Reich as teenagers said they felt themselves most often as German and not east German.

By contrast, no such feeling of a separate "west German" identity exists. Our survey showed that only one in 5 west Germans questioned said they felt more west German than German – a feeling that reflects both the long-held belief among West Germans that their state was the successor to the Third Reich and that they, not the easterners, were the "real" Germans.

This view is again similar to that among those in the northern U.S. states during the post-Civil War era, where any sense of separate, unionist, identity, was much weaker if it existed at all.

The suppression of patriotism in West Germany during much of the post-world War II era (even singing the words to the national anthem was discouraged until the mid-1980s) and the lack of any official push to develop a distinct "West German" identity during the Federal Republic's 40 years of existence also are reflected in response to our questions.

Our survey indicated that west Germans so far have had little trouble dealing with the transition from West German to German. It is not difficult to understand why. Little has changed in their daily lives, their emotional ties with the Federal Republic were weak, and they had long perceived themselves as the "real Germans".
(Unlike their East German counterparts, for example, West German sports announcers almost always referred to their national teams as simply "the Germans". West German automobiles abroad carried the letter "D" for Deutschland, while East German cars used the letters "DDR" for German Democratic Republic). Unity has left west Germany's national leaders, its laws and the personal lives of its people largely untouched. A majority of western Germans (70%) felt themselves completely unaffected by the events of unification.

For the east Germans, our survey shows that unification has been an all-encompassing trauma, in which a majority believe they have won freedom, but at the expense of a significant erosion of their quality of life.

The absence among east Germans of such basic prerequisites as self-confidence, independent thinking and self-promotion - all so vital for success in a free market - would appear to raise doubts about the ease of integration and the speed of unity.

Indeed, many analysts believe these shortcomings point toward a prolonged unification process and a lengthened eastern German recovery. Such developments would test the patience and tolerance of both western German taxpayers who must finance unity and of eastern Germans who must wait longer to shake their self perception as "second class" people.

The economic fallout of these difficulties has already extended beyond Germany's frontiers as a weakened deutsche mark and domestic inflation pressures generate a push for interest rate hikes. A prolonged economic recovery in Germany will only exacerbate these
pressures. The rising cost estimates required to finance unification (the latest Finance Ministry figure is $250 billion through 1995) will sap Germany's financial and technical capabilities to help the recovery of other east European countries, many of whom look to Germany as their primary hope.

Our survey carries evidence that frustration among eastern Germans has been exacerbated by the impression that the east German man in the street is suffering far more in the present economic and political transition than former privileged members of the communist hierarchy whose greed and misguided policies drove the country to its eventual destruction.

Over the first several months of 1991 juicy press reports have told east Germans how former Communist Party boss Erich Honecker avoided arrest by slipping on a plane to Moscow; how his successor, Egon Krenz, has landed a cushy job as - of all things - a real estate executive in west Berlin; how Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, a former senior officer in the East German security police, known as the Stassi, now resides in a palatial villa near Munich and gets up to $12,000 for a television appearance.

These reports together with the fact that not one senior member of Honecker's government has so far been found guilty of acting illegally, have delivered a cynical message to a majority of east Germans - especially to those who have lost their livelihoods.

Nearly 90% of those east Germans questioned agreed with the statement that, "today...the rich just get richer while the poor get poorer". This was significantly higher than the 78% of west
Germans who agreed with the same statement.

More than 6 out of 10 east Germans questioned (63%) also believed "more should be done to identify and hold accountable people who were responsible for the injustices of the old regime".

In answering this question, they specifically rejected the suggestion that one "should look to the future and forget the past" (28% disagreed with this statement).

However, the survey indicated that east Germans found other, more pressing personal problems, such as unemployment, rising crime and the general economic outlook more worrying that the fact those closest to the old regime had not been punished.

While half of all east Germans (50%) believed the Stassi remains a clandestine forced within a united Germany, Stassi activity was not mentioned on the east Germans list of personal worries.

THE SOCIALIST LEGACY IN THE EAST

The swiftness and totality with which the communist systems of eastern Europe collapsed in the fall of 1989 left many analysts astounded that 4 decades of marxist ideology appeared simply to have disappeared without a trace. Our survey, using attitudes among east and west Germans as a template, suggests that this is not the case.

There is evidence that 40 years of communism has not dampened the east German desire for democracy and a free market economy. However, the survey suggests the impact of these years has altered views toward religion, war, freedom, trade unions and the role of
the state in society.

For example, 68% east Germans favored state intervention to assure no one was left in need, even if it meant sacrificing the freedom to pursue life's goals without interference from the state. Only 41% of west Germans supported this view.

In related questions, only one in 4 east Germans (24%) agreed with the statement that state-run enterprises were "usually inefficient and wasteful", while close to half (45%) of west Germans endorsed this view. The east German response was the lowest of any eastern country surveyed. A smaller minority of east Germans (30%) than their western cousins (40%) believed the state controlled too much of their daily lives and, by a smaller margin (43% to 41%) more east Germans than west Germans thought the state was "run for the benefit of all the people".

More than 9 of every 10 east Germans said the state should care for poor people who can't care for themselves and should also guarantee every citizen basic food and shelter. West Germans endorsed these ideas but by smaller majorities (87% and 80% respectively).

On questions of religion, more than twice as many west Germans as those from the east said they had never doubted God's existence and believed prayer and God were important aspects of life. By nearly the same ratio, more west Germans (23%) than east Germans (12%) agreed with the statement that "AIDS may be God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior".

Trade unions have a higher status among east Germans, who saw
the best possible job for their children as a skilled blue collar trade, rather than the professional jobs of scientist, doctor and engineer, that top the dream list of western parents. In addition to the glorification of the manual laborer, skilled workers were at the top of the pay scale in the former East German communist state.

To at least some extent, these opinions have an historical base that go back beyond the post-World War II communist era. Large parts of the predominantly Protestant region that became East Germany were socialist strongholds during the Weimar Republic and earlier, while the more Roman Catholic areas of Bavaria and the Rhineland became the base of the Christian-based parties.

The large residue of socialist values that our survey shows among east Germans carries potentially important ramifications for Germany's political future. Above all, it suggests that a revitalized Social Democratic Party, with a credible leadership and a viable electoral program could find the eastern states especially receptive recruitment grounds in the future.

At present, for example, our survey showed that east Germans gave the Social Democrats as a party, a slightly lower rating (63%) than did west Germans (66%), despite their consistently stronger endorsement of the basic values associated with such a party.

The Social Democrats were crushed there in two parliamentary elections last year - in the March vote for the East German Volkskammer and in last December's first post-unity election that returned Kohl's Christian Democrats to power. They also won only one of 5 state elections held there last October.
The party's policies advocating a cautious approach to unification were out of touch with the strong pro-unity mood that dominated the east during much of last year. The Social Democrats' chancellor candidate, Oskar Lafontaine, from the far western state of Saarland, also was seen by eastern voters as having little interest in their problems.

The Social Democrats were also swimming against a strong east German desire for a swift currency union and implementation of a free market economy - policies far more associated with the Kohl government than the opposition.

Our survey shows that the east German enthusiasm for the free market economy remains strong (86% approval) and seems to exist easily with the professed socialist values also found in our questioning - a result that would suggest they see the two as compatible rather than contradictory.

The Social Democrats have already injected new blood at the top, with the aging party chairman Hans-Jochim Vogel giving way to the more popular, but largely untested, 51 year-old Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, Bjoern Engholm. They have followed this change with state election victories in Hesse and in Kohl's home state of Rhineland-Palatinate.

Our survey also showed that Kohl's popularity has plummeted in the months since his landslide victory (41% approve, 52% disapprove) - in the east mainly because the problems of unity there have been greater than expected and in the west largely because he was forced to renege earlier this year on an election
campaign pledge that he would not raise taxes to finance unity. Officially labelled a "solidarity surcharge", west Germans more often refer to the revenue increase simply as "the tax lie".

While the political mood can (and has, frequently) changed quickly in Germany in recent years and popularity polls conducted less than a year into a four year-term of office would appear to have little real meaning, our survey pointed to some areas that must give Kohl's Christian Democrats cause for worry.

For example, while Kohl's party drew the support of 28% of all German voters (compared to 41% for the Social Democrats), backing in the important eastern states was only 21%. The Times Mirror poll also showed structural weaknesses within his party, especially among young people. With voters under 25 years old, support for the Christian Democrats dropped to 14% and to only 12% of eastern voters in this age group. These results come from a region that only last December gave Kohl's party a strong 42% plurality.

These low survey results, coupled with an aging party leadership in danger of losing touch with the rank and file on such crucial upcoming political debates as abortion and womens' rights, provide a major challenge for the party that has shaped unification.

PACIFISM

Our survey found one of the most visible legacies of the marxist era in East Germany was a professed pacifism that today remains far greater than that in the western part of the country.

Only 15% of east Germans questioned agreed with the statement
that "the best way to ensure peace is through military strength". Among east Germans under 25, the figure was only 10%.

Further, only 16% of east Germans believed, "we should be willing to fight for our country whether right or wrong" and barely one third agreed with the statement that "sometimes it is necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world" (37%).

In related questions:
- 90% of east German respondents said it was wrong to sell weapons to Third World countries. A sizeable, yet smaller majority of western Germans (74%) echoed a similar sentiment.
- Only 37% of east Germans endorsed the statement that "It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world", compared to 56% of those west Germans questioned.
- A similarly small number of east Germans (36%) considered the army to be a positive influence in Germany, with the approval rating slipping to 28% among those under 25 years old - roughly half the number of younger west Germans who gave a positive response (57%).

The consistent, one-sided nature of the east German responses to military-related questions were the most extreme of any country involved in our survey.

An east German Protestant pastor participating in an east Berlin focus group discussion recalled the response of a vicar from the western part of the German capital to a sermon given regarding the Gulf crisis: "If you had said this in Hannover (a western city), people would have left the church...".
Because of the overall lack of influence of eastern politicians at the federal level, east German attitudes likely had little direct impact in Germany's resistance to become more involved in last winter's Gulf War. However, the results of our survey suggest that once eastern voices do gain a measure of power in foreign policy matters, they would probably act to reinforce rather than counter German hesitance to participate in non-European military ventures.

(Meanwhile, resistance by Germany's European neighbors to Bonn's efforts to steer European Community policy in the Yugoslav crisis and the Yugoslav rejection of Germans among the EC's group of observers dispatched to monitor a ceasefire in the troubled country, underscore the difficulties encountered by a united Germany even when it wants to assert itself in international affairs.)

Influence from the east could also result in pressure for further cuts in German defense spending as the government struggles to contain budget deficits bloated by the costs of unity. With Germany by far the largest, most important European member of the 16-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), any pressure of this kind would also raise questions within the alliance.

**WOMEN AND UNITY**

Our survey indicates that Germans believe women have done better under 40 years of West German capitalism than under East German communism, but that both systems have left them lagging behind in
terms of their rights and quality of life. The survey shows further that the conditions under which unity is being carried out – conditions where the rights and status of women in the east are being eroded – have left eastern women far more pessimistic than men about their future.

While nearly half of west German men and 4 out of 10 women believed unity had left life basically unchanged for both sexes, only 30% of east German men and one in three eastern women felt that way. Among those who believed one sex had a better life, 40% in the west believed men were better off, compared to 59% in the east.

Fewer than 2% of well-educated east German women believed they enjoyed a better life than men.

Better housing stock in the west plus more money to spend on a wider variety of food and clothing there is believed to have had at least some influence in the these perceptions.

The conviction of those surveyed that west German women enjoyed a better life came despite a wider range of social benefits in the east available to women with young children, more liberal abortion laws, a higher percentage of eastern than western women employed outside the home (44% compared to 40%) and near identical percentage of eastern and western women who expressed some degree of job satisfaction (86%).

They also came in the face of more liberal attitudes in the east toward the role of women.

For example, 3 out of 4 east Germans said they preferred a
marriage in which both partners work, compared to a far more even division in the west (54% prefer sharing responsibilities). In another question relating to womens' rights, nearly 8 in every 10 east Germans believed women should be allowed abortions if they choose. Only 6 out of 10 west Germans endorsed such a policy.

Our survey indicated a visible pessimism shared by all in the east about the future of women in a united Germany.

There are several likely causes for this view.

Large scale layoffs in the east's labor intensive industries such as textiles which traditionally employed women, an erosion of social benefits, such as the demise of low cost child day-care and the reduction of paid sick leave granted working mothers from 5 weeks to 1, plus a diminished status in some areas. Unmarried mothers, for example, treated under old communist East German law on a par with married mothers, under all-German law are now separated into a special bureaucratic status.

Two thirds of east German men and 7 of every 10 eastern women questioned in the survey believed eastern women had "fewer social and legal rights than they did before unification" and nearly 10% more eastern women than men surveyed said they believed east Germany was moving too quickly in the direction of the free market economy.

The upcoming national debate on abortion, in which the country tries to reconcile the highly restrictive west German legislation with the more liberal old east German law that remains temporarily in effect in the five eastern states is billed by many analysts as
a pivotal women's rights issue.

However, even if a compromise is found on the abortion issue, with only a fledgling women's movement active in the east, and the eastern region beset by the turmoil of fundamental economic and social change, the potential for swift, significant overall improvements in conditions for women would appear to be slight.

ETHNIC MINORITIES

Few German domestic issues are the subject of greater concern or monitored more closely by outsiders than relations between Germans and the growing populations of ethnic minorities that live among them in the reunited country. Government statistics show that just over 5 million foreigners or 6.4% of the total population presently reside in Germany.

For obvious reasons, levels of anti-semitism, the popularity of right-wing extremist parties such as the Repubikaner, and activities of young anarchistic, so-called skinheads draw far closer observation in Germany than in, say, France or Britain, where the levels of violence aimed at ethnic minority groups have been consistently high in recent years.

Our survey found a mixture of attitudes in today's Germany that were both encouraging and yet at the same time, worrisome. It showed, for example, that Germans today tend to be neither more nor less prejudiced against minorities than their European neighbors. Levels of anti-foreigner and anti-immigrant emotions fell roughly between the extremes of opinions in other European countries, the
poll found.

However, the ghosts of history and the increase of immigration pressures already visible in Germany at a time of severe economic strains, combine to make Germany a special case.

Government officials expect 200,000 applications for political asylum alone this year. Most applicants come from east European or Middle Eastern countries and are drawn more by the relative ease of Germany's asylum law and glitter of its affluence, rather than protection from political persecution.

Ethnic Germans from eastern Europe are also flowing into the newly united country at roughly the same rate, causing widespread public alarm about the country's ability to absorb such diverse groups at a time unification exerts its own enormous social strains.

The results of the Times Mirror poll only confirm the sensitivity and importance of the minorities issue.

From a list of 5 potential external threats facing Germany, those questioned listed "a flood of refugees coming into our country" as by far the greatest danger. Forty percent cited this problem, compared to the next greatest perceived danger from abroad, an overall economic decline as a result of European integration, selected by 16%.

The worry about refugees was stronger in west Germany (43%), where pressure is greater and the foreign population is already nearly 8% of the total, compared to little more than 1% in the east. Concern about refugees was highest of all in smaller west
German communities of 20-49,000 (60%), rather than large urban areas where much of the country's foreign population is concentrated (44%).

Our survey showed the number of young east Germans expressing favorable opinions toward the east's largest minority, the Vietnamese (36%), was conspicuously below that of the general population (56%). As the largest of the region's small minority population, they have in many ways come to symbolize the foreigners problem, experts believe.

In related questions, 70% of those questioned in both east and west agreed with the statement that, "we should restrict and control entry to our country more than we do now". The response was slightly higher in rural areas of both west and east Germany (around 75%).

A sizable minority in both parts of Germany also favored repeal of the constitutional guarantee to ethnic Germans living outside the country of the right to emigrate (36% for the west, 27% for the east).

One-third of those surveyed favored repeal, 43% opposed any change and 23% offered no opinion.

During the height of the Cold War, with east-west population movements highly restricted, this guarantee was more symbolic than substantive, yet it was important in defining the West German state as the natural home for all Germans. The strength of sentiment for repeal, although still a minority, suggests a major shift in thinking that has come in the wake of the collapse of the political
barriers in Europe.

In an interview for this survey, Martin Haushofer, a member of the Bavarian state parliament for the conservative Christian Socialist Union, expressed in unequivocal terms, the need to keep immigrants out of Germany and Europe. He was just as emphatic about the necessity to keep ethnic Germans in eastern Europe from returning.

"There is nowhere to put them," he said.

At the other end of the country, Hans-Hermann Tiedje, editor in chief of the Hamburg-based Bild Zeitung, Europe's largest circulation daily, put in the simple, direct language so commonly found in his newspaper: "50 to 70% of the German people are against immigrants," he said, arguing that money used to support them in Germany would be used instead to help their home countries develop. "If we don't give them something to eat, they will eat us."

Influences from the east could act to worsen the minorities problem, the results of our poll indicate.

The survey indicates, that, overall, anti-minority sentiments in east Germany tend to run marginally higher than those in the western part of the country, although anti-semitism was found to be lower in the east than the west.

Despite these concerns, there was no hint that immigrants constituted a real immediate threat to the nation's stability. In a general question about future worries, Germans ignored such options as "destabilization of the country" and "political
instability in the future”. However, they did say they believed groups inside the country posed a greater threat to the nation's future than other countries (57% vs. 18%).

However, the poll also suggested only token support for the right wing extremist Republicans, who campaigned in the last national elections on an anti-immigrant platform. The party rated less than 2% of all mentions in both east and west to the question, "For which party would you most likely vote?"

However, Republican support was slightly higher among young Germans, with 3% of those under 25 in the west expressing a preference for the Republicans and 5% of easterners under 25.

While our survey provided no evidence that these feelings were strong enough to win any broad acceptance of the recent violent actions of young, virulent eastern neo-Nazi groups against minorities, the results provide an important warning sign for 2 specific reasons:

- In the east, where these youth gangs have operated, economic conditions and social disorientation are likely to deteriorate further in the months ahead. With little effective political representation at the national level in distant Bonn, and the belief (reflected in our survey) that they are being treated as "second class" citizens, a certain risk could development that otherwise moderate, but increasingly frustrated, east Germans might react to such pressure either by finding an echo in simple, yet extreme solutions.

- There is strong anecdotal evidence that shows the lack of any
attempt by the communist authorities to come to grips with the Nazi era during their 40 year reign has left some east German youths seeking a base for their actions in the ideas of the Third Reich - ideas discredited for years by western educators.

A senior west Berlin police officer recalled a community meeting recently in the eastern part of the capital where a group of youths accused a German neighbor married to a Mozambique man of committing "Blutschande" - a Nazi expression used to describe the outrage of polluting Aryan blood. The officer said the youths told him later they had found (Nazi) literature that they had previously not had access to, which they believed contained answers to the country's problems.

At the time of writing, it seemed apparent that the Kohl government had grasped the potentially explosive nature of this socioeconomic mix and was moving to restrict the influx of immigrants, initially by overhauling procedures which permitted political asylum-seekers to remain in the country, sometimes for years, before their cases are decided.

Levels of anti-semitism in eastern Germany were found to be among the lowest in the former communist dictatorships of eastern Europe (only Bulgaria was lower). In Germany, as a united country, however, these sentiments were stronger, second only to Poland (and equal to Russia) among those countries surveyed.

A small majority of all Germans questioned (53%) said they had a favorable impression of Jews, compared to 23% who expressed "mostly or very unfavorable" impressions. The small Jewish
population (estimated at around 30,000 in a united Germany of 79 million) is most likely the reason for the unusually large number who voiced no opinion (24%).

In Poland, whose Jewish population was all but wiped out in the Holocaust, only 40% of those questioned said they had a favorable impression of Jews and 34% said their impression was unfavorable.

Our survey found that anti-semitism among younger Germans was much lower than among those who are older. In west Germany, nearly twice as many of those over 60 years of age (40%) voiced unfavorable opinions of Jews than did those under 25 years old (19%). In east Germany, the sentiments were far milder, yet the aged-linked difference in attitudes was still visible. Just over 11% of those under 25 said they held unfavorable views of Jews, while the figure among those over 60 was 18%.

Unfavorable opinions among Germans toward Poles (50%), Turks (46%) and Romanians (44%) also ran higher than anti-minority sentiments in the balance of other countries surveyed. While gypsies were held in the lowest esteem of any minority in Germany, the 59% who voiced unfavorable opinions was low compared to the 91% in Czechoslovakia and 79% in Hungary.

As a general rule, there was no strong correlation between age and anti-minority sentiments, although older Germans seemed to display marginally less tolerance, while those in the 25-39 year age groups gave marginally more favorable impressions.
A series of political events since German unification has shown the problems Germany faces in assuming a political role commensurate with its position as central Europe's largest, richest nation. Criticized for its indecisive backing of long-time allies during the Gulf War, Germany was then faulted for trying to take the lead in the steering European Community policy in the Yugoslavia crisis. However, our survey shows that among the nations of eastern Europe, the revolutions of 1989 that swept Stalinism from the region, also removed much of the suspicion and fear of Germany as a potentially aggressive power from the region.

In Hungary and Bulgaria, Germany was mentioned most often as the most dependable ally, while in Russia, the Ukraine, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, Germany was mentioned more often than all countries but the United States.

Only in Poland, did historic enmity toward Germany appear to linger. Initial German hesitance last year to recognize the post-World War II German-Polish frontier along the Oder and Neisse rivers, Polish suspicion of the large German minority within its frontiers, coupled with friction stemming from the steady flow of Polish immigrants into Germany have all combined to complicate this crucial bilateral relationship.

Our survey showed that Poles rated Germany as highly as the Soviet Union as a country posing the greatest threat to their future. Only Lithuania's fears of the Soviet Union were expressed in stronger terms.

Conversely, Germans omitted Poland from a list of countries
considered their most dependable allies and mentioned it high on the list of countries posing a threat to Germany in the future.

Among east Germans under 25 and those less well-educated, no country rated higher as a potential external threat than Poland, although the overall assessment of such an external threat was very low, the survey showed. (By far the largest single response to a request to name those nations that posed a danger to Germany, was that no country posed such a threat, 37%).

The German concerns appeared to be based on the belief that a relatively poor Poland and an open Polish-German frontier constituted an immigration threat to Germany in much the same way Mexico is viewed by Americans.

The mutual unease reflected in these responses shows that promoting bilateral relations is vital for both countries and the region if a broader European integration is going to succeed.

The Polish-German border in many ways symbolizes the contradictions and challenges for Europe as it struggles toward a better future. The dream of a free, open Europe, is impossible without ease of movement across this border. Yet a steady westward flow of Poles and other east Europeans seeking the fruits of western Europe's economic success could endanger both economic and social stability of western countries, analysts believe.

Some fear that the Oder-Neisse line will become a new European divide, separating the continent's "haves" from its "have-nots", with all the tensions that such a frontier implies.

Our survey pointed to another possible point of friction to the
German-Polish relationship. Nearly 40% of Germans questioned agreed that, "there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to us". Large areas of present-day Poland belonged to Germany for centuries before World War II. Although Germany's political leadership has formally renounced any claims to these territories, the results of our survey suggest that the claims remain valid among a large minority of the population.

German unity and its inherent eastward pull appears to have generated little internal pressure for altering Germany's close ties with its key western partners, according to the results of our survey.

Indeed, for two peoples who grew up in alliances aligned against each other, east and west Germans shared remarkably similar views regarding those nations they judged as reliable allies. Those questioned in both parts of Germany cited the same four countries most frequently as their "most dependable allies": the U.S., France, Britain and Austria.

The fact that east Germans rated France above all other countries may well be a signal that, at least in terms of German popular support, the addition of east German opinion has worked to strengthen the European Community's pivotal relationship.

While France initially feared a united Germany might no longer need French help in pushing its European policies, recent events - especially the Yugoslav crisis - has shown the Bonn continues to have far more influence when working together with France than when it tries to go on its own.
East and west Germans also appear to hold remarkably similar views about important global personalities and institutions. Those questioned in both east and west, for example, gave Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev the highest approval rating for an individual (85%). They both found German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher as the best person in the present German government and rated the United Nations as the world's best organization (83%).

Former Social Democrat Chancellor and father of Germany's successful Ostpolitik of the 1970s, Willy Brandt, Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and the European Community all won higher approval ratings among east Germans, while President George Bush and German authors Heinrich Boell and Guenther Grass scored better in the west.

**GERMAN DEMOCRACY**

Our survey shows that the east Germans, despite having lived for nearly 6 decades under tightly controlled dictatorships, expressed both an enthusiasm for the free market economy and an endorsement for political pluralism. These opinions carry the potential to make democracy in a united Germany even stronger than that which matured with such success in West Germany.

The 94% voter turnout for the March, 1990, East German parliamentary election, for example, was one of the highest ever recorded in a free, open election. Our survey found that approval ratings for the change to a multi-party political system (91%) were both higher in east Germany than anywhere else in former Soviet
bloc countries and among the highest approval ratings to any question in the survey.

Perhaps even more heartening, this approval rating was highest of all among east Germans under 25 years old (94%). (In one of the more curious results, the poll found a unanimous, 100% approval for political pluralism among members of the renamed Communist Party, the Party for Democratic Socialism!)

There are warning signs, however.

The political and economic strains of unity which are particularly acute in the east, the stirring of right wing extremist groups in the region and poll responses to a series of questions aimed at gauging the level of commitment to the democratic process, all suggest German democracy will face new strains in the years ahead.

Although committed to the idea of political pluralism, responses to our questions suggested a high degree of skepticism in both east and west Germany about the importance of the individual in the process. This skepticism was greater than that found in other European democracies.

More than 8 of 10 east Germans (81%) believed that "People like me don't have any say about what the government does" and (87%) that "Generally speaking, elected officials lose touch with people pretty quickly". A minority of east Germans questioned agreed with statements that, "Voting gives people like me some say..." (42%) and "Most elected officials care what people like me think" (29%).

In part, this cynicism has been fueled by the prevailing view
among east Germans that they have been taken over by the west and the reality that no one in real power is seen to represent their interests in a distant capital, Bonn, for which they have neither emotional links or much trust.

A majority of east Germans interviewed (51%) and nearly two-thirds (65%) of those best-educated easterners also believed that west German leaders cared mainly about their own interests rather than in the well-being of the eastern region. Just over one-third (35%) of all east Germans and barely one in four of those better educated (28%) easterners were convinced western politicians had eastern interests at heart.

The strength of these responses can be explained in part by the survey's timing. It came shortly after Chancellor Helmut Kohl and some of his key cabinet members were widely criticized in the German tabloid press for failing to visit the east since their party's December, 1990 election victory 4 months before.

However, there is evidence that suggests these feelings are more than simply transitional and that they are linked as much to the lack of eastern representation in the first post-unity government as to any one political controversy.

Only 71% of all east Germans questioned said they would bother to vote if an election were being held that week and 18% said they would definitely not vote. These responses compare to the 93% voter turnout for the March, 1990, East German parliamentary elections and the region's 75% voting rate in last December's first all German elections.
In response to similar questions, only 42% of east Germans believed that "Voting gives people like me a say" and a disturbing 81% agreed with the comment that, "People like me don't have any say about what the government does". In both instances, the responses were significantly different than those from west Germany where 57% believed voting gave them a say and 67% believed they had no influence over government affairs.

Although diminished, east German support for the ballot box still remained higher than anywhere else in the former Soviet bloc. When asked directly, only one in 5 east Germans agreed with the comment, "I am losing interest in politics".

The German parliament's decision last June to move the government to Berlin has been applauded by many in the east, but several years will be needed to complete this move. In the meantime, the opinions expressed in our survey would appear to give a special urgency to the need to find voices at the national level that are judged in the east to be effective defenders of their interests.

These results pose a warning for Germany, a country in the depths of the most severe, painful, economic adjustments since the success of the West German Wirtschaftswunder and where democracy, however successful, has always been seen as fragile.

Evidence of this fragility was also apparent in our survey.

More than in any other western democracy surveyed, a majority of Germans (72%), both east and west, agreed that ideologically dangerous books should be banned from public school libraries. By
comparison, only 50% of Americans surveyed said they would be prepared to back such a ban and the figure in Britain was still lower, 47%.

The survey also found Germans much more willing to deny freedom of speech to extremist groups, such as fascists, than citizens in other western democracies.

A total of 63% of all Germans questioned said they would approve of such a move, compared to 35% in the U.S., and 32% in Britain.

Three in 10 Germans also said they would approve of placing "greater constraints and controls on what newspapers print". In this, as in the questions of book banning and restricting freedom of speech, east Germans expressed higher approval ratings.

Regarding the free market economy, our survey found strong, undiminished enthusiasm among east Germans despite the present turmoil.

Nearly 9 out of 10 east Germans (86%) said they approved of the region's shift to a free market economy and similar number (85%) said they admired people "who get rich by working hard". This level of admiration was slightly higher than that expressed by west Germans (81%).

Further, young east Germans - supposedly those most indoctrinated by communist ideals - were the most admiring of all of those who make money by working hard. Nearly 92% of east Germans under 25 said they looked up to those who got rich by working hard compared to 76% of West Germans in the same age group.

A young eastern member of a focus group discussion in Dresden
put it this way, "I think it is better when I can push my way up ... and I'm able to achieve something through my own performance ... rather than having a situation where everybody does the same ... and gets paid the same amount of money."

**IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE**

In several instances, the issues, ideas and outlook that separated east and west German appeared to be part of a larger difference of attitudes dividing those Europeans who lived under the shadow of Soviet domination and those tied closely to the West.

If this is correct, it would imply that subtle, yet important attitudinal differences linger as unseen scars from the decades of barbed wire separation.

To be sure, the survey found Europeans – and Germans – east and west shared many similar beliefs. A need to ensure equal opportunity for all, a willingness to support tough new environmental laws and suspicions regarding the commitment of elected officials in the democratic process were views held in roughly the same strength on both sides of the old Iron Curtain.

But our survey also found that views on key issues such as the importance of the individual in a democracy, the role of the military in society, and the depth of religious conviction, today separate Germany and Europe along the Cold War divide.

A question about future worries also underscored that those in the former Soviet Bloc, although now free, live amid the legacy of a bankrupt ideology and the turmoil of transition. Eastern
Europeans - including the east Germans - cited economic conditions, a lack of financial security, and children's education among their primary worry about the future, while west Germans, together with other west Europeans, listed environmental pollution, poor health and a fear of war.

Over 40 years ago, the world watched a newly created West Germany emerge from the rubble of war, and blossom as a free market democracy in a way its founders never dared to dream.

Today, eyes are again on Germany as it begins anew as a reunited, fully sovereign whole.

Our survey shows the legacy of that earlier success is strong, giving Germans an underlying confidence in their democratic and financial institutions as they work to overcome 4 decades of division and consolidate the reunification process.

If those who lead Germany through the early 1990s can build, both from this confidence and from the commitment to democratic ideals professed by east Germans in our poll, then a powerful, stable, Germany can be a force for good and stability in the new Europe, showing the way for others as the continent searches for its own larger, unity. Such hopes are repeated often in the speeches of Chancellor Kohl and others in his government.

However, if the danger signs that also are so clearly shown in our survey prevail - if, for example, the deep splits within German society are allowed to fester, if the country is unable to absorb its growing minority population peacefully, or if it runs into economic difficulties that require severe financial sacrifice -
then Germany could once again become Europe's problem child.

It is the challenge of the nation's present and future leadership to determine which way Germany goes.
In the aftermath of the revolutions of 1989, Eastern Europe has become a discordant mosaic of contradictions, ambiguities and animosities.

Assessed most ominously, our results at first blush give rise to fears of "impending chaos" (an expression used by a member of Times Mirror Board of Advisors) among these largely Slavic nations stretching thinly from the Baltic to the Black Seas. The failed Communist Party coup in Moscow in August may, for a time, foster more cohesion to their approach to Western Europe, and perhaps even give new impetus toward inter-regional cooperation. But we found that the peoples of Eastern Europe, simply put, do not like their neighbors. Their ethnic divisions are so sharp, and their national hostilities so deep, that radical improvement of relations probably must wait on new generations to come. "What I call the cemetery problem," a Pole in Bialystok says only half jokingly; "those who suffered grievances will have to be buried before we see any improvement."

All of these peoples have unique histories, from their arrival from the Asian steppes through the communist period, which shape their attitudes toward the new freedoms. Their current national borders, for example, seldom coincide with ethnic and religious boundaries. Blood cousins live just across the river or road that
make up the frontiers. It is not surprising that nationalist forces, long suppressed by communist rulers, have erupted into violent demands for independence or greater political autonomy, as in Yugoslavia. Our findings indicate that more ethnic conflicts of this kind are likely.

On top of such nationalism has come the cataclysmic political, economic, social and security changes of the past two years, which have brought confusion and disorientation to these peoples. East Europe in effect is simultaneously undergoing the French and Industrial Revolution. Or in American terms, the region is experiencing our Great Economic Depression, pre-Civil War fear of conflict, and the Vietnam War-Watergate crisis of political legitimacy all at one and the same time.

We found unrealistic expectations that the turmoil will work itself out within a few years, and impatience with the pace of change. Both attitudes could become fertile ground for political demagogues. In Sophia, a Bulgarian sociologist complains about "hysterical super-expectations." And in Debrecen, a Hungarian chemistry professor worries that "there is a real danger that people will become more and more apolitical or, out of ignorance, turn to extremist groups."

We found a great appetite for foreign investment throughout the region but also a high level of suspicion of foreign investors, as if they intended to annex any land they bought to their own countries. The conflicting attitudes, particularly where they coincide with revived ethnic and religious prejudices, make some
East European nations considerably less attractive as recipients of Western dollars. "Minorities, who make up only 2%, at most 5%, of the Polish population, constitute a moral problem, a litmus paper of the moral fitness of the nation," muses a Polish writer. "Like this strange phenomenon called anti-semitism when there are practically no Jews here. But their treatment also has political significance, because it affects Poland's chances to get into Europe."

In every country we heard complaints that entrepreneurs were only trading, not producing; that they were only transferring rather than creating wealth, including jobs. We heard strong differences on whether political change should take priority over economic restructuring, and vice versa. But we also found heartening indicators that democracy is taking root and free market instincts have not perished under the weight of 45 years of communism.

So while there is the potential for calamity, there are also exciting signs of renewal among the former Soviet bloc as these small nations seek their place in the new Europe. "History," observes a shop manager in Prague, "proceeds here."

**Personal Life**

East Europeans rate their personal life today an average of one-third below West Europeans (6.1 vs 4.4 on 10-point scale). All West Europeans feel they have made progress in their daily lives over the past five years, but all East Europeans have experienced
demoralizing decline. "What is still happening is the process of atomization in all areas, the destruction of various relationships and ties," says a Polish priest.

But East and West, on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, came together as optimistic about their personal future, with the exception of Hungarians (in whom pessimism is culturally endemic, as we will show). Remarkable is the extreme optimism shown by Bulgarians and East Germans. While the German justification for hope is their recent unification, the Bulgarians appear to be basking in a honeymoon period like the dawn when the horizon is brightly lit but the intervening ground is still shrouded in darkness, hiding -- in Bulgaria's case -- the harsh economic realities ahead.

Czechs are also optimistic about their personal futures, which is probably tied to trust in the highly popular president of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel. Optimists who approve of Havel rate their country's situation significantly better than those who, although also optimistic, disapprove of Havel; he appears to give them heart. In sharp contrast are the Slovaks, the poorer third of Czechoslovakia, who are as pessimistic about their personal future as Hungarians. The "velvet revolution" of 1989 in Czechoslovakia has left those two peoples even more separate, and hostile toward each other, than before. "Czechs behave in a very arrogant way at present," complains a biologist in Kosice; "they plainly don't like us very much." "And they don't want to understand us, that we want our own identity," adds a Slovakian pediatrician.
Czechs rate their personal lives today higher than do any other peoples of East Europe, higher than the former East Germans and comparable to nations of West Europe. Materially, there is no reason for this euphoria, no recent unification with a richer and stronger relation like the East Germans, no high living standards like Europe's better half. But by various measures they are a feisty people, whose pre-war living standards rivaled that of the Swiss, and who emerge from our survey as more Western in most respects than the other East European nations. They and the Hungarians both lead in preferring to be paid by incentive scales rather than fixed salaries (Czechs - 73%; Hungarians - 75%), but they, unlike the Hungarians, are optimistic that they can make it personally.

Slovaks, their unhappy partners in the Czechoslovak federation, feel their lives have declined drastically -- more than any other peoples of the region -- as a result of the political and economic changes (Slovaks - 64%; Czechs - 41%; Others - 42%). Their pessimism appears to be due to their role as, in their eyes, second-class citizens in the partnership as much as to objective economic difficulties. These difficulties, however, are considerably worse than the Czechs are experiencing. By various measures, the gulf between these two peoples has widened in the past two years.

"When I look at football or hockey teams and there are more Czechs on it than Slovaks," says a taxi dispatcher in Kosice, "I am not interested, absolutely not, in watching any more. I want a
separate Slovak team and a separate Czech team, regardless of their success."

His wife goes one step further: "If there is one team, it should have equal numbers of Czechs and Slovaks on it."

Hungarians stand out for their pessimism, and for rating their fellow countrymen very low. Unique in East Europe and the Soviet republics surveyed, they say most people in their society are not trustworthy. The margin was not merely a majority but more than two to one (68% vs. 27%). This attitude is not considered particularly fertile ground by political scientists for democracy to take root.

Hungarians, the only non-Slavic people in our survey, have always stood out as the gloomiest of East European peoples. Among other distinctions, Hungary has one of the world's highest suicide rates. Its Magyar peoples are Europe's newest arrivals from Asia even though they have lived in the Danube Basin for a millennium. There is almost pride in Hungarian pessimism. "A Hungarian will always see the worst. It comes from a peasant mentality, which will never predict a good harvest," explains Prime Minister Jozsef Antall (NY Times, June 24, page 7). Unlike the United States where optimism "is the motor of American life," he says, "even our anthem is pessimistic."

Are Hungarians pessimistic for realistic or cultural reasons? Is their depression based on the objective evaluation of their condition or just part of being Hungarian? We concluded that Hungarian pessimism is culturally based after examining East Europeans who are satisfied (or not) with their financial
situations and who then profess themselves to be optimists or pessimists. Of those Hungarians who feel things are going well financially for them at present, half said they were optimistic, half pessimistic. In contrast, of those doing well financially in other countries than Hungary, optimists considerably outnumbered pessimists. Even among Poles and Czechs who are doing poorly in money terms, we found more optimism than pessimism. Our conclusion is that Hungarians doing well financially are not optimists, and when things go poorly, Hungarians become not just depressed but despairing.

Poles are unexceptional in their personal assessments, compared to others in the region, although as we will see below, they are remarkably different in assessing their country's status.

Bulgarians, in contrast, have a very low opinion of where they are now, with three out of five reporting personal decline compared to five years ago, but with the same number, two in three, professing optimism for five years hence. We feel that these Slavs at the southern tip of Europe do not realize yet how bad things will get before they get better.

**National Situation**

East Europeans rate their nations's standing today as significantly lower than West Europeans. What is striking is how low. On a 10-point scale, Bulgarians (and Russians and Ukrainians) lead in negative assessment of just over 2. The average for the rest of East Europe is about 4. West Europeans' average 5, with
West Germany at the top of the pack at 6.6.

Most nations, east and west, believe their country has declined over the past five years, but also, significantly, three nations -- Poland, East Germany and Spain -- believe they have advanced. Spain registers progress because of entry into the Common Market, East Germany because of unification. Poles alone in East Europe give a positive assessment, despite lower living standards.

Remarkable, too, is the optimism in East Europe for their countries. It is much more pronounced than in Western Europe. About 4 in 10 of West Europeans are optimistic. Among East Europeans, 6 in 10 are optimistic, led by Bulgarians among whom 8 in 10 looked to a better future for their country. East Germans and Czechoslaks are close behind (76% and 69% respectively). Even the Hungarians, pessimistic in personal terms, were significantly more optimistic than pessimistic about their country's prospects by a margin of 3 to 1.

Such optimism for the future among East Europeans, as well as those in the Soviet republics, flies in the face of economic conditions that will likely worsen before they get better. It indicates an impatience among populations for rapid improvement, particularly in living standards, which the new governments in the region will be unable to fulfill. Their "hyper-expectations," as it was called, can be exploited by populists and demagogues.

Bulgaria is the most obvious and most extreme cause for concern. Bulgarians are optimistic about their nation's future by more than
13 to 1, optimistic about their personal future more than 2 to 1, both without much justification.

After economic difficulties arose, the former communist regime instituted a vicious campaign against the Turkish minority, who make up about 10% of the population. Turkish citizens were forced to take Slavic names, fined for speaking Turkish in public, harassed to drive them out of the country. Animosity toward Turks runs very high today. Four out of ten Bulgarians expressed unfavorable views toward Turks; among Christian Bulgarians, the hostile attitude reaches 46%.

Bulgarians are also very hostile to Turkey, which often subjugated them in the past. They say the greatest threat to their country comes first from Turkey (41%) and secondly from Yugoslavia. Unlike the rest of East Europe surveyed, they do not fear the Soviet Union very much (6%). They worry more about a military attack from a neighboring country (29%), ie., Turkey, than about economic domination by the west, floods of refugees or a Soviet economic collapse (13%). Like all other East European states (except the former East Germany), a majority of Bulgarians (52%) feels that parts of neighboring nations really belong to them, dating back to their "Greater Bulgaria" period. "Many Bulgarians live in neighboring countries," says a Plovdiv surgeon. "We say Bulgaria borders on itself." As Yugoslavia falls apart, its southernmost republic of Macedonia includes many ethnic Bulgarians who could, under difficult circumstances there, seek Bulgarian refuge and protection.
Hungary, among all the countries of Europe, East or West, has the largest majority claiming that pieces of neighboring territories belong to them: 68%, or more than two out of three. Poland is next with 60%, after which Bulgaria reports 52%. Even a thin plurality of Czechoslovaks identify neighboring regions as their own (39%).

More than Bulgaria or Poland, Hungary is surrounded by Hungarians. Dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian empire after World War I ceded lands to virtually all bordering states: Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Ukraine. As Yugoslavia disintegrates, Hungarian officials have pointed out that Vojvodina -- the Yugoslav region in the Danube bend that holds 500,000 Hungarians -- was ceded to Yugoslavia as an entity. If that nation breaks apart, they note, Vojvodina does not automatically belong to Serbia or any other surviving piece of Yugoslavia. By implication, Hungary would want a voice in Vojvodina's disposition. (It should be noted that the intensification of the ethnic war in Yugoslavia has already resulted in a surge of ethnic Hungarians crossing the Croatian border into Hungary, where the government had established temporary camps to house civilian refugees from the Yugoslav conflict.) The same appears likely if Slovakia separates from Czechoslovakia. The former Hungarian uplands, which stretch across the entire southern border of Slovakia, would apparently not be recognized by Hungary as part of that nation if the federation disintegrated. Hostility toward Hungarians is very strong in Slovakia (65% unfavorability rating), making it likely that ethnic
Hungarians there would appeal for protection from Budapest and even seek refuge in Hungary itself if Slovakia separates.

Poland, overrun for centuries by Germany and Russia, also has former lands distributed among its neighbors (although it too gained territory that was once held by its neighbors). Three out of five Poles believe neighboring lands still belong to them. Our survey found that Poles are the most xenophobic and militaristic peoples in the region. They rate the foreign threat higher than any other country, East or West (28%). More than two out of five fear Soviet troops will not withdraw fully from their country, and three out of five fear that Soviet troops transuding Poland from Germany to return home will create problems for Poland. More than any others in the region, Poles say not enough money is spent on national defense (27%). Almost one in two Poles (45%) would sell weapons to Third World nations for economic reasons; only in Slovakia, with large factories producing outdated Soviet-designed weapons, do a higher proportion of the populace (58%) support such sales.

Finally, a greater proportion of Poles (28%), more than citizens of any other country, say they have no dependable allies. (Russia is next at 22%). Czechoslovakia, as indicated above, is really two countries and becoming more so. Czechs and Slovaks both rate the standing of their "country" (the word used in the questionnaire) about equal today, at about the same level as the other East Europeans. But while the Czechs see a modest national decline (43%) over the past five years, the Slovaks said a severe decline (68%)

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has occurred. Both were very optimistic for their country's future, but here, too, the Czechs were considerably more optimistic than the Slovaks.

Czechs and Slovaks agree, by margins of eight to one or better, that relations between the two peoples have suffered since the revolution. Slovaks were more than twice as concerned (37% to 14%) about jobs than Czechs. Almost twice as many Slovaks as Czechs (59 to 35%) disapprove the present power-sharing arrangement. Two out of three Slovaks believe the arrangement unfair; more than half the Czechs believe it fair (52%).

Slovak resentment probably derives from two factors. First, until Havel, communist Czechoslovakia was ruled by Slovaks for more than two decades. (Even Alexander Dubcek, author of the ill-fated "Prague Spring" that was crushed by Russian tanks in 1968, was a Slovak although he was always more popular among Czechs than his compatriots.) And under the communists, Slovakia advanced as a nation -- in education, industrialization, and public health -- rather than having their development slowed, if not reversed, like the Czechs who had a Western living standard before World War II.

Slovaks and Bulgarians, as the two peoples who benefited most, or at least suffered least, under communism, show the most sympathy toward the Soviet Union and socialism. In many respects, they would have preferred to remain a communist/socialist state, as other indicators show. In fact, there are hints that the nationalist-separatist sentiment in Slovakia represents in part a nostalgia for its authoritarian past. We found support for
state-owned farms (rather than private farms) greater among those who were most anti-Czech and pro-Slovak -- those who object to the current power sharing arrangement (45% vs. 33%), oppose the present federation, believe the federation is unfair, and support the Slovak National Party (47%).

For Czechoslovakia, the stage is set for the two nations to separate if the economy worsens and if Slovenia and Croatia successfully point the way to independence. One of the few ties that still bind them is their approval of Havel. For he is popular even in Slovakia. More than four in 10 (42%) Slovaks approve of the way he is doing his job, which is a higher rating than Hungarian Prime Minister Antall gets for his entire country. This data indicates that if Havel should leave office, separatist sentiment would rise.

**Personal Hopes And Fears, And National Concerns And Priorities**

"I'm more aggressive, more exacting toward others, more demanding of myself now," says a Krakow haberdashery clerk. "I've started to fight for my just rights. I have started to look for work that could really satisfy me."

East European fears are linked overwhelmingly to economic problems, including unemployment; this is also true in West Europe where several countries -- notably France, Britain and Spain -- show greater or comparable levels of economic concern of one kind or another. We found that individuals in Eastern Europe tie their future much closer to the future of their country than do West
Europeans. Those East Europeans optimistic about their country are twice as likely to be also optimistic about their own future as are West Europeans.

Jobs are the most dominant economic concern in East Europe, although the issue rated higher in some West European nations. Frenchmen (64%) and Spaniards (60%), for example, expressed this specific worry more than twice as often as Poles (29%), Hungarians (28%) and Czechoslovaks (27%). Another surprise was that Russian and Ukrainian concerns about jobs did not register among their top 10 worries, and only 2% of Lithuanians cited this issue. Much as Lithuanians are primarily worried about independence, Russians and Ukrainians, as we shall see, are worried about major cataclysms like civil war.

Hungarians, on the other hand, are most angry about prices. More than one in three volunteer complaints about prices, inflation, and the cost of living. Prices there rose 35% in the first half of 1991, more than twice the rate of 1990 inflation, 29%. "I am constantly trembling for fear of new price rises," says a pensioner in Debrecen. "One week they raise the price of sugar, then flour, lard, meat, and so on. It's not that we are afraid; we are terrified."

Poles cited improvement of provisions and accessibility of goods as the single thing they liked most about the political and economic changes of recent years. Says Grazyna, a middle aged school librarian: "The stores are all full, a visible and physical proof that something has changed. We could all talk a lot about the
ration cards we had before and standing in line day and night. So this is a fantastic result. The fact that all this costs a lot, that's another matter. But this is a good road to follow."

Moreover, Russians (59%) and Ukrainians (51%) also favor price rises in order to get a larger selection and higher quality of goods. Clearly, they do not yet have well-stocked stores. So the Hungarian reason for keeping prices low (62%) was not immediately obvious. Perhaps Hungarians are simply more skeptical that higher prices will mean more and better goods. They have experienced more free market concepts, for longer, than any other nation in East Europe.

In general, political concerns did not rate high when we asked about important problems facing the nation, except in Bulgaria. There, when we asked what would make them personally happy, 23% mentioned political stability. No other nation, east or west, cite this as a reason for personal happiness. Another 19% of Bulgarians express worry about destabilization of the country, and a further 12% about a prolonged crisis period. All told, over half of Bulgarians express deep political fears, reflecting their perception of a fragile state. Also unique -- no other nation mentioned it -- is the 10% of Bulgarians who cite the need to preserve and develop the state's social policy, another sign of Bulgaria's continued affinity for socialism even as it vocally embraces free markets.

The fear of war was down, as expected, throughout all of Europe in May, although surprisingly, somewhat lower in East Europe
compared to the West. Before the coup attempt in Moscow, most of these nations struggled with their special specters: famine and civil war in Russia and the Ukraine; military intervention in Lithuania; a return to its authoritarian past in Bulgaria.

But when asked which among four threats they view as the greatest to their countries, only Bulgaria cited a military attack by a neighbor as its first concern (29%). For the rest, economic issues had highest priority. Hungarians (42%) and Czechoslovaks (37%) fear a flood of refugees from the Soviet Union, which in view of recent liberalising Soviet immigration measures is probably the most realistic concern for the region even if the coup attempt has no impact on emigration.

Hungarians (23%) and Czechoslovaks (19%) also fear Soviet economic collapse, which would not only both heighten the flow of refugees but also worsen the economic condition of their industries which sold mostly to Russia and the Ukraine. Poles most feared economic domination by the West (29%).

The hopes and fears of East Europeans differ markedly from those of West Europeans and the Soviet republics when divided up among three categories: material, societal and personal. Material concerns include general economic conditions, shortages of food, and lack of financial security. Societal concerns include civil war, loss of freedom, and political crisis. Personal concerns include loss of family, poor health, and children's future.

In Western Europe, fear and worry are distributed evenly among these categories. In Eastern Europe, material concerns dominate;
societal fears are second and personal concerns a distant third -- only one-third as important, on average, of material fears. In the three Soviet republics, precedence is given to societal fears, then material fears, and lastly personal fears. Clearly, the peoples of the Soviet republics are concerned about far graver issues, including civil strife, than the more materialistic worries of Eastern Europe and the more egocentric concerns of the West. Citizens of the former West Germany are closer to citizens of the Soviet republics than to either West or East Europe in their fears.

The hopes and aspirations clustered into these three groups are somewhat different. Among "material" concerns are old age security as well as general and personal economic conditions. Societal mentions by respondents include freedom, peace and political stability. Personal mentions include family well-being, good health, children's health and happiness.

In the West, material and personal hopes are equally paramount, with societal hopes far behind. In East Europe, material hopes dominate, with personal and then societal hopes far behind. In the Soviet republics, material hopes are also first, although far below those in East Europe, and societal and personal aspirations considerably behind. In their hopes, West Germans are more like the other Western Europeans.

Finally, hopes differ strikingly by gender. Women's hopes deal primarily with personal matters in every country surveyed. On societal matters, women are more engaged than men in nine of the 12 countries surveyed -- in all five Western European nations, and in
most of the Eastern countries. Only on material issues are men, in all countries, east and west, more concerned than women.

**Leadership Support**

The most popular leader in Eastern Europe, and the man most important for the future of his country, is Vaclav Havel. More than two out of three people (68%) in Czechoslovakia approve his handling of the presidency despite the fact that he was a novice at politics -- a dissident playwright before the revolution -- whose grasp of foreign affairs was relatively low. His popularity tops 80% in the Czech lands, and while only 43% in Slovakia, he obviously enjoys the trust of a very significant minority of Slovaks. His strength probably reflects a greater strength than any other Czech could probably expect in the present situation. And his status casts other institutions in a favorable light. Says a 50-year-old medical lecturer: "I have confidence in Mr. Havel, and since he is ultimately responsible for the army, I put trust in the army, too."

His popularity and that of the changes reinforce each other. Of those who approve of Havel, an overwhelming majority also approves of the changes to democracy and free markets. The obverse is also true: of those approving of the changes, huge majorities approved of Havel. His popularity, even among those opposed to change, indicates that his ratings are to some extent independent of support for democracy and free markets. Among Czechs opposed to political changes, for example, 66% liked Havel; among those
opposed to free markets, 39% still approved of Havel. Even in Slovakia, one in four of those who disapprove of democracy still approve of Havel. The data also suggests that Havel's popularity increases the support of Czechoslovaks for the changes; as noted earlier, optimists who approve of Havel rate their country significantly higher (74% high and average) than those who disapprove of him (50% high and average).

Majorities disapprove of both President Lech Walesa in Poland and Prime Minister Jozef Antall in Hungary, but for quite different reasons.

Antall is less popular than his own political party, 34 and 40% respectively, and his party is less popular than any of the three main opposition parities. The FIDESZ Youth Party is far ahead in the favorability ratings with 73%; even the ex-communists, now called Socialists, get 39%, essentially equal to Antall's Democratic Forum.

Hungary appears to be suffering a profound disenchantment with the new political process as it has developed, probably due to the quagmire over long-running disputes over privatization, even though now partially settled. "I've never heard about a privatization that wasn't criticized, let it be a hotel, or Tungsran (light bulb manufacturer) or anything. They say we're trying to give away the country. No matter whether it's a slow process or fast one, it's never right. People only concentrate on the disadvantages," complains Istvan, 60, a biological research manager in Debrecen.

Poland's Walesa rates higher than Antall, at 42% favorability,
but it is a far cry from his election victory margin of over 70%. Scoring higher is Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Polish-born American academic and former presidential security advisor, with 49%. Last winter's bruising election campaign and bitter squabbles with Parliament clearly eroded Walesa's standing. The Catholic Church, with which Walesa is associated in the public mind, is in even greater trouble with Poles than Walesa (see below). Opposition to Walesa is correlated with opposition toward the Church; of those disapproving of the Church, fully half (51%) also disapproved of Walesa. In contrast, of Czechoslovaks disapproving of the church, only 24% disapproved of Havel.

Walesa is also linked to the Central Alliance, the political party which encompasses most of the Solidarity trade union movement. The Alliance's popularity stands at a mere 29%, significantly below the opposition Democratic Union (at 37%). This low Alliance rating reflects the reduced popularity of trade unions in the country as they have become political forces. "I have changed my opinion about Solidarity, which I've been a member of since its very beginning in 1981," says a Krakow worker. "I believed it to be a union of the most upright people, but now my view is that it's just another clique wanting power." "The unions are not interested in workers enough, more in politics and political contests now," adds Ryzard, 48, a teacher in Krakow.

Walesa seems highly dependent on union support; more Walesa supporters are found among those with a favorable view of unions (37%), while among those critical of unions, there is
proportionately less support for Walesa (26%).

A final problem for Walesa is that he has driven away the intellectuals who, with the workers, put together the remarkably successful Solidarity movement a decade ago. He is being accused of authoritarian instincts, of being responsible for the emergence of Tyminski because of the quality of his campaign against Mazowiecki, while his champions call him the Polish de Gaulle. In short, Walesa has few of the features that make Havel popular and effective.

The huge level of Bulgarian support (69%) for Prime Minister Dimitur Popov is considered a passing phenomenon. He is a caretaker figure, a compromise non-politician chosen by the political parties after street rioting forced out the Bulgarian Socialists, formerly the communists, despite their victory in free elections in June, 1990. Attempts at coalition governments under different men failed until the non-partisan Popov was chosen as prime minister. But this impasse has meant that fundamental restructuring of the system has not yet begun in Bulgaria. In fact, because of the severe strait jacket imposed by the communist rulers, Bulgaria has never really tinkered with reform in the way of other East European states.
**Views Of Change**

"The changes have brought a sense of freedom, of liberation, because now we have the opportunity to use our creativity, without paralyzing restrictions," says a Calvinist theologian in Hungary. "But I worry we may fail to make use of this freedom, and that people will use it only for their own enrichment."

The peoples of Eastern Europe approve the revolutions of 1989 but dislike many of their effects on themselves or their societies. Approval of the political and economic changes of the past two years ranges from overwhelmingly positive to luke warm. Enthusiasm is generally higher for economic restructuring than for political reform in Eastern Europe. But even where changes are greeted warmly, the effects of the changes are considered overwhelmingly negative.

Most positive about the revolutions are the former East Germans, with 9 out of 10 approving the changes. Czechs and Lithuanians are also very enthusiastic, with almost 8 out of 10 positive. Poland and Bulgaria are solidly positive, with over 6 out of 10 for the changes. But the Slovaks are dubious (49% pro, 42% con), as are the Hungarians (47% to 39%). In effect, the jury is still out in Hungary and Slovakia on whether the revolution was good or bad.

In material terms, some East Europeans are elated by the changes. "Everything is in the stores. There is no waiting in line. I can buy my child a banana if I can afford it. At one time one couldn't even buy a stupid orange for a sick child in the
hospital," says a middle-aged weaver in Krakow.

But all of these nations, however supportive of change writ large, see more negative than positive effects from the revolutions.

Asked about their views on 11 measures of society's well being -- such as how hard people worked, how well they got along with each other, whether their spiritual and family values had improved -- only Lithuanians said 8 of the 11 effects were good. At the other end of the scale, Hungarians and Bulgarians found 10 of the 11 effects bad.

"Hungarian folk dances are of two types," muses a Hungarian engineer. "One is lively and cheerful, the other sad, mournful, melancholy. If we were to dance now, we'd dance the second type."

Hungarians believe the only good effect of the revolution is that people work harder now. The Bulgarians believe the single positive effect is the new way they "think about things." Virtually all of the other nations surveyed also believe that they "think about things" more positively now. "This is most important to me, to change the thinking of people, more than the economic effect, that they recognize their responsibility to society," says an institute director in Prague.

Hungarians and East Germans were negative about the "new way of thinking "however. Slovaks and East Germans felt marginally more effects were bad than good; Poles and Czechs felt marginally more effects were good than bad.

The worst effect of the changes was on law and order, and on

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interpersonal and interethnic relations. All nations but one feel that law and order has suffered (Poland). All except two peoples believe people care less about each other now (Czechoslovakia and Lithuania).

"People are irritated, uncertain," says a Slovak economist in her mid-20s. "Before, when two friends met, they asked: `how are you?' Now they ask: `Do you still have a job?' Before we were closer to each other." All except one feel relations among people have worsened. All without exception reported that relations with other ethnic groups had deteriorated.

**Political Pluralism And A Free Market Economy**

"There are so many changes that one has no confidence in the new system either," complains a 19-year old student in Budapest. Democracy and free market economy do not always go together. Spain, under Franco, was largely a free market system under an authoritarian ruler; South Korea under various leaders has been that way until very recently. On the other hand, many democracies in Western Europe, such as those in Scandinavia, are so highly regulated that they are significantly less "free" than those of Japan or the United States.

All of the nations of Eastern Europe like the change to free markets more than to democracy, except Bulgaria (and Lithuania) where both are approved equally. (In contrast, Russian and Ukrainians prefer democracy more than free markets.) This preference for free markets is accompanied by overwhelming
approval of democracy, however. Of those for market economies, seven out of eight are also for political pluralism. Even those against market economies showed healthy support for democracy, i.e., 30 to 60% for pluralism. In short, we found a heartening support for democracy even among those who oppose -- and probably are being harmed by -- the market changes.

The implication is that East Europeans, more sensitive to economic than political events, are likely to tolerate political disarray more than economic dislocations in their national lives. Put another way, they could become so impatient for "economic miracles" that they will blame free markets for the crime and sharp dealings that accompany any economic upheavals, let alone revolutions like those of the past two years.

But which should be pushed fastest, politics or economics? Instead of politics controlling the economy as in the past, economic considerations will now rival, if not take precedence, over politics. Yet there are disputes in each country and throughout the region about which should take priority.

A Prague woman maintains that "the economy won't be reformed by old politicians, only by new ones." And a Bulgarian lawyer argues that "most important for this country now is political stability as a condition for economic reform."

The interdependence of politics and economics is not in doubt; neither can lag much behind the other without grave consequences to both. But as in other matters, timing is most important on which takes precedence. Circumstances will decide each country's pace.
East Europeans, accustomed to statism even before the communists arrived, are strongly in favor of a social democratic form of capitalism -- margins of up to 5 to 1 for a "Garden of Sweden," as it were -- rather than the free market capitalism of the United States and Japan. Despite their overall enthusiasm for free markets, they are at least as determined to be protected from capitalists and entrepreneurs as they are anxious to attract foreign money and expertise. They want the state to retain a dominant role in industry and transportation, but even though majorities want retail outlets to be private (except Bulgaria), significant minorities want both the state and private individuals to own restaurants and shops. There is no reason in principle why state and private ownership cannot exist side by side, but the political, economic and social compromises necessary to make it work -- to permit a healthy market economy to emerge -- are daunting, particularly for nations new to democratic traditions.

Specifically, huge majorities favor state ownership of mining, heavy industry, phones, and trains and buses. Large majorities favor the state-run banks, health care, and radio and television stations. For newspapers and farms, returns are mixed. A majority of Slovaks, Hungarians and Bulgarians want newspapers state-run rather than private. Narrow majorities in all countries favor private ownership of the manufacture of consumer goods (except Bulgaria), and overwhelming majorities favor private ownership of shops (except in Bulgaria where a majority prefers
state ownership). Restaurants should be privately owned, according to majorities in all countries. But significant minorities in all countries also want state or cooperative ownership of all industries and services in our questionnaire.

East Europeans who are optimists about their personal future are much more approving of efforts to establish a free market economy than are pessimists, by as much as 20 to 1 in East Germany, as low as 3 to 1 in Hungary.

Democratic sentiment may be eroding in Poland and Hungary because of difficulties in converting to free markets. Privatization squabbles in the parliaments certainly have made the political process appear squalid and ineffective. The privatization dispute has also hampered the conversion to a market economy. All peoples say the pace of market changes is too slow, except for the Slovaks. At the same time, parliament is criticized by majorities in all East European countries except in Bulgaria. Wide-spread apathy is seen, particularly in local elections. Only in Czechoslovakia does a clear majority say it retains its interest in politics (65%).

Signs of disaffection with the political process in Hungary are particularly noteworthy. Hungarians are most critical of their parliament (47%) and among the most dissatisfied with the pace toward free markets (46% say "too slow"). So few vote in local elections -- in one recent case, only 17% -- that the election had to be held again to get the required 50% turnout to be valid. Signs of political polarization, particularly among the elite, are
strong. Of all the changes of the past two years, for example, Hungarians say they like least (after price rises) the political changes, including the multiparty system, democracy and pluralism (16%). But the opposite view gets even more support: a larger proportion says what they liked best about the changes are political freedom (18%) and the multiparty system (14%). Diametrically opposed groups appear to be responding. More significantly, both of these opposing groups are overly represented with the best educated and best paid Hungarians, i.e., the upper echelons of its society.

Bulgarians seem most innocent and appreciative of the political change. Alone among East Europeans, they give majority approval to parliament (42%). And what they liked best about the changes, they said, is their "restored civil rights" (23%). Bulgarians were arguably the most repressed nation in East Europe (although Romanians may have been as bad off) prior to the 1989 revolutions. The Turkish minority especially suffered widespread human rights violations. Bitterness among Bulgarian Turks remains despite the overthrow of the communists. Says a 33 year old Turkish engineer: "The only change is they don't give me a ticket any more for speaking in Turkish; that's all."

The breakdown of support for democracy and free markets by gender, age, education, and community size shows striking patterns. Men, significantly more than women, back both the change to the multi-party system and to a free market economy in all countries.
For democracy, almost twice as many men than women on average (40/26%) strongly approved the change. And many more men than women on average (35/25%) strongly approved change to a free market.

Young people under 40 years of age, the more highly educated, and city dwellers most favor the reforms. These same young, male, educated urbanites, in all eight East European states or Soviet republics, supported unlimited profits for entrepreneurs.

Institutions

"Trust in social institutions is lacking," says a Bulgarian lawyer and member of parliament, "-- in legislative, executive and legal power. And this is a common problem for the whole of Eastern Europe. It is connected with the exaggerated expectations created last year. A new social contract is needed, a new elite that will make people believe in state institutions. All the rest is in second place. Without trust in the state institutions, it is hard to hope that we will develop democracy."

Most of the social institutions in Eastern Europe get votes of confidence in most of the countries, in the form of majorities or pluralities. But they also get disturbingly large unfavorable ratings and sometimes huge number of "no opinion" for such agencies as the courts and the army. Some institutions, like the courts, were never pillars of independence in these nations. Certainly they have not been part of the democratic societies for very long.

The institution of the church has survived the communist period best. Least approval goes to the parliaments. The level of support
for trade unions is the most surprising in view of the fact that they were totally coopted by the communists -- the "transmission belt" for Party orders -- when in power and might have remained more suspect than they are.

UNIONS

"Those who win the trust of trade unions, they will win the war," claims a Bulgarian professor, "because the trade unions appear to have a more significant role in our reality, they fit the mentality of the nation much better than parliament."

The largest majorities approving trade unions are found in East Germany (68%) and Bulgaria (53%); in Slovakia, while only 42% expressed support, the ratio was 6 to 1 for the unions among those giving either approval or disapproval. Poland gives unions a slim majority (33% vs. 28%), while Czechs and Hungarians are roughly split on the organizations (Czechs - 24% vs. 24%; Hungary - 30% vs. 33%). Overall, however, unions had the lowest negatives of all the institutions in the region.

Unions, more than any other institution, deal in the nitty gritty of what matters most now in that region -- jobs and living standards -- which explains the support we found in practical terms. In some countries, like Bulgaria, the trade union movement has been visible in fighting for price restraints and welfare for unemployed. Says the secretary in an industrial firm: "If we can expect real help from somewhere, it's the trade unions." "Employees must be protected against entrepreneurs," echoes a Slovak
“and the unions are the only one backing the working man.”

Poland's Solidarity, when it emerged a decade ago, justified Moscow's demands that unions be kept under a tight rein throughout Eastern Europe. It was the first independent union in the Soviet bloc whose major task was to protect the rights of the workers that succeeded, despite the imposition of martial law, to change Polish history. The Polish experience undoubtedly contributed to the more sympathetic attitude in East Europe toward unions which is shown in our findings.

The region as a whole experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization during the communist period, particularly Bulgaria and Slovakia which had been the most agrarian states there. (One measure of this is that in 1939, less than 20% of Bulgarians lived in cities; in 1989, over 60% did.) Bulgarians and Slovaks, who show most support for unions, favor socialist values more than the other peoples of the region. In Bulgaria, where the intelligentsia was more leftist than in the other East European countries, the greatest union supporters are among the best educated, the middle aged and the better paid. In Slovakia, most union support came from middle aged men in big cities -- presumably peasants converted to workers after World War II. These workers are apparently a conservative force in the country now, in so far as those who approve of unions are somewhat more hostile to President Havel.

Czech antipathy toward unions, in contrast to Slovak approval (Czechs - 24%; Slovaks - 42%), reflects the high level of support
communists enjoyed among trade unionists, both in the late 1940s when the communists were voted into office, and following the Soviet military invasion in 1968. Unions were considered a brake on the 1989 revolution for some time and may today as well. Says a Prague worker: "Before November, as a joke, we said unions were the `B' team of the Communist Party. Now they should be protecting the people, but they don't seem to be working that way."

Hungarians, for their part, are hostile toward collective activities in society; to them, the family is the basic unit of activity and solidarity. (In a 1982 European value survey, when asked if you would sacrifice for anyone outside your family, West Europeans answered no by margins of 38% to 64%; Hungarians stood out with 85%. But asked if they preferred to spend their leisure time with family, Hungarians answered yes almost twice as often as West Europeans. Cited in Elemer Hankiss, "In Search of a Paradigm," Daedelus, Winter, 1990, p. 183-211.)

Polish support for unions is minimal -- at 33% vs. 28%, it is barely significant statistically -- which is surprising since the Solidarity movement was in the forefront of the successful effort to oust the communists and eventually brought Walesa to the presidency. Strikes for higher wages in recent years have cut into support for industrial unions, as has Solidarity's political activism and support for Walesa's dubious campaign to bring down the former Mazowiecki government by arguing that reforms could go faster. "Our trade unions are more political parties now, but they
play that role badly," complains a computer specialist in Krakow. "They don't know which place in society to occupy."

All East Europeans were positive about the influence of "the Church," as it was put in our survey. The phrase was used generically, and allowed to mean Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, or whatever the respondent chose. In one country, Poland, where religion has been a particularly powerful political force in recent years and where the population is largely homogeneous, "the Church" clearly meant the Roman Catholic Church and the responses were remarkable.

In Poland, the Catholic Church is in trouble, even more than unions. The Church, identified with the anti-communist, independence movement, played a decisive role in the bloodless revolution of the past decade and has become the foremost power-broker in the land. Politicians vie for its support, but a backlash has developed. "Like the trade unions, the Church has found itself in a completely new situation," admits a Polish priest. "They are not doing what they ought to be doing, and they both must change." And again, more than with Solidarity, the unpopularity of the Church has hurt Walesa who is closely associated in the public mind with it. Of those disapproving of church influence, over half also disapproved of Walesa (51%).

The Church receives the lowest approval rating from Poles of any East European peoples -- 46% favorable to 39% unfavorable, a barely significant majority. Poles listed the Church's role in public life as the third worst effect of the political and economic
changes of the last few years, immediately after high prices and unemployment. In no other nation was such censure given, let alone volunteered. When asked specifically if the church plays too large or small a role in society, 70% said too large. This was more than twice the anti-church margin of any other country. (Czechoslovakia was next, with 31%.)

"The church teaches only backwardness and narrow thinking," says a woman student teacher. "Recently I attended an obligatory course in premarital education, every week. I wasted a whole month. It was completely useless. I cannot repeat a single reasonable sentence from what we were told."

This level of antagonism is all the more striking because Poland is the most religious nation of the region. The explanation appears to be that Poles saw the Church during the communist period in a vastly different role than now. With independence, Poles want the Church to leave politics and social policy-making.

Fully 67% of Poles favor abortion, which is only slightly lower than all of East Europe (80%+), including Lithuania where 75% approve of abortion. The Church, of course, adamantly opposes it. But the Church has antagonized Poles in other ways, too. It wants religious classes in schools that would de facto be compulsory, and it has sought to eliminate from the Polish constitution the clause that separates church from state.

Poland aside, the church as a social institution appears to have weathered the communist period in East Europe. It has not disintegrated under the twin pressures of ideology and corruption.
In all nations of East Europe, majorities of up to 6 to 1 (Bulgaria) approve the influence of the church on society. But there are also signs that the level of religious profession has dropped over the past 40 years; at least, it is now lower than in Western Europe, as we will discuss later. Suffice to state here that East Europeans apparently want the church to remain in the background. Everywhere in the region except in Poland, majorities say the Church plays just about the right role now in the country's political life -- which is relatively small.

Bulgaria, where the Orthodox church is dominant, is different. "The authorities in this institution (the church) in our country are nomenklatura as well," observes a Sofia sociologist. "It's a pity."

In attitudes toward capitalism, which constitutes another of the institutions scrutinized, East Europeans are hungry for but wary of foreign investment. And they are critical of state-run institutions although, as noted earlier, they want a strong state-run sector as a hedge against private entrepreneurs.

At the extremes, Hungarians are by far the most enthusiastic for private businesses and businessmen, big and small. People who run their own firms are favored by a 6 to 1 margin. Slovaks and East Germans are most dubious. Hungarians are also most positive toward investors from other countries (65%), with Slovaks least positive (27%). Hungarians most favor large private companies (61%), Slovaks least (30%).

We found considerable misunderstanding of foreign investment in
our discussions in Eastern Europe. A Polish pensioner complains that foreign purchases of land could mean "Poland might fall into foreign hands."

"That reminds me that Poles are like the dog which can't eat the bone but won't let anyone else eat it either," responds a computer expert in Krakow. "We have nothing here, no technology, no normally functioning economic life, but we fear foreigners. What do we fear they'd deprive us of? Our debts?" Poles are not the most hostile people to foreign investors. But of four foreign threats, Poles most fear economic domination by the west -- more than a Soviet military invasion, Soviet economic collapse, or a flood of refugees. The potential for unscrupulous politicians to exploit Polish bigotry -- and Walesa made a thinly-veiled anti-semitic appeal during the presidential elections, for which he later apologized -- could well dim the attraction of doing business with Poland.

"No one will be investing in a country which is practically a volcano, and no one knows when this volcano might erupt," complains a Bialystok lawyer.

The parliaments of East Europe fared worst among social institutions, as noted earlier. Only the Bulgarian legislature got modest approval (42%), while elsewhere, disapproval ran as high as 5 to 1 in Slovakia.

"They have bandages over their eyes, solving problems in the dark, without a program, a definite goal," complains a university librarian in Debrecen. "It's like a circus."
East Europeans obviously are disappointed with the bickering and partisan squabbling that these national parliaments have often exhibited. They complain about the theatrical quality of some legislative sessions when they are televised, and about the time spent on peripheral issues, such as national symbols: whether the Polish eagle should again wear a crown, and whether the Hungarian emblem should be topped by the crown of St. Stephen. But the difficulties in writing new constitutions as well as laws to govern the first truly civil society for most of these nations is a difficult, laborious process that requires more understanding and patience than most of these peoples seem prepared to give.

Television and newspapers are given strong votes of support for providing information, at least during the revolution. Now they are far less appreciated. In every country are heard such critical words as dislike and distrust, disturbingly nasty, sensationalism, partisan, unaware of their responsibility, and calls to punish journalists for untrue information. The sentiment for state ownership of media is disturbing, for it raises doubts as to whether East Europeans really understand and distinguish between a "free press" which may be irresponsible and a "fair press" in which a censor decides what is "fair" (Newspapers - 22% of Czechoslovaks favor state ownership, 30% of Hungarians, 19% of Poles and 38% of Bulgarians. Radio and TV - 40% of Czechoslovaks favor state ownership, 47% of Hungarians, 35% of Poles and 55% of Bulgarians).

The inclination toward censorship is significant, with majorities favoring banning some books and political parties if
offensive to them (Over 50% in all the East European nations surveyed favor banning of books with dangerous ideas with as many as 71% in Hungary; 57% of Hungarians also favor outlawing some political parties compared to 34% in Poland, 36% in Bulgaria and 39% in Czechoslovakia). A mixed state and private ownership system is preferred in most nations. But such an arrangement is difficult to balance even in very well established democracies (such as Britain). It would be particularly so in Eastern Europe as the media seek to change their economic base from reliance on state subsidies to earning revenues based on advertisements, circulation and viewer ratings.

Local authorities who collect garbage and fill potholes get approval in Hungary (46%) and Czechoslovakia (36%), but marginally negative notices in Bulgaria (38% disapprove) and Poland (39%). Majorities in all countries claim they continue to be concerned about news of local events but as mentioned earlier stet; majorities also admit they are losing interest in politics (except in Czechoslovakia where 65% disagree). Local government is usually first to suffer such apathy.

Police get positive ratings overall -- very positive in Poland, by almost five to two -- 50% vs. 20% -- with Czechs making the only negative judgment (23% positive vs. 33% negative). The publics are torn between conflicting fears -- of crime and domestic spying. Says a Prague student: "I'm still afraid of the secret police; I still get an unpleasant feeling, I don't know why..." And a woman doctor adds "Yes, I trust normal, ordinary police. They are very
important to insure public order." Rising crime, in some countries up 50% in the first half of 1991, makes police protection far more important than previously, and probably is taking precedence now over memories of ordinary police being used by secret police for surveillance and other political jobs.

The armies of these countries were all given positive assessments. The military is especially highly regarded in Poland (60%) and Bulgaria (66%) where the populations are most apprehensive about foreign threats.

In Poland, where militarism and nationalism runs strong (as we shall see in Section C), the army figures particularly highly in that nation's romantic image of itself as the defender of Western Christianity against Tatar and Turk, and more recently as its ultimate guardian against the Russians (60% approve, 6% disapprove). Rightly or wrongly, it was always expected to refuse communist orders, if ever issued, to fire on Polish citizens. Now, whether warranted or not, trust in it remains strong; "You can always rely on the army." an older Polish woman says simply.

Courts were also judged more positively than negatively, but the margins were often small with a large number of "don't knows" registered. Courts in Eastern Europe never had power and influence approaching the judiciary in the West, particularly in the United States. Under the communist regimes as well as in pre-war days, courts largely did the bidding of the rulers in political matters, including meting out punishment to dissidents. In civil and criminal actions that did not impinge on ideology, the courts were
viewed as fair if not wise, and law as a profession has been experiencing new respect in some countries such as Hungary as communist rule eased.

"It is safer to subject oneself to justice now than it was before," a Polish priest says. But a Polish entrepreneur, warns: "In Poland, the judicial branch (of government) has never been fully independent, and it still is not strong enough to be independent. As long as such a situation exists, and our law is not strict, there is a danger that certain special regulations might be declared to bypass the law by someone in power, such as Lech Walesa."

**Internal Conflicts And Instabilities**

Most dangerous of the internal conflicts and instabilities of the region will be the ethnic and nationality disputes within borders, as in Yugoslavia today, as well as those that could easily spill across frontiers.

Standing out in this respect is Czechoslovakia, which (as related earlier) is even more two nations today than before the "velvet revolution." Slovaks by two to one are angry at how power is shared with the Czechs, and by four to one believe the new Federal relationship is unfair. As its economic difficulties grow, Slovakia could become a separate state in Eastern Europe, perhaps with Russian or Ukrainian protection. Few expect such adventurous behavior from the former Soviet Union in the near future. But small concessions such as favorable terms for purchasing oil could go far
toward persuading Slovaks, who are already more sympathetic to socialism than most others in the region, that such independence would be preferable to continued federation with the Czechs.

The level of ethnic nationalism and hostility we found within all countries is disturbingly high. They reinforce arguments that the international community, which has shown itself largely impotent to stop the violence in Yugoslavia, should take steps to prevent new conflicts. One way would be to intensify pressure on the new democracies of the region to build strong civil and human rights guarantees in the constitutions and monitor their implementation. Majorities which do not respect minority rights seem certain to suffer violent outbursts.

Self-determination is already a well-established principle in international affairs to which large, already defined ethnic entities can appeal. But smaller and more diffuse groups, most of which will never reach the size or influence necessary to create a separate nation, need to be guaranteed greater cultural, social and perhaps political autonomy by the majorities in East European countries.

Some ethnic and religious groups which are too small to be a threat to the majority are nonetheless the targets of resurrected animosities of Eastern Europe. Over history, they have been used as scapegoats. Gypsies are one. All nations surveyed are overwhelmingly hostile to these largely nomadic peoples (Bulgaria - 71%, Czechoslovakia - 72%, Hungary - 79%; GDR - 57%). Another are Jews, and although the hostility is much lower, the world's
sensibilities to anti-semitism is far greater because of the Holocaust by Nazi Germany (Bulgaria - 9%; Czechoslovakia - 20%, Hungary - 12%, GDR - 12%, Poland - 34%).

Poles and Slovaks are considerably more anti-semitic than the other nations of the region. One in three say they don't like Jews, with unusually large percentages of "don't knows Poland - 26%, Slovaks - 24%). "The contemporary "Jewish Question" is how the Poles and Slovaks can be anti-semitic without Jews. "We are such terrible racists!," a middle-aged Polish librarian explodes. "We cannot say that anti-semitism doesn't exist here." "No," an industrial nurse sadly replies, "because it does."

About 10,000 Jews still live in Poland, among some 30 million Poles, which is about three-hundredths of one percent. The percentage cannot be much greater in Slovakia where a puppet regime also helped Nazis kill Jews during World War II. Arguments have been made, most recently by Adam Michnik, a former dissident and distinguished newspaper editor who is a Polish Jew living in Warsaw, to view anti-semitism as a manifestation of anti-democratic sentiment. Our results to not support this theory. Poles are not more or less in favor of democracy than other peoples, and we found no statistically significant correlation between anti-semitism and opposition specifically to free markets (ie., those who may be pained by the economic changes and turn on Jews) or with opposition specifically to democracy. However, among those opposed to "change" in its broadest context -- to both political and economic changes -- our data find somewhat more people unfavorable to Jews (Czechs -
29%, Slovaks - 41%, Poles - 44%, Hungarians - 14%).
The conclusion is that malcontents, including those often lowest in
education and social place, are most anti-semitic.

Anti-semitism correlates with opposition to change in eight of
the nine peoples (including Czechs and Slovaks, but not Bulgarians)
of Eastern Europe. In the overall survey, anti-semites were
predominant among the poorest educated in most nations, including
in France; the exceptions were Russia and the Ukraine where those
with average education were most hostile to Jews (Russia - 35%, the
Ukraine - 30%). Not only older people (60 and above) were
unfavorable to Jews. In Poland, anti-semitism was found in all age
groups, with the young (under 25) almost as hostile as the very old
(Polish youth - 39%; 60+ - 41%). In Russia and the Ukraine, the
young (under 25) were more anti-semitic than the old (Russian youth
vs. 60+ - 31% vs. 23%; the Ukraine - 29% vs. 14%) In Slovakia, the
middle-aged, from 25 to 59, were the most hostile to Jews (age 25-
39 - 34%; age 40-59 - 36%).

Anti-semitism also goes with those professing strong religious
beliefs in most European countries, we found. This relationship
will be described in the subsequent section on religion.

Hostility toward gypsies, on the other hand, shows no
correlation with religious profession. In East Europe, dislike runs
as high as 18 to 1 against gypsies among those Czechoslovaks who
answered positively to the religious questions; in Hungary, it was
5 to 1 against gypsies. In Spain, gypsies fared best in our survey,
with equal numbers favorable and unfavorable.
The virulent hatred of gypsies in East Europe follows no other defined pattern, either. It is just as strong among supporters and opponents of recent changes. In some countries, like Hungary, anti-gypsy sentiment was stronger among supporters of change (84% vs. 77%) and among those with higher (82%) and average (80%) levels of education.

Bigotry by age was also unsystematic. Slovak youths under 25 were 100% hostile toward gypsies, whereas in Czech lands, the prejudice was concentrated among the 60 year olds and older (96%). [In Poland, where a near-pogrom against gypsies occurred in July, the attitude toward gypsies was not asked in our survey.]

"People automatically consider a gypsy a criminal," admits a well-educated manager in Prague. Skinheads go out on weekends intending to kill gypsies, he adds.

"We, the whites, are very angry at gypsies," says a Slovak driver. "They are given flats (apartments) and I heard that they sold things out of them, or had open fires right inside the flats. I won't give them a job. I hate them."

**Individuals And Society**

As they rush into the future with baggage from the past, East European society and its members today are fragmented and disoriented, even demoralized, by the changes of the past two years. The "social contract" that existed between the Communist rulers and the people has disintegrated, with no new one in place. "There are so many changes that one has no confidence in the new
system either," says a Budapest university student; "I hear speeches in parliament, prices are going up, but the state is incapable of presenting a comprehensive program."

Totalitarian structures have collapsed much faster than totalitarian consciousness. The peoples lag in learning new meanings of old words like private property, profits, and even democracy. They are all pleased to be rid of their previous communist regimes, yet they remain attached to key features of communist societies and "socialist" values. Cut loose from their Marxist moorings, social tensions are rising swiftly as they seek a place in their new democratic worlds.

But these societies were not blank pages in history before the communist takeovers. They were not strangers to despotic rule, and in fact, obedience in quasi-feudal relationships was encouraged by state and church before World War II. Authoritarian behavior by individuals in Eastern Europe was accepted and even desireable in the region. (Ivan Volgyes, "Politics in Eastern Europe," p118).

These societies also reflected the attitudes of the dominant religions and the cultures they fostered. Roman Catholics put a higher premium on obedience, for example, than Protestants who permit greater individualism. Western Christianity, for its part, permits more challenges to political authorities than Orthodox churches like those in Bulgaria (and Russia). Orthodox lands never experienced the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment and as a result, they have sufficiently different values, particularly in relationship to the state. A map of the region
separating Western and Eastern Christianity would divide Eastern Europe roughly north from south. Such a line separates the Baltic States from Russia, splits the Ukraine, passes along Hungary's southern border, and separates Croatia from Serbia before reaching the Adriatic Sea.

"Left value systems are present in the mentality of our people," says a Bulgarian sociologist. "In Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Slovenia, the complex of ideas and values which we call socialist or communist, left values, had very serious opponents, in liberal and Christian values which in our country were never as explicitly present."

Had the communists never come, the larger effects of industrialization, urbanization and secularization on Eastern Europe after World War II would probably have moved these nations toward political pluralism. What happened instead was that onto the hierarchial foundations of largely agrarian societies of the region, the communists attempted to build a "new communist individual" living in a "new communist society." Socialist values were implanted through the many socializing tools (media, unions) at their disposal. Certain values were emphasized more in some countries than others.

"Socialist patriotism," for example, converged with traditional state and ethnic nationalism, which explains in part why it has resurfaced with such strength and virulence throughout the region. Anti-imperialism never caught on, as seen by the highly favorable ratings the United States (as high as 77% in Poland) and Germany
(as high as 78% in Hungary) receive in the region. In political life, the communists reinforced the earlier reluctance of East Europeans to take part in politics except in limited and sanctioned circumstances. But the turnout at the first free elections, at least, indicated that the people were anxious to express themselves after centuries of being ignored.

On the other hand, communist attitudes toward religion may have left their mark on these societies. The level of support for abortion suggests that pre-war attitudes toward church teachings and societal pressure in Eastern Europe have changed more than the world-wide trend toward secularization would explain (Bulgaria - 73%, Czechoslovakia - 80%, Hungary - 81%, Poland - 67%). The relatively lower level of religious profession in East Europe, compared to Western Europe, is another indicator of this effect.

Contemporary Western values such as consumerism and privatism (which conflict to some degree with the puritan ethic, of course) have gained a great deal of acceptance, beginning in the 1970s when communist rule began to ease. But it's not certain that these new features in East European societies are capable of sufficiently motivating and regulating a dynamic economic renewal.

In sum, East Europeans manifest an intriguing mixture of individual and societal values today. Some originate in distant identities, others from their recent socialist past, and still others reflect what they hope or fear will be the features of their new world. Precisely what these new values may be is not known, of course. But there is no doubt that these values are being
scrutinized by these peoples now. Our survey found that one of the greatest impacts of the political and economic changes on these peoples is how they "think about things" (Bulgaria - 49%, Czechoslovakia - 51%, Hungary - 38%, Poland - 43%).

"The change of the system means spiritual renaissance," says a Bulgarian ex-communist.

**Family And State**

Nothing will change until we do away with the Homo Sovieticus that lives in each one of us," says Jerzy, a Polish lawyer in Bialystok. East Europeans expect the state to do much more for them than West Europeans, who in turn expect more from their states than Americans. Most East Europeans would prefer the state to ensure that nobody in society is in need, rather than allow everyone to be free to pursue life's goals without interference; (Bulgaria - 60% vs. 31%; Czechoslovakia - 40% vs. 49%; Hungary - 64% vs. 28%; Poland - 73% vs. 23%) except the Czechs, who preferred freedom. All overwhelmingly expect society via the state to do what's necessary to ensure equal opportunity for all citizens, to take care of the poor, and to guarantee every citizen food and shelter. The West has these same sentiments.

Yet East Europeans are more cynical about the effectiveness and purpose of state activities. A majority in every East European nation believes that any state-run enterprise is usually inefficient. They have differing views about whether the state controls too much or too little of their lives, and whether
the state is run for the benefit of the people. Most Poles feel the state controls too little (64%), while most Hungarians believe it controls too much (57%). Most Czechoslovaks and Bulgarians agree the state benefits the people (65% and 53% respectively); Hungarians (56%) and Poles (55%), Russians (66%) and Ukrainians (72%), do not.

Majorities of 90% in all of East Europe and the Soviet republics say they retain "traditional values about family and marriage," but most feel family values have suffered from the changes. Remarkably, most East Europeans (unlike West Europeans) want marriages where the husband works and the wife stays home, except in Bulgaria where a majority (54%) opts for modern marriages. The explanation is that the people in these states now want the opposite of what was encouraged of them by the former rules. In most of Eastern Europe, the communists wanted both husband and wife to work; so now in reaction, these peoples want the wife to stay home. In Bulgaria, the rulers strongly encouraged traditional marriages, so now, Bulgarians prefer women to work (54%).

Even Bulgarian Turkish women who live in villages want to work if they have a higher education. "I would never give up my occupation," says a middle-aged woman physician. "I will never stay at home if I start working in my specialty," insists a young unemployed woman electronic technician. "I cannot imagine spending my whole life at home," declares a woman medical student; "a part-time job at least, but I would prefer to work."
As asked what occupation they would like for their children, a significant number in all East European societies mention physician — highest in Poland (22%), and in Spain (21%), — among the top 10 vocations volunteered in each country. A surprising number of middle Europeans — East Germans, Czechoslovaks and Hungarians — mention skilled workman (by 28%, 20%, and 15%, respectively), which suggests that pre-World War II values still survive to a considerable degree.

Virtually no one, east or west, want their children to be farmers except in Bulgaria and the Soviet republics — and even there, it was not many (in Bulgaria, 6%; Ukrainians were highest with 8%, Russians lowest with 4%). Only in Poland and Lithuania did parents want priests in the family (5% and 3%, respectively). Only in Hungary did parents cite computer programming as a job they would like for their children, and only in Hungary did parents say they wanted "anything the child wants to be."

**Education**

A goodly portion of East Europeans are snobs, but they are not alone in this. One out of four Poles and Hungarians believe they do not have much in common with their less educated fellows, which is about the same level as in the United States. The rest of East Europe and the Soviet republics deny such elitism, perhaps reflecting the decades of communist rule when workers were lauded over, and paid more than, professionals.

Religious education was not specifically mentioned in our
survey, but comments in our interviews indicate it will increasingly become a political issue. The churches in countries such as Hungary are aching to reclaim secular schools that were confiscated by the previous communist regimes, and the Catholic Church in Poland has pushed for religious observances in schools.

"The situation at my son's school is that the headmaster has to obey the priest who teaches there," complains a Krakow secretary; "to me it was a great scandal last year when the minister of education said she had to introduce religion into schools; what does she mean she had to? She could have resigned."

Environment

All East Europeans, and West Europeans, and Americans, are overwhelmingly sure (90% and above) the world should have stricter laws to protect the environment. But asked if they are willing to pay higher taxes to carry out such laws, the approval rate drops to about 60% on average. There is clearly a green vote in East Europe, although how successful green legislators will be in taking practical steps to clean up the region is uncertain.

Some fear is also expressed that western investors will take a callous attitude toward the environments of these nations. But the ecological consciousness of East Europeans is suffused with the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. "If what we read about the Kouzruduy nuclear power plant (i.e., its dangerous condition), the ecological problem may turn out to be the most urgent one facing the country," says a Bulgarian economist.
Religion

Poles and Slovaks are the most religious as well as the most Catholic peoples in East Europe. Strong belief among Poles is spread across all ages: 3 out of 4 Poles under 25 years of age never doubted God's existence as did 92% who are 60 or over. Bulgarians, who are mainly Orthodox, are third highest in religious beliefs, with Hungarians and Czechoslovaks least religious (Bulgarianas - 50% never doubt God's existence; Hungary - 49%; Czechoslovakia - 45%). Both of these nations are the most pluralistic in East Europe, with larger numbers of Protestants and other religions in their populations.

East Germans are the most atheistic of all, with only 8% of young people under 25, and 50% of those 60 or over, saying they never doubted God's existence. But predictions by Marxists at how fast the "opium of the people" would wither have clearly been wrong in East Germany. (By 2000, the number of believers was supposed to be down to 10% of the population, according to 'Der Spiegel'. We find 27% of East Germans, overall, who do not doubt He exists.)

In the other nations, pluralities deny that prayer is important. Some peoples, like the Czechs and Russians, register majorities that doubt God's existence. Hungarians are evenly split on God's existence, but this masks a striking gender difference most pronounced among Hungarians: 55% of men doubt, but only 41% of women doubt. Over 60% of Hungarians under 40 years of age also doubt. Finally, doubters are more numerous among opposition parties (60%) than among the governing party (30%), which indicates that
political parties there have begun to divide along West European lines of Christian democrats and social democrats.

Despite the strong religious professions of the Poles and Slovaks, those two peoples are also most critical of the church (as mentioned earlier). Fully 70% of the Poles and 50% of Slovaks believe the church plays too great a role in the political life of the country. (Russians and Ukrainians believe the role is too small.) The more pluralistic countries are less critical of the church, probably because the churches there are weaker.

It is striking that the most religious people in this region are most hostile to Jews. This is particularly true in Poland and Slovakia. Poles who have a very unfavorable view of Jews say, by margins of 9 to 1, that prayer is an important part of their daily life, that God plays an important role in their lives, and that they never doubted God's existence. With Slovaks, the correlation of anti-semitism and religion is somewhat less gross; those who don't like Jews say, 7 to 1, that they never doubt God's existence. Another correlation is that among Poles who say God's role is important and that His existence is never doubted, fully 1 out of 2 express dislike of Jews; among Slovaks, the prejudice was only a little less blatant.

Lithuania and Hungary, in contrast, showed the least correlation between religious profession and anti-semitism. Lithuania is nearly as Catholic as Poland about considerably less religious, by our measures, than Poland and Slovakia. Of those for who God's role was important and never doubted, fewer than 1 in 7
Lithuanians showed hostility to Jews; the figure was about 1 in 6 for Hungarians. The level was slightly greater in France (i.e., about 1 in 5) and rose to about 1 out of 3 in West Germany and Russia.

**Women**

"An intelligent woman is the enemy of men," says a Slovak pediatrician; "Societies are men's on principle," echoes a Bulgarian journalist.

Women have a worse life than men, according to majorities in East Europe, the Soviet republics and Western Europe. But the farther east, the worse it gets for them. Another way to put the results: women live best in the west, not as well in East Europe, and far less well in the Soviet Union. In Western Europe, about 4 in 10 say men have the better lives; in East Europe it is 5 in 10; and in the Soviet Union, almost 7 in 10. Similarly, East Europeans say women have fewer rights than men, except in Hungary where fully 37% maintain that women have more rights than men.

Gender differences are surprisingly large on several questions. As noted earlier women are significantly less enthusiastic for the changes than men. On hopes and fears, women aspirations focus overwhelmingly on personal matters and slightly less on societal issues. In every country in East Europe and in the Soviet republics, women are losing interest in politics faster than men. This is most striking in Russia, where 60% of women say they are less politically motivated now, compared to 44% of the men, but
it extends throughout the region. This may reflect the scarcity of women candidates in last year's elections; one study found that in Moscow, whereas one in three candidates were women when the communists ruled, one in six were candidates in the first free elections. The same may be true of recent democratic elections in the other nations. On another issue, on whether the state should provide food and shelter for the poor, considerably more women than men in the region said yes. But in all nations except East Germany, significantly more men than women complained that the state controls too much of their lives. And the men in all nations without exception felt stronger that the political and economic changes had a good influence on how they think about things.

WORK

"I'm more aggressive, more exacting toward others, more demanding of myself. I've started to fight for my just rights," says a Krakow woman haberdasher. "I have started to look for work that could really satisfy me."

In Prague, a lab technician puts it this way: "I like most the idea that if I wanted to start a business, I could do so, that it depends only on myself. I don't have to become part of a big factory, a small cog."

Slim pluralities in East Europe say people, some presumably fearing unemployment, now work harder than they did before the changes, except in Bulgaria where they feel the changes had a bad effect on work (77%). All of these peoples show that the
enterprising spirit has not been killed. Overwhelmingly, by margins of at least 2 to 1, these people prefer to be paid on an incentive basis, allowing them to earn more or less, depending on how hard they work, rather than on a fixed salary basis. In the west, the preference is reversed, with the same overwhelming majority preferring safe, fixed salaries.

But in interview comments to us, the people complain that those who get rich will be suspected of working "in the shadows," as a Bulgarian lawyer puts it; and that the present elite are beholden to the former leadership in a "you-scratch-my-back" exchange of favors. And there is bitterness toward incompetent management and corrupt city officials still in power.

Says a doctor in Slovakia: "in our teaching hospital, two of the three top positions are held by very, very heavy alcoholics, absolutely incompetent. I am terrified at the thought of the chief physician looking at one of my patients. Conditions like this can't exist even in Bangladesh. Why are they still in charge? Because the Mafia (network of old boys) is so powerful, even nowadays."

People are more dissatisfied with the organization they work for than with the kind of work they did, and those unhappy with their place of work are, perhaps surprisingly, more likely to want to be paid on an incentive basis rather than by fixed salary. Job satisfaction falls off rapidly going west to east. From 93% in the United States, it drops to the 80 percentiles in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the 70s for Poland and Bulgaria, and the 60s or lower in Russia and the Ukraine. Satisfaction with
employers is at a lower level throughout, from 84% in the United States to 58% in the Ukraine.

**Emigration**

Dissatisfaction with jobs correlates with desire to emigrate. The younger and best educated are more anxious to emigrate, which if realized would have an adverse affect on economic recovery in these nations. Emigration is not only a future problem. Estimates are more than 1.5 million persons have left their countries in Eastern Europe over the past two years, an emigration that constitutes a continental drift of individuals. In Bulgaria, over 400,000 have departed, "greater than the number of all men killed in all the wars Bulgaria has ever had," says a Sofia economist. Half were Turks, most of whom worked in agriculture, but the rest were skilled persons "connected with the intelligentsia" and will seriously impede national recovery unless they can be persuaded to return, the economist adds.

**Personal Morality**

Whether the communists have robbed East Europeans of confidence in themselves is not certain. East Europeans believe in themselves enough to choose incentive pay rather than fixed salaries. But all are depressingly self-doubters about how much they control their fate. Significantly more East than West Europeans believe hard work offers little guarantee of success (Bulgaria - 47%, Czechoslovakia - 50%, Hungary - 81%, Poland - 63%, GDR - 57%, UK - 52%, France -
50%, Spain - 42%, Italy - 44%, FGR - 57%) and that success in life is determined by forces beyond our control. (Bulgaria - 73%, Czechoslovakia - 55%, Hungary - 67%, Poland - 66%, GDR - 52%, UK - 51%, France - 57%, Spain - 56%, Italy - 54%, FRG - 61%) And huge majorities, often well into the 90 percentiles, believe the rich get richer, the poor get poorer, which is significantly higher than the West European majorities on this question.

East Europeans, however, admire people who get rich by working hard. Hungarians are the most cynical on these matters; more than one in four say, perversely, that they do not admire people who get rich by working hard. But to a marked degree, Hungarians also appear more liberated, even exhilarated by the changes of recent years; 66% of the better educated favor both the political and economic revolutions in their lives.

The Czechs also stand out, and not only in comparison to the Slovaks, although that relationship helps make the point. Czechs, to a marked degree, are already part of Western Europe; Slovaks remain one of the most distant parts of East Europe. Slovaks are less politically mature, more alienated from democratic processes, feeling far more victimized by the revolution, more fearful of capitalism and foreigners, more prejudiced.

East Europeans are also less tolerant of deviant behavior and politics than the west. All nations registered majorities saying they would bar homosexuals from teaching in schools; the same majorities in the west would permit such teachers. All East European states would bar free speech to fascists by two to one
margins; Western Europe (except for West Germany) and the United States would not limit free speech.

East Europeans are more in line with western attitudes about "dangerous" books and nudity. All nations in the region would ban books containing "ideas dangerous to society" from public libraries; so would all western publics, including the United States. And East Europeans agree that nude magazines and sexually explicit movies are harmless, including the Catholic Poles but excluding the prudish Russians (51% against). The American and Italian publics also don't consider such entertainment to be harmless. Finally, East Europeans do not consider AIDS to be God's punishment (nor does any Western nation in the survey), although Lithuanians and Ukrainians think it might be.

Overall, East Europeans take more seriously the modern world's extremists -- perhaps because they've had less exposure to them, perhaps because they have suffered more at the hands of extremists. But Poland among them was most moralistic in believing there are clear lines about what's good and evil in the world. Czechoslovaks, East Germans and Hungarians are least sure that absolutes exist.

**Militarism, Patriotism And Nationalism**

All East Europeans are patriotic, although at levels below the American high of 88%. Most would again impose restrictions on entry into their countries, except for the Bulgarians (as well as Russians and Ukrainians). All believe that parts of neighboring territory belong to them, except for those peoples whose nations
include large parts of their neighbors. Slovaks, for example, are evenly split on the question and have a very large Hungarian minority. Russia and the Ukraine are content with their borders, which include large minorities annexed after World War II. Poles believe peace comes through strength; in this they are unlike the other East Europeans but like Americans. Poles and Bulgarians (like Americans and Britons) believe they should fight for their country, "right or wrong."

Poles dislike all other peoples by the largest amounts among any country. They are the only nation in the survey, east or west, in which 3 out of 4 persons said they had little in common with people from other ethnic groups or races. In all other countries, majorities rejected this premise, often by huge margins. In Poland's eastern region, anti-semitism was significantly higher than in the nation as a whole (one in 2 were hostile to Jews, vs. one in three nationally), but the Poles there dislike Ukrainians (47%) as much as Jews, and hostility to Lithuanians (22%) and Byelorussians (15%) is also at significant levels (at least one in 4 were unfavorable). Only distaste for Germans (53%) was higher in this most xenophobic region where Poles allude to Vilnius and Lvov as Polish cities.

These results indicate a high degree of militarism in some states, particularly Poland, whose people are xenophobic as well as nationalistic. This is a concern to well-educated Poles. "Nationalism can be very dangerous to our future," says a Polish businessman. "Here nationalism means a romantic, mystical way of
thinking about Poland. It shows a non-European way of thinking."

Militarism also runs high in Bulgaria, which approves of its army even more than Poland. Slovakia is nationalistic, with the two political parties using the Slovak nation's name to attract majority (69% and 55%) support. The separatist movement there, while perhaps masking Slovak yearning for the old command communist system, is a major force in the country.

The belief that national lands lie in neighboring countries is most widespread in Hungary (68%). The present government insists it does not seek recovery of these lands and their ethnic Hungarian peoples, but few in the volatile Balkans would bet on what tomorrow might bring as refugees threaten to stream across borders.

NEW DIRECTIONS AND THE COMMUNIST LEGACY

POLITICAL

The greatest hope for the region is the budding political pluralism, even more than efforts to create a free market. Democracies seldom if ever have been first to attack another country, and if they become well established in Eastern Europe, the dangers posed by militarism and nationalism, and by the barely hidden desire to recover former lands, should be mitigated.

These new democracies, while still fragile, shows healthy signs through much of the region. Populations are impatient for results and growing skeptical of the political process, but large majorities say they support politicians who are willing to compromise. Huge majorities say they want to keep up with national
affairs, and most even want to keep current with local affairs. Most would allow even fascist parties in their democracies, and all by large majorities would oppose greater constraints (like censorship) on newspapers. Finally, majorities or large pluralities in all countries would vote in parliamentary elections if held next week. All are losing interest in politics, but East Europeans retain greater interest in politics than their Western cousins.

East Europeans are more skeptical of the democracy they have newly embraced than are Westerners. More than in the west, they complain that people like themselves have no say in what the government does (Bulgaria - 89%, Czechoslovakia - 76%, Hungary - 85%, Poland - 88%). But they are not much different than the West in the levels of dissatisfactions with politicians, i.e., elected officials quickly lose touch with them (Bulgaria - 77%, Czechoslovakia - 85%, Hungary - 82%, Poland - 88%) and don't care what people like them think (Bulgaria - 21%, Czechoslovakia - 30%, Hungary - 32%, Poland - 23%). But, much as in the west, they largely believe voting gives them some say in how the government runs things, although this generality masks major differences between peoples in the region. Czechs, Hungarians and Bulgarians believe voting gives them a say, Poles adamantly do not, and Slovaks are on the fence.

Majorities in Poland and Bulgaria say their fellow citizens are mostly trustworthy although Czechs and Slovaks were not so sure, and Hungarians strongly disagreed (2 to 1). Distrust is not a social characteristic consistent with democracy, political
scientists say, but in this indicator, the French, Spaniards and Italians are distrustful like the Hungarians. In fact, Hungary is probably the farthest advanced toward democracy, with fairly well defined political parties that were first to stand in free elections (compared to Czechoslovakia where political parties are just forming and Poland where the first parliamentary elections are set for this fall, and Bulgaria where, after the first elections were won by former communists, the results were overturned by popular outcry). This tempts the conclusion that trustworthiness is a value that divides Europe's north from south, more than west from east. Moreover, we found no correlation between trustworthiness and attitudes toward political or economic changes; those believing their compatriots were trustworthy did not support democracy or free markets any more or less than the skeptics.

Nonetheless, the minority problems in all of these nations require caution in predicting that democracy will survive. Until majorities stet insure rights to minorities, the danger of clashes and the potential for authoritarian rule will remain high. "If we don't sort out this problem of minority rights," says a Polish professor, "we will be making our way forward to Europe with a xenophobic ball and chain dragging us back."

**Authoritarianism**

"Totalitarianism can always be a threat, but especially in a time of transition, as now," says a priest, adding "Liberty for us has always been the forbidden fruit. The paradox of freedom is that
once it is achieved, it's a great burden, which everybody would like to shed. One of the forms of escape from liberty is to long for what we had before, authoritarianism."

The pre-communist disposition toward authoritarianism among the northern three states of East Europe -- Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary -- has already appeared in Tyminski's challenge to Walesa in the final round of presidential elections. He is the shadow on Poland's successful fight for independence. With dubious credentials, the unknown Tyminski received about one-quarter of the vote after a campaign which had earmarks of early stages of fascist movements. Some authorities fear that this will be the direction that social frustration in the region will turn if economic recovery is not achieved soon.

"There exists in our country a clientele for totalitarianism; the case of Tyminski was proof of this," says a historian in Krakow.

Longing for authoritarianism appeared in the willingness of majorities in almost every East European country to circumscribe their freedoms for material guarantees. Asked whether everyone should be free to pursue life's goal without state interference, or whether the state should play an active role in society to guarantee that no one is in need, only among Czech people is the preference for freedom. The others are willing to have their rights impinged upon. Moreover, huge majorities in all nations are willing to ban fascist political parties, and all are also prepared to ban dangerous books.
While East Europeans are not very much different from westerners in book banning, the absence of checks and balances in their new democracies, particularly in established and respected judiciary systems to insure civil rights, makes this finding also disturbing.

Finally, the preoccupation with symbols of previous imperial reigns in Poland and Hungary, as well as the open support for the former king (tsar) of Bulgaria to return, suggests a sympathy for authoritarianism also. "I see Bulgaria as a monarchy," says a Sofia drama specialist; "the chaos will bring us to a situation where we will need the tsar to guarantee our boundaries."

HISTORY SHAPES THE FUTURE; LOOKING WEST

Germany And The US

"In which time do we live?" asks the East European satirist. "If we constantly look into the past, will we dive back into the past? Do we live in the present or look to the future?"

"Which past?" responds a dramatist. "The closer past or the farther one?"

Domestically, East European nations are not reconciled with their own communist past, which has already become a major factor in their present politics. On the broader map of Europe, they cannot escape their geography. Both their military and economic security are hostage to their position between a strong Western Europe and an unpredictable, fragmenting Soviet Union. And globally, the East Europeans want American and German economic aid and support, but recognize the reality that the remnants of what
was once the USSR will always exert the strongest of tugs and pulls stet in whatever direction history determines for the once mighty Communist empire.

**Revenge And The Old Regime**

The nations of the region are split on whether to identify and punish those people who were responsible for injustices of the old regimes. More than two out of three East Germans and a majority of Poles, Czechs and Bulgarians want blood. But Slovaks by a 2 to 1 margin, and Hungarians by a bare majority, would look to the future and forget. These two peoples may take similar views for different reasons, however. Slovaks have residual empathy with the old regime, while for Hungarians, their most repressed days are most distant of all in East Europe.

But when it comes down to the issue of justice vs. efficiency, all East Europeans chose efficiency. All agree that top level people from the old regime should be kept on, rather than replaced, if they are doing a good job (Bulgaria - 58%, Czechoslovakia - 62%, Hungary - 79%, Poland - 79%). "Top level people" in smaller cities and villages probably include local mayors, who needed communist support (or at least neutrality) to get the jobs initially and who, in many cases, now have already been voted back into those positions. "Party shadow doesn't bother me," says a Bulgarian member of parliament, "as long as the man or woman is a professional, competent, and not criminal."

In Hungary, where this issue has been wrestled with for somewhat
longer, there is even a pugnacious attitude among former communists who feel they are being badly treated and should be accepted as liberals in the new democracy. Says a socialist who, with his family, has been physically threatened because of his past Communist Party membership: "Wherever I go I'm identified with things I had nothing to do with. I'm not willing to take responsibilities for all of those mistakes (of the communists), not even out of a sense of party loyalty. The country must now recognize that a left-wing politician can be as valuable as a politician belonging to other parties."

More than any other, this issue of assessing blame for the old regimes may be "the cemetery problem" in which only the death of those with personal grievances will lay the issue to rest.

**National And Economic Security And The USSR**

None of the nations of Eastern Europe cited a Soviet military attack as their biggest fear, even though they were all concerned about a Soviet move on them following the January 1991 crackdown in Lithuania and Latvia. Whatever the outcome of Moscow's present convulsions, the threat from beyond the River Bug will always be a dangerous fact of life in Eastern Europe.

East Europeans had mixed views before the aborted coup in Moscow on how best to protect their national security. Three possibilities were offered in our survey: NATO membership, regional defense pact, or individual treaties with a neighbor. Most sentiment was for individual defense treaties (Bulgaria - 27%, Czechoslovakia - 32%,
Hungary - 23%, Poland - 33%), with regional pacts next (Bulgaria - 27%, Czechoslovakia - 28%, Hungary - 37%, Poland -13%). Poland expressed the most sentiment for NATO association (30%), and least for a regional pact.

East Europe has no security assurances from the all-encompassing Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Yugoslavian civil conflict and Albanian refugee panic have dramatized the self-imposed impotence of the European Community to mediate such explosive issues.

None of the East Europeans like each other. Each feels threatened by all of their neighbors. East European peoples in our survey don't often identify themselves beyond their own nationality as also being "European." More than half of Bulgarians say they never think of themselves as European, and a plurality of Czechs, Slovaks and Poles say the same. Whether this self-perception will be a major problem in integrating the former Soviet bloc nations into the West is not certain, but the responses appear to be another manifestation of insularity and ethnic nationalism that most authorities believe will impede the process.

On the other hand, perhaps "Poland's road to Europe leads through the east," as a Pole in Bialystok says. "History convinced me that we are dependent on the Russian market, on the eastern market. The tragedy is that it will be ten years before there will be someone over there to negotiate with. Our only option is to become imperialists in the East, to put it jokingly."
Friends, Enemies, Strangers

Despite their past hatred toward Moscow, these states are not uniformly hostile to the Soviet Union nor critical of its influence today. Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are most antagonistic. But Bulgaria and East Germany think the Soviets have a good influence in their country. Almost one in two Bulgarians (46%) believe the Soviets have a positive effect on their country, and more than one in three (38%) feel the Soviets would be a dependable ally. One out of four Slovaks (24%) also feel the Soviets are having a positive influence on them and 15% feel the Soviets would be good allies. Perhaps, a Slovak woman suggests, this lack of hatred arises because "we got rid of them without a single man dead. And in the end, if they hadn't started (with reforms), we'd still be silent; if not for them, we'd have stayed where we were."

Poles are most hostile toward Moscow of all East Europeans. Their dislike is spread equally between Germans and Russians. In fact, these two countries, which have invaded and carved up Poland for a millennium, virtually exhaust Poles in their first responses to which nations constitute the greatest threat. Fully 33% of Poles consider the Soviets the biggest enemy, another 32% see the Germans as most threatening, and 31% don't know or can't name any; Romania and Czechoslovakia share the remaining 4% of Polish dislike. The story is told that in the early 1980's, when the Poles felt in danger of invasions from both the Soviets and the East Germans, they had to decide who they would fight first. "Germany," said one Pole;
"business before pleasure."

Czechs see the Soviet Union as their main enemy (37%), followed by the Germans (15%); Slovaks, in yet another indication of their difference from Czechs, see Moscow as significantly less hostile (27%), and see the Hungarians as almost as much their enemy (22%), four times more than the Czechs do. But 9% of Czechs and 13% of Slovaks also fear the Poles. Hungarians, for their part, see their main enemy in the Romanians (42%), more than twice the number who view the Russians as the principal threat (20%).

They also give Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks enemy status (16% and 8%, respectively). And as noted earlier, Czechs and Slovaks not only differ on practically everything of importance; they are also hostile to each other.

Much as East European states believe everyone around them is hostile, so they see few allies nearby. The United States rates uniformly high -- between two-thirds and three fourths of all populations consider its influence to be positive. Germany scored next best: highest in Hungary (78%), almost double the Polish rating (41%). Some surprising findings were the popularity of France throughout the region, particularly in Poland (26%); but France was not mentioned in Hungary. Similarly, Austria got high marks in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and Japan was rated relatively high in Hungary (72%), (and in Russia (37%) and the Ukraine (44%) as well).
SECTION V
RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE

At the end of August the Soviet Union of the past 75 years disappeared. As the new leaders jockey for power and the economic crisis deepens, their daunting task is not only to take their increasingly vocal and divided population into the twenty-first century, but also to deal with the legacy bequeathed to them by more than seven decades of communism and hundreds of years of history and political culture.

If political events were measured on the 10 point Richter scale, the events of August would come in at 8.5. There is life, but all the structures of society that existed before have either been pulled down already, or have had their foundations weakened to the point of shaking instability.

With the shattering of the Soviet system, those who live there and those who observe from the outside are unclear about the direction the former superpower will take. Will 15 Republics decide that they need each other and develop a loosely knit confederation, or will ethnic conflicts erupt into border wars? Will pluralism emerge, or will chaos invite a leader with a strong hand? Will people who at one and the same time were artificially homogenized and isolated from each other, create a functioning social system, or will the papered over cleavages create further alienation? Will a free market economy flourish, or will a primitive barter system and emergency measures replace the all-
controlling command economy? Finally, will the new units be a threat to the international community?

The Times Mirror survey, representative of the adult populations of the European portion of the Russian Republic, the Ukraine, and Lithuania, was conducted just prior to the earthquake that reshaped the Soviet Union. It and a follow up poll in Moscow and Leningrad provide a scientific measure of the attitudes, values, and qualities of the peoples of Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania, and enables us to suggest indications of what is to come.

Significant portions of the data underscore the conclusion that turning a one party state with a command economy into a functioning pluralistic country with a market system is an herculean task; and that even a more politically conscious population will have to overcome the heavy burden of a socialist legacy. The data also shows that, there is little comprehension of the basic principles of democracy and the free market among people who have lived in an hermetically sealed society for the better part of the twentieth century.

As the new leaders seek to fashion a different system, they will have to keep in mind the following very specific findings that emerge from the Times Mirror Survey:

1. The Soviet Union has fragmented and people are deeply divided. An empire, in which 120 ethnic groups were held together by terror and the tentacles of the communist party, no longer exists and carries within it the seeds of incalculable violence.
2. Pluralism and democracy are far from their historical and cultural traditions. While there was appreciation for glasnost and democratization, support for pluralism and the ability to develop a new relationship between the state and the individual is embryonic at best among people who have thought of themselves as objects of state policy, rather than its initiators.

3. The majority of people are not prepared for capitalism. Obsessed by their economic problems many think that they want a free market economy. But, the majority's socialist mentality still dominates and they do not understand the basic components of what a market system means in practice.

4. The people are searching for ways to deal with the social turmoil created by the withering of their old political and economic systems, and their doubts about what their country might be.

5. Their national identity crisis is raising questions about what role a weakened Soviet Union and the Republics will play internationally.

Our survey also revealed several specific and in fact surprising findings that need to be stated at the outset.

First, there is a large and unexpected gender gap in Russia and the Ukraine.

Second, there is an extremely hopeful generation gap, with those under 25 significantly more prepared to accept new political and economic structures.

Third, while understanding of capitalism is rudimentary at
best, even before the August events there were clear signs of political and economic differentiation, with the development of a reformist group of better educated people living in cities who are more prepared to work for and support change. The composition of those in the streets and who supported Yeltsin are testimony to the fact that those dedicated to change are willing to act on their beliefs.

In every society there are differences in attitudes between those who live in metropolitan areas and rural ones. This is no less true in Russia and the Ukraine. The differences, however, may have greater significance in this disintegrating empire than in other countries. In stable societies an adjustment between urban and rural interests are part of the normal political process. However, in a society which is in turmoil, which must make rapid political and economic change, and which most important of all must worry about feeding itself major disagreements between those who live in the cities and those who live in rural areas can be a serious brake on progress. If an increasingly politicized and reform-minded urban population must drag the preponderant portion of the population through the changes, not only are serious splits caused but also the process may well falter.

Finally, our survey makes crystal clear that the Lithuanians do not belong in the Soviet Union. In terms of their attitudes, they resemble the Germans or even the Americans more than they do Russians and Ukrainians, and even other Eastern Europeans. As a result, they will be treated separately in this report.
GENDER GAP

Communist doctrine boasted that it had liberated women; but, talk to any Soviet woman, and you will quickly learn that they have been liberated in order to work three times as hard as men: at their jobs, taking care of their families, and generally making things work.

Although there is disagreement between men and women, large majorities of both agree that men have a better life in the Soviet Union than do women. (59% Russian men agree, 68% women; 63% Ukrainian men agree, 80% women).

Many women stood side by side with men supporting Yeltsin and calling for Gorbachev's return, but our survey shows that on the whole Russian and Ukrainian women are considerably more conservative than the men. Whether it is due to the extreme difficulties of their daily lives, their role as nurturers, or perhaps some natural conservatism, Russian and Ukrainian women are more concerned with the consequences of economic and political chaos than are the men. They are also much less supportive of political changes and possible economic experiments. They are less interested in politics and much less willing to speculate about how to solve economic problems. Women, themselves, admit that the past few years have not had as big an effect on how they think about things. (44% Russian and 46% Ukrainian men say that the changes have had a good influence on their thinking, while 29% Russian and 37% Ukrainian women do).

Perhaps because women are working harder than ever to make
ends meet, make their lives work, and are less into political and economic discussion, they are not enjoying the psychological dividends of change to the same extent. Significantly fewer Russian and Ukrainian women than men approve of the political and economic changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union (Russian women 25%, Russian men 36%; Ukrainian women 30%, Ukrainian men 42%). While almost three quarters of Russian men (70%) approve of the introduction to a multi-party system, slightly more than half of the Russian women do (54%). A similar gap exists in the Ukraine where 65% of the women approve and 81% of the men do. As far as economic changes are concerned, women again approve less than men do. (Russian women 46%, men, 64%; Ukrainian women 47%, men 60%). The gender gap narrows at 25 or under, on the issue of multi-party democracy, where 74% of Russian men and women approve; however, it is just as wide on the issue of market economy where 79% Russian men approve and 60% women do.

Whether the issue is political, economic, or social, women across the boards exhibit strong conservative tendencies. For example, fewer Russian and Ukrainian women than men think that their respective republics should be independent (Russian women, 62% men, 70%; Ukrainian women 67%, men 76%). Fewer women agree that an individual has the right to own and sell property at the price he or she sets (Russian women 57%, men 73%; Ukrainian women 65%, men 74%). And women are not economic risk-takers, fewer would chose the incentive over fixed basis of pay (Russian women 59%, men 73%; Ukrainian women 73%, men 87%). More women agree completely that
AIDS might be God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior (Russian women 24%, men 17%; Ukrainian women 20%, men 9%)

There are a number of indications that women are much less interested in the political and economic debate. A quarter of Russian and Ukrainian women have no opinion on whether democracy and a move to free market economy is moving too quickly or too slowly. More Russian women than men admit that they are losing interest in politics; (Russian women 60%, men 44%). The percentage of Ukrainian women losing interest in politics while high at 46% is lower than their Russian sisters, and not much out line with the men at 43%.

There is one area in which women's views are less conservative than men's: the question of the right to have an abortion. An overwhelming majority of Russian women (87%) believe they should be able to have an abortion if they want one while 73% men agree. In more Catholic Ukraine, 85% women want the choice in comparison with 78% men.

**GENERATION GAP**

As might be expected, the younger people in any society are the most optimistic and the most interested in most change. The significant role they played on the barricades in August testifies to this profound sentiment. It is not unexpected, therefore, that this age group would have the more radical views on political, economic, and social questions. On the other hand, some also demonstrate dramatic nationalistic views that could prove
worrisome, given the fact that they have more possibilities to act on their feelings.

An overwhelming majority of Russians and Ukrainians under the age of 25, (74% Russians, 83% Ukrainians) approve of efforts to establish a multi-party democracy, in comparison to the one-fourth Russians over (33%) and the less than half Ukrainians over 60 (44%) who do. And, in fact, 45% young Russians and 42% young Ukrainians think the effort is moving too slowly. Younger Russians and Ukrainians also are much more in favor of efforts to establish a free market than are their parents and grandparents (70% young Russians, 16% of 70+; 58% young Ukrainians to 33% of those over 60). It is worth noting, that while younger Russians and Ukrainians are far ahead of their elders in favoring a free market, they are not as ready for economic change as those of their generation in Central and Eastern Europe.

Young Ukrainians and Russians are also much more pro-independence of their respective Republics than are their elders. (Young Russians 75%, over 70, 47%, young Ukrainians 78%, over 60, 60%)

Youth has allowed those under 25 to escape the socialist legacy. They are much more comfortable with the concept of farmers selling their land (72% of young Russians, 78% of young Ukrainians), allowing unlimited profits (67% Russians under 25 favor, 33% over 70; 71% young Ukrainians, 14% over 60), and borrowing from banks to start a business (89% Russians under 25 favor, 57% over 70; 95% Ukrainians under 25 favor, 65% over 60).
Interestingly enough, while the gender gap persists even among the younger generation, the percentage of younger women who are more supportive of change in all spheres is considerably higher than those of their mothers and grandmothers.

For seventy years Russians and Ukrainians, whatever their education or place of residence, or income, were supposed to have the same political views supporting the ruling party. Glasnost has made it possible for them to differ not only from the regime but also from each other. The survey does in fact point out that political views vary according to demographic factors, and that a potentially active elite of the better educated who live in cities is forming.

Because political parties are in an embryonic state in the Soviet Union, political differences can be sorted out best at this stage in terms of personalities or desire for independence. Throughout the survey it is evident that those who support Yeltsin are more progressive than those who support Gorbachev, and certainly than those who support the communist party. In the Ukraine, where there is no strong personality to match Yeltsin's, differences can be seen between those who support Gorbachev and those who support the communists. Also those who identify themselves as favoring a more independent Ukraine, are most likely to favor reforms in the political and economic spheres.

The political differences are evident throughout the analysis of the survey. The growing political gap is evident in responses to two key measures, support for the introduction of a multi-party
system and of a free market economy. In Russia, 73% of those who identify themselves as Yeltsin supporters are in favor of pluralism, compared to 54% of Gorbachev supporters, and 41% of those who favor the communists. In the Ukraine, 83% of those who favor an independent republic favor pluralism, 61% of those who back the Union do. On the question of a free market economy, in Russia 61% of Yeltsin supporters approve of it, 52% of Gorbachev backers, and 43% stet the Communists. In the Ukraine, there is no apparent difference between on the independence-union measure; however, there is a very large difference between the 65% of Gorbachev backers who are in favor of efforts to establish a free market and the 50% of those who support the communists.

The Empire Disintegrates--Ethnic Conflicts--An Identity Crisis

In the USSR of 1991, the center is weak and the Republics are in ascendancy. People who were forced to think of themselves as Soviet citizens are once again Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Armenians, Georgians. They dance in the streets, wave flags, and talk of their own currencies and armies. But when the euphoria dies they will have to consider how much faith they have in their Republic authorities, how they will survive politically and economically, how they will relate to other ethnic groups, and who they really are.

The Times Mirror survey indicates that deep doubts existed on all these issues before the August events, and that the cleavages evident in these societies will be extremely hard to bridge.
THE RED TAPE MONSTER

A clear message emerging from our survey was that Russians and Ukrainians resented the central authorities and were prepared to rely on their Republic institutions to deal with their problems. However, while they were dissatisfied with the Center they were not prepared to totally dismiss its role, and they had some doubts about the effectiveness of their Republic leaders and local authorities.

One man in Volgograd explained the public's feelings toward the center vividly, "That's why people are so angry with Moscow. Moscow is for them the head of that red-tape monster. Many ministries, many offices are only a nuisance, they stand in the way of progress."

When asked to choose which institution they could rely on most to deal with the problems facing their country, the largest proportion, 65% of Russians and 80% of Ukrainians, chose the Republic authorities. However, even in their frustration with the center, 45% of Russians and 53% of Ukrainians designated the central authorities as their first and second choice for dealing with the problems facing the country.

Even before the August events, only 21% Russians and Ukrainians believed that the USSR Supreme Soviet was having a good influence on developments in the country. Twice as many Russians and Ukrainians, but notably less than half, 45%, believed that their Republic parliaments were having a good influence. Furthermore, more Russians (33%) and Ukrainians (35%) believed that
their local authorities were having a bad influence than praised their performance. Of those surveyed, less than a quarter of Russians (24%) and 33% of Ukrainians thought their local authorities were having a good influence on the developments.

As might be expected, the younger generations are more supportive of Republic authorities, while the older ones continue to favor the Central system. In Russia and the Ukraine, twice as many people under 25 as over 60 see the Republic as the institution upon which to rely.

The more educated Russians favor Republic authorities over the center, 72% of Russians with the highest education support the Republics, while only 57% of those with the least schooling do. There is less distinction between those with different levels of education in the Ukraine, with 82% highly educated pro-Republics and 77% with less education favoring those authorities.

There is a visible urban-rural difference on this issue in Russia, where over 50% of those living in Moscow and Leningrad support Republic authorities, while 34% of those living in the countryside do. There is no urban-rural difference in the Ukraine on this issue.

**THE STATUS OF THE REPUBLICS**

While there is a clear choice away from centralized control to regional autonomy, there is some confusion about what the majority of people really want or expect as a future relationship between their republics and the center. Although strong support was
established by peoples in both areas for independence (65% in Russia and 71% in the Ukraine), when asked to give their first choice for the future, 64% of Russians prefer that their Republic remain a part of the Soviet Union, with more independence and authority. Only 19% choose the option of complete independence. Even a majority of those under 25 express the same views (52% for the union and 32% for complete independence.)

When Ukrainians were asked to say what they thought would most likely happen in the future, 54% said that their Republic would remain in the Union, and 39% saw the Ukraine as an independent country. Those living in Western Ukraine have a radically different view from those living in other sections. (76% of Western Ukrainians, in comparison to 40% of those who live in the center, 19% miners and those who live in the South think the Ukraine will become a completely independent country).

The ambivalent feelings about independence or union were evident when people explained their reasoning. Those favoring staying in the Union pointed out that it was impossible to manage without political and economic relations with other republics, that the Union should be preserved for the sake of power, and if the Union disintegrates then all lose. Those who wanted more independence thought that would hasten the solution of economic problems and that centralized power got in the way of normal development.

ETHNIC CONFLICTS
It is impossible for a nation composed of over 120 ethnic groups, with a variety of languages and different religious traditions to avoid ethnic controversy. The so-called nationalities question has posed a problem for every Soviet ruler, and for the Tsars before them. Each has tried to suppress and manipulate it in a different way.

The Times Mirror survey illustrates vividly the fact that communism masked innumerable, deeply divisive ethnic conflicts. Before the August events, it was clear that people of one Republic thought that those living in others were receiving more than their fair share of resources. Even those living in one Republic did not share common views, and differed from each other on the basis of their historical tradition or ethnic background. Ethnic groups showed signs of deep dislike for others.

In Russia and the Ukraine, almost 8 out 10 believe that the Gorbachev changes had a bad influence on inter-ethnic relations (79% in Russia and 76% in the Ukraine.) More than eight out of ten Russians and Ukrainians (84% Russians and 82% Ukrainians) believed that internal strife is a greater danger to the future of their country than outside threats. In fact, 71% Russians and 76% Ukrainians do not know or cannot think of which countries pose a threat to theirs--Germany, Japan, and the United States are each considered to pose a minimal threat -- 11% or less.)

As one young woman in Lugansk put it: "You know, I love my country very much. And I am grieved for everything. Why is it so that before perestroika our people did not fight over anything
between themselves. Take those Azerbaijanians or Armenians: Why did they not try to divide Nagorno Karabach stet. Before the perestroika?...It seems to me that due to this we have a complete breakdown."

Russians were evenly divided on whether some republics were more favored on the distribution of resources. They believe that Uzbekistan (10%), the Ukraine (9%), Khazakhstan (9%) and Byelorussia (8%) were the greatest beneficiaries; and that they, themselves, along with the Baltic Republics received the least. The Ukrainians are less inclined to believe in favoritism, 41% think there is none, 28% think that some exists. The Ukrainians agreed that they benefited, but they thought that the Russians (12%) and Byelorussians (10%) did even better. They agreed that the Baltics were the biggest losers.

**DIVISIONS WITHIN REPUBLICS**

If the disintegration of the Soviet Union proceeds, attention will not only be focused on the newly independent Republics, but also on the division within them. Our survey of the Ukraine provided dramatic evidence of deep cleavages within that Republic.

There are twelve million Russians living in the Ukraine. Our survey shows that they have quite different views on a number of pivotal issues.

It is not unexpected that the Russians who live in the Ukraine would be much more likely to name the Soviet Union as their country rather than the Ukraine. Of the Russians surveyed, 57% named the
Soviet Union, and 20% named the Ukraine. When asked what they saw in the future, 70% of them thought that the Ukraine would remain a part of the Soviet Union with more independence, while 49% of ethnic Ukrainians saw that future, and 45% saw the Ukraine as a totally independent country. (only 17% of Russians in the Ukraine chose that option.)

In comparison to ethnic Ukrainians living in the Ukraine, more Russians disapprove of political and economic changes (Russians 69%, Ukrainians 54%); of the introduction of a multiparty system (Russians 24%, Ukrainians 16%); of efforts to start a free market system (Russians 39%, Ukrainians 33%). More Russians living in the Ukraine disapprove of farmers selling their land (Russians 35%, Ukrainians 24%) and of an individual selling property for the price he sets himself (Russians, 25%, Ukrainians 19%). More Russians carry the burden of a socialist legacy, by believing that those who get ahead do so at the expense of others (46%) rather than thanks to their ability and ambition (38%), and that when people fail it is due to society (40%) and not their personal failures (45%).

More Russians think that a leader with a strong hand can solve their problems than do ethnic Ukrainians. (Russians 39%, Ukrainians 29%)

In addition, there are significant differences between those Ukrainians who live in the Western section of the country and the others. Western Ukrainians, generally were more favorably inclined towards the political and economic changes introduced since 1985. They were much more pro-democratic, and had a better sense for some
basic principles of a free market system. They were much more pro-Ukrainian, more religious, and more anti-semitic.

Despite these differences a majority of Western Ukrainians agreed with others that they did not like the overall effect of political and economic changes, ostensibly because of the disruption they had caused in their daily lives; more Western Ukrainians, 42% approved of the changes than did non-Western Ukrainians, 36%.

Western Ukrainians were also much more enthusiastic about the introduction of a multiparty system than were the others. They favored it by 84%, in comparison to the 70% of non-Western Ukrainians who approved. When asked what type of government they thought could best solve their problems, 67% of Western Ukrainians chose a democratic form, while 55% of non-Western Ukrainians did. Twice as many non-Western Ukrainians (31%) as those who live in the West of the Republic (15%) chose a leader with a strong hand.

When asked to name their country, more than three-quarters of Western Ukrainians (78%) said the Ukraine, and 10% named the Soviet Union. Less than half, 44%, of those Ukrainians living in other parts of the republic named the Ukraine, while 34% cited the Soviet Union. When asked to predict what would happen in the future, 80% of Western Ukrainians said that the Ukraine would become an independent country, while 60% of non-Western Ukrainians thought that the Ukraine would have more independence but that it would remain a part of the larger Union. As noted earlier there was no urban-rural difference in the Ukraine in support for Republic
authorities; it is explained by the very high proportion (73%) of those living in the Western Ukraine who choose that option.

Within the more religious Ukraine, the Western Ukrainians are considerably more religious than other Ukrainians who live in the Republic. For example, in response to a question about church attendance, 86% responded that they attended church (12% once a year, 54% a few times a year, 18% once a week, and 2% several times a week). In contrast, 56% non-Western Ukrainians attended church with varying degrees of frequency (31% once a year, 20% a few times a year, 5% once a week)

Although eight out 10 Russians (82%) and Ukrainians (81%) do not agree with the statement that they do not have much in common with people of other ethnic groups and races, other measures from the survey indicate that a level of prejudice does indeed exist.

While the Western Ukrainians are more religious, they also are markedly more prejudiced than other Ukrainians about Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and those who live in the Asian republics. They also are more anti-semitic than other Ukrainians. More Ukrainians (67%) have a favorable view of Jews than non-favorable (23%). However, a much smaller percentage, 55%, Western Ukrainians have a favorable view of Jews than do the 71% other Ukrainians.

Generally, Ukrainians resemble Russians living in Russia in their approval of efforts to establish a free market system. (Russians 54%, Ukrainians 53%). Interestingly enough, Western Ukrainians at 46% are much less approving of the changes than other Ukrainians at 53.
The Western Ukrainians, however, are much more supportive of other measures which indicate a readiness for a free market system. Of those surveyed, 70% Western Ukrainians believe that farmers should be able to sell their land, while 57% of the other Ukrainians do. Similarly, 79% Western Ukrainians agree that a person should be able to set the price for private property he wants to sell, in contrast to 65% other Ukrainians who agree with that free market concept.

In many societies, those who are better educated are more tolerant. That pattern does not hold in Russia or the Ukraine. In the case of unfavorable opinions about those who live in the Asian Republics, the Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians, those in society with the least education are more tolerant than those with more education. The least tolerant group of all are those whose education ended between the ages of 19-21. Those with the highest education are surprisingly bigoted especially in Russia, where more than half of them had unfavorable opinions of those groups (only in the case of the Asian Republics did the percentage fall to 38%). The pattern does not hold for feelings about the Jews, where the most educated are the most tolerant. One explanation for the lack of tolerance towards non-Europeans by the more educated is that they are also those who are least in favor of maintaining the Soviet Union.

One finding about young people gives cause for concern. People under the age of 25 in Russia give very high disapproval ratings of non-European publics: 55% disapprove of Georgians, 59%
of Armenians, and over 50% of those who live in the Asian Republics (52%) and Azerbaijanis (56%). With the notable exception of those who live in the Western Ukraine, the Ukrainians are only slightly less prejudiced. 42% have an unfavorable opinion of Azerbaijanis, 39% of Armenians, 30% of those who live in the Asian republics, and 31% of Georgians. It should also be noted that the highest percentage of those holding unfavorable views about Jews can be found in those under the age of 25 in Russia (31%) and the Ukraine (29%).

The level of anti-semitism in Russia and the Ukraine at 26% and 22%, respectively, is among the highest of the countries surveyed, higher than in any other former bloc country, except Poland (34%). The least anti-semitic group in Russia are those over 70, where 20% expressed unfavorable views. The same is true in the Ukraine, with 16% of those over 60 with negative feelings towards Jews.

**Patriotism and Militarism**

Their national identity crisis clearly has some effect on the Russian and Ukrainian peoples feelings of patriotism and militarism. The nation that has frightened the West during the preceding half century, is actually composed of people who are not highly militaristic, and far less enamored of force as an instrument of policy than is the American population.

Three out of five Russians surveyed (61%) agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force, which is significantly
below the 84% of British, and 77% of French, who feel this way. Far fewer Russians, 23%, feel that military strength is the best way to ensure peace. Again Western opinion is more hawkish; 52% Americans, 41% British and 43% of the French agree that military strength is the best way to ensure peace.

Six out of ten Russians and Ukrainians see themselves as patriotic (Russians - 60%, Ukrainians - 61%), which is comparable though somewhat lower to the people in newly-liberated Eastern Europe; however, Russians and Ukrainians are more equivocal about their patriotism than people of other nations. Just 21% of the Russians surveyed, and 22% of Ukrainians completely agreed with the statement that they are very patriotic. In ascribing characteristics to each other, less than 50% thought Russians were patriotic, and 35% of Ukrainians.

Indeed, lower levels of militarism and patriotism were evident among those groups in Russian and Ukrainian society most committed to change. Among young Russians, 48%, and Ukrainians, 47%, said that they were patriotic, compared to 83% of the oldest Russians and 82% Ukrainians. Of those in Russia who continue to favor the communist party 76% described themselves as patriots, compared to 58% who describe themselves as Yeltsin supporters. In the Ukraine, 77% of those who favor the communists see themselves as patriotic, while 60% of Gorbachev supporters do.

Interestingly enough, the Red Army continues to command respect from people in all strata of society, for all political groups, and from all generations. However, Russians do not see the
institution as having a leading role in solving their current problems.

Almost half of the Russian and Ukrainian respondents prior to the coup attempt, (Russia - 45% and the Ukraine - 43%) said that the Red Army was having a good influence on society, compared to 25% Russian and 26% Ukrainians who thought it was having bad one. However, only 16% of Russians and 7% of Ukrainians mentioned the Red Army as their first and second choices for dealing with the problems facing the country. In fact, 8% of both Russians and Ukrainians said the army could be relied on least. As one might expect, those groups who continue to identify with the traditional pillars of Soviet society, have the highest regard for the Red Army, while those questioning the system are less effusive. A considerable percentage of those under 25, in Russia (41%) and in the Ukraine, (40%) expressed the view that the Red Army was having a bad influence.

**Political development; support for the multi-party system**

Even before the August revolution, the Russian and Ukrainian people were generally approving of developments in the political sphere. They approved of efforts to establish a multi-party system, and they appreciated their new freedoms.

It is interesting to note that prior to August 19, Russians and Ukrainians were much less concerned that political liberalization would not continue and that there might be political repression (15% - Russia; 16% - Ukraine), than they were worried
that their economic problems would not be resolved (18% - Russia; 17% - Ukraine). In Russia, those who live in Moscow and Leningrad approve of political pluralism to a much greater degree than do those who live in rural areas or villages (Moscow - 69%; Leningrad - 67%; the countryside - 46%). In the Ukraine, there is a similar gap in urban-rural approval of the multi-party system (Cities - 83%, rural - 68%).

It should be kept in mind that a quarter of the Russian public (26%) explicitly disapproved of the effort to establish a multi-party system, and 14% had no opinion. Of the Ukrainians, 18% disapproved, and 10% had no opinion.

When asked what they liked most about the way things have changed, Russians and Ukrainians put Glasnost, openness, freedom of speech at the top of the list, followed by democratization in the country and society. While these changes top everyone's list of changes, the gender gap is evident in the level of support for these choices. Interestingly enough, there is very little difference between Moscow, Leningrad, and the rural areas on this issue.

**INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY**

Although Russians and Ukrainians make clear their appreciation for glasnost and democratization, the Times Mirror survey presents evidence of the difficulty these people are having in trying to develop a new relationship between the individual and the state. They tend to rely on traditional family and religious structures,
while they consider a new political and economic system.

Even before the August revolution, one of the survey's most important findings indicated that 36% of Russians, 41% of Ukrainians and 61% of Lithuanians said that the changes in the Soviet Union had more of a positive than negative influence on "how I think about things." Clearly the nights in the streets, not only energized those who participated, but also had a profound effect on those who waited in their homes. What is yet to be determined is whether the events of the mesmerizing week affected permanently the deep-rooted feelings about the subservient relationship of the individual to the state, and long-embedded ideas about the minimal value of the individual as opposed to society-approved egalitarianism.

STATE CONTROL OF PEOPLE'S LIVES

Their communist and pre-communist traditions have conditioned the Russian and Ukrainian people to the state running their lives. It is not surprising that in both Republics less than half (49%) agree with the proposition that the state controls too much of their daily lives.

While there is no gender difference in the Ukraine, Russian women are significantly less concerned about state control than are men (42% women in comparison to 58% men)

There is also a marked generational contrast in reaction to state control. In Russia, 55%, and in the Ukraine, 55%, of those under 25 agree that the state controls too much, while in Russia
only 30% and in the Ukraine 27% of the oldest people hold that view.

**STATE UNFAIRNESS AND INEFFICIENCY**

While there is evidence of equivocation as far as the question of whether the state controls their lives too much, there is no doubt in the minds of the Russians and Ukrainians that the state has not been run for the majority of the people and that it has run the country inefficiently. Only 26% of Russians and 22% of Ukrainians believe that the state is generally run for the benefit of all the people. As to the sentiment that when something is run by the state it is usually inefficient and wasteful only Americans (67%), the Poles (77%), and Italians (74%), top the Russians (63%), and Ukrainians (64%).

There are gender, educational, urban vs. rural, and affluence differences on the issue of whether the state is run for the benefit of all people; however, the truly significant disparities are evident between older and younger generations as well as among those with differing political orientation. In Russia only 17% and in the Ukraine 19% of those under 25 agree with the proposition, in contrast to the two in five among the oldest Russians and Ukrainians who believe that to be true.

Those identified with reform clearly do not believe that the state has been run for the benefit of all. In Russia, of those who support Yeltsin only 19% think the state helps all the people, while 48% of those who support the communists and 41% of Gorbachev
supporters agree with that view; in the Ukraine, those who are more for independence of the Ukraine support the proposition by 12% while those who are for the Soviet Union by 35%.

**THE STATE'S RESPONSIBILITIES**

More than 90% of the people in Russia and the Ukraine agree that it is the responsibility of the state to take care of the very poor and those who cannot take care of themselves. More than 80% of them believe in the even more paternalistic and egalitarian sentiment that the state should guarantee every citizen food and basic shelter. One could attribute this attitude to the socialist emphasis on welfare statism or the lack of a tradition of individual responsibility and voluntarism.

Those who live in rural areas in Russia, are less inclined to support this type of government guarantee, 74% in rural areas vs. 84% in Moscow. In the Ukraine -- the miners (73%) and those in Western Ukraine (76%) are less willing to do so, in comparison to the Center (89%) and the South (85%). On the other hand, in contrast to Russia, more Ukrainian rural people are in favor of guarantees -- 86% to 80% in cities.

Women in both Republics are more interested than men in guaranteeing food and shelter by the state. (Russian women - 86%, men - 76%; Ukrainian women - 87%, men - 73%). As might be expected, older people, those with less education, and with less income in both Republics favor these guarantees.

Yeltsin supporters are less inclined to see the state take a
role in these social areas. One of the interesting political questions now that Yeltsin and his followers have gained control, is how they will respond to a majority population which continues to believe that the state must fulfill basic social responsibilities.

In general, an overwhelming number of Russians and Ukrainians think that society has failed individuals in not providing them with enough goods for a satisfying life. When asked whether their problems come from people wanting too much or society providing too little, 74% of Russians and 75% of Ukrainians blame the system.

**INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY**

If there is to be any change in the relationship between the state and its citizens, the people must think of themselves as actors rather than subjects. Therefore, a strong sense of the individual is vital. In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire before it, have sublimated the role of the individual to society and the state. As a result of this cultural heritage, Russians and Ukrainians readily acknowledge that they are not very individualistic. When presented a choice between characterizing their fellow countrymen and women as individualistic or collectivist, in Russia only 10% chose individualistic to 48% collectivist and in the Ukraine 12% individualistic to 29% collectivist.

A distinct minority of Russians and Ukrainians acknowledge that success is a consequence of some people having more ability or
ambition than others (38% Russians, 37% Ukrainians). More women, older people, those who earn less, and those who do not live in the major cities, believe that people get ahead because they have exploited someone rather than because of their own abilities.

Of those interviewed, 45% thought that most people who fail in life do so because of personal shortcomings, but almost as many (40%) thought that personal failure is society's fault, not the individual's. Ukrainians were even more inclined to blame society for failure (48%) than to blame the individual (36%). The same demographic patterns, as noted above, are evident on this measure of individualism also.

It does not bode well that on the issue of individual responsibility, even the youngest generation is not free of the socialist legacy. Of those Russian young people interviewed, 40% believe that individuals get ahead because of ability and ambition and the same percentage think that they do so at the expense of others. The young Ukrainians also split almost evenly on the question, with 41% crediting ability and 39% citing exploitation. As far as personal accountability is concerned, the young people do not exhibit that much individualism either. While a majority of Russians under 25 (53%) think there is personal accountability for failure, a third explicitly blame society (15% have no opinion). Half the Ukrainian young people blame society (51%), with 33% choosing personal accountability, and 17% having no opinion.

TOWARDS A NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM
There has been a great deal of discussion about the need for former communist societies to develop into civil societies in which there is two-way communication between the rulers and the ruled, and where the people articulate their views through a number of political parties and a series of interest groups. The Times Mirror survey provides evidence that even before the August events, Russian and Ukrainian people did not know how to relate to their political institutions which they did not believe were working for them.

The fragility of politics, especially in Russia, is demonstrated dramatically by responses to the question of whether to rely on a democratic form of government to solve the country's problems or a leader with a strong hand. In Russia, the barest majority, 51% chose the democratic process, with 39% choosing a strong leader, and 10% having no opinion. In the Ukraine, the democratic process has slightly more support with 57%, 30% for the strong leader, and 13% with no opinion. Lithuania stands alone, with 79% for a democratic process, 15% for a strong leader, and 6% with no opinion.

The streets of Moscow and Leningrad demonstrated a fact which was clearly evident in the Times Mirror Survey. In Russia, the most politically active group is composed of men under the age of 50, with a higher education, who live in cities and are more affluent. They supported democratic rule by 55% to 60%, with those under the age of 25 giving the highest percentage of support. Although the Moscow street crowds were notable for the number of
women, in both republics fewer women than men believed that a democratic form of government could best deal with the nation's problems. (Russian women - 46%, men - 58%; Ukrainian women - 52%, men - 65%).

While Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Russians made it quite evident that they supported Republic over Central authorities, prior to the August Revolution, both the Ukrainians and Russians were ambivalent about how well their own institutions were working. Less than half of Russians (46%) and Ukrainians (44%) believed that their respective parliaments were having a good influence; one-fourth of the Ukrainians actually think that the Ukrainian parliament is having a bad influence.

Majorities in the Soviet Union have indicated their appreciation for democratization; however, additional responses indicate that Russians and Ukrainians are very uncertain about their relationships to their elected officials. An overwhelming majority of Lithuanians (73%), practically identical with Americans (73%), French (76%), and Spaniards (73%), believe that their vote gives them a voice in how the government runs the country. In both Russia and the Ukraine, (47% for each), more in line with Hungarians (49%) and Poles (41%), are skeptical about their own influence. Moreover, less than a fourth think that elected officials care about what they think; and almost 90% believe that elected officials lose touch with the people pretty quickly.

People are also concerned that the political institutions are not accomplishing anything. Even before the disruptive events of
August, those who participated in the focus groups often complained about the problems of moving from the old system to a new one. As one man in Volgograd put it: "Now we have sort of anarchy in the country. The inefficiency of the government causes chain reaction, local directing bodies also become paralysed. Some parts of the administrative system have been destroyed and it hardly functions now."

**POLITICAL AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS**

The relatively low appreciation of political and personal freedoms is another sign of the fragility of the newly developing political system.

Although majorities approve of the activities of the media, they do not understand the importance of a free press and many choose state ownership for newspapers and radio and television. They welcome openness and democracy, but would not allow free speech to fascists. And although they favor the development of a multiparty system, a majority would outlaw parties that did not believe in a democratic system. These views help explain why there was little objection when Boris Yeltsin closed down all communist party papers and banned the party.

The socialist legacy is evident. When asked if the media should be part of the public or private sector, majorities of Russians and Ukrainians chose state control of radio and television (53%) and 41% favor state control of newspapers. In both republics there was minimal support for private ownership of either type of
media. However, in Russia 37% volunteered the answer that both types of ownership were suitable for radio and television and 47% said both for newspapers; higher percentages of Ukrainians volunteered both types of ownership as appropriate: 43% for radio and television, and 53% for newspapers.

Despite their lack of support for private ownership of the media, there is no doubt that the Russians and the Ukrainians are appreciative of the newly liberated media, and they favor the variety after decades of homogenized news. Radio and television, as well as newspapers, receive high marks relative to other institutions for the roles they are playing in the country today. Much larger proportions of the population approve of their activities than disapprove (46% of Russians, and 53% of Ukrainians give newspapers favorable ratings in comparison to 18% and 12%, respectively, who are unfavorable; 40% of Russians and 41% of Ukrainians rate radio and television favorably, while 21% of Russians and 18% of Ukrainians disapprove).

It is hard to expect people who have lived in a one party system to understand the need for political tolerance. Therefore, it is not surprising that 54% of Russians and 47% of Ukrainians believe that even in a democracy certain political parties should be outlawed.
PERSONAL FREEDOMS

As far as personal freedoms are concerned, Russians and Ukrainians are generally conservative: 89% of Russians and 90% of Ukrainians subscribe to traditional values about family and marriage; 78% of Russians and 87% of Ukrainians believe that there are clear guidelines between good and evil; 59% of Russians and 67% of Ukrainians do not think that homosexuals should be allowed to teach school; 57% of Russians and 65% of Ukrainians think books containing dangerous ideas should be banned from public school libraries. 43% of Russians and 45% of Ukrainians believe that pornography is harmless entertainment; 45% of Russians and 47% of Ukrainians believe that AIDS might be God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior.

But 81% among Russians and Ukrainians think a woman should be allowed to have an abortion in the early months of pregnancy if she wants one. This view coincides with those held in Czechoslovakia (80%), Hungary (81%), and the former GDR (80%) but not with those of the Polish people (67%) where the issue has become almost as political as it is in the United States (62%).

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

Seven decades of Marxism-Leninism brought the Soviet people to economic disaster. The August coup has in fact changed the political configuration of the Soviet Union, but the dismal state of the political economy remains the same. The new leaders not only have to come up with a plan, but they also have to continue to keep
in mind that the communist system has necessarily left its mark on the way people think about property and profit, prices, and the workplace.

Even if the new leadership were prepared to administer shock therapy to the Soviet system, would the people be prepared to respond. The Times Mirror survey of Soviet attitudes indicates that if Gorbachev had tried to make more rapid changes, he would in fact have been dragging a largely reluctant citizenry behind him. Evidence exists that the public support for a market economy which is expressed has been fueled much more by a desire for economic change and relief than by a significant understanding of, or commitment to, free enterprise.

The Times Mirror survey gauged the receptivity of the Soviet publics to a market economy in three ways: 1) by asking direct questions about the kind of economy desired in the future; 2) by measuring people's willingness to accept specific economic changes; and 3) by examining the values of Russian people that bear on their capacity to accept capitalism. Analysis of the survey reveals that general opinion about capitalism and attitude toward specific changes are highly correlated with the demographics of Soviet life.

Before the events of August the primacy of economic concerns was such that in free response questions about national priorities and personal aspirations there was little registration of concern about important matters attendant to the emergence of democracy, the restructuring of the Soviet Union or the nationalities problems. The economy, economic deprivation, and
financial worries overwhelm all other aspects of Soviet life.

More than three of every four Russians and Ukrainians mentioned economic problems as the nation's most important concern. And nearly one in five Russians cited the threat of starvation as the overriding issue in the U.S.S.R. (18%). Just 8% of Russians and 10% of Ukrainians mentioned the most frequently noted non-economic issue, solving political problems and disputes.

One measure of the high level of economic pain and worry about civil chaos, is the very low percentage of people mentioning personal fears, those having to do with health, family, children's education. When comparing all the nations surveyed, Russia and Ukraine were far below all other countries in their personal concerns. Compare the French and Spanish at 48% and 43%, respectively, or even the Hungarians and Poles at 16% with the Ukraine at 11% and Russia at 10% It is hard to think even about the education of one's children when there are genuine fears of starvation. A similar pattern is evident when hopes for the future are mentioned.

Public ambivalence about a free market is underscored by the equivocal attitudes that Russians and Ukrainians have toward economic changes required to transform the Soviet economy. When questioned about the desirability of state control versus private, we found a clear preference for privatization in only one out of 13 areas--farming.

The lack of general enthusiasm for privatization was put most clearly by a person in our focus group in Kiev, who said very
simply, "While we have a dictatorship of jealousy, it's hard to have private property."

Members of the younger generation are clearly more receptive to the free market than older ones; however, their choice of state versus private ownership in 12 of 13 areas of the economy indicates less than overwhelming understanding of what is needed to change from a command to a market economy. But they favor privatization in farming, restaurants, and shops. They choose state control of heavy industry, electricity, transportation, and the phone system. For the remaining six areas the survey measured: manufacture of consumer goods, banks, health care, schools, newspapers, and radio and televisions; those under 25 wanted both types of ownership. Those over 70 chose state ownership for all but farming. Those between the ages of 40-49, chose 8 to be state-owned (in addition to those named by the younger generation, they added banks, health, schools, and radio and television); for 4 they chose both types of ownership (shops, restaurants, manufacture of consumer goods, and newspapers); again Russians in their forties thought only farming should be privatized.

By huge margins (79% and 86%) the Russian and Ukrainian publics say they would like to see state-run enterprises for heavy industry. Communist doctrine about control of the "commanding heights" -- the major tools of production, is firmly embedded in those who lived under the system. Those in the Soviet Republics do not differ markedly from those living in Czechoslovakia (79%) or Bulgaria (77%).
Support for state control of heavy industry is somewhat lower -- though not much at 70% -- in Poland and Hungary. In Russia, there is virtually no gender difference on this issue; however, there is a significant generational difference. Those under 25 favor state ownership by about 66% while those between 50 and 70 support state control by over 90%. As might be expected, those supporting Yeltsin are less in favor of state control, at 76%, while those supporting Gorbachev favor it by 80%, in contrast to communists at 94%.

There is more support for state control of heavy industry in the Ukraine than in Russia. Some of the difference, however, comes from non-Ukrainians living there (93%), as compared to 84% among Ukrainians. Those in the South favor it by 94% in comparison to 82% in Western Ukraine.

Russian and Ukrainian publics, like most Europeans, also prefer state ownership of electricity, transportation and phone systems by overwhelming majorities. One significant sign of a lack of understanding for a free market economy is continued majority support for a state-controlled banking system by 52% of Russians and Ukrainians. Less than 10% support private banking; 33% of both Russians and Ukrainians would like both types of ownership.

For years those living in the West were persuaded that the free medical service in the Soviet Union was not only to be envied but also to be admired for its accomplishments in doctor-patient ratios and disease eradication. However, glasnost has revealed inadequate health care facilities and insufficient medical supplies. It is,
therefore, not surprising that there is some equivocation on how future health care should be handled. Not wanting to give up free health care, 46% of Russians and 43% of Ukrainians were for continued state control, and 43% of Russians and 46% of Ukrainians wanted both. As might be expected, women, older people, those with less education, lower incomes, or who are communists, favor state management of health care. There is very little difference between large cities and the countryside. As with many other areas of the economy, however, the results from Volgograd are surprising, where half as many people as in Moscow opt for a state health care system.

For consumer manufacturing and retail shops, pluralities prefer the availability of both private and state enterprises.

Russian and Ukrainian women, who clearly shop more than the men, supported state enterprises over private shops, 27% to 24% for Russian women and 30% to 21% for Ukrainian ones (Russian men preferred private shops 32% over state 20%, while Ukrainian men reversed the preference, 25% state and 22% private). Women were even more supportive of state manufacturing of consumer products over private, 28% to 17% for Russian women, and 32% to 17% for Ukrainian women (Russian men were more evenly divided with 25% for private and 21% for state; Ukrainian men favored state slightly over private, 20% to 16%).

In both Republics those with lower incomes are more likely to prefer state to private control of shops and consumer product manufacturing. Among Ukrainians, those earning less than 700 rubles
per month support state enterprises over private shops (30% to 21%); Russians with higher incomes prefer private 33% to 20% and richer Ukrainians prefer private 23% to 19%; the poorer people prefer state manufactured consumer goods (Russians 27% to 19%, Ukrainians 29% to 16%) while richer Russians prefer private 27% to 18% and richer Ukrainians 19% to 16%.

Russian and Ukrainian rural populations show a marked preference for state owned shops and state consumer goods, while city preferences are reversed.

Those with the longest shopping careers ahead of them, those under 25, show a clear preference for the private sector, with four times as many favoring private shops to state enterprises (48% to 11%) and more than twice as many for the private manufacture of consumer goods (34% to 14%). The youngest Ukrainians do not show such a clear preference of private over state (26% to 15%) with 57% choosing both in comparison to 46% of Russians 25 and under choosing that option. Older people in both Republics, on fixed incomes who cannot deal with generally higher prices coming out of the private sector, continue to favor the state sector overwhelmingly.

Russians believe that they are better served by private restaurants. In this area of the economy, a plurality, 42%, exists in favor of private ownership; 34% think both types should be available and 18% continue to favor state ownership. The Ukrainians are not yet convinced; fewer (33%) favor private ownership than choose both (38%) 25% support state-owned
Farming is the only area in which there is an overwhelming majority for privatization, with 75% of Russians supporting the concept and 74% of Ukrainians. But, it is important to note that those in the rural areas are markedly less enthusiastic about the prospect than those who live in the cities. Those who live in Moscow favor private farming by 80%, and those in Leningrad by 89%, while those who actually work the soil chose privatization by a much smaller majority, 60%.

The urban-rural difference is less stark in the Ukraine, but it does exist: cities, 78% in favor of privatization, rural 71%. It must be noted, however, that once again Western Ukraine is different, in an area where more than half of the population lives in rural areas, 88% are for privatization, while in the center with Kiev 68% favor privatization. Political differences on the farming privatization issue are stark; those favoring independence for the Ukraine, support the issue by 82% and those more oriented towards the Center and the Soviet Union favor private farming by 68%.

While three fourths of the Russians support the privatization of farming, 41% of them oppose allowing farmers to sell land on the open market. This measure, which is at the heart of private farming, is favored by a narrow 48% to 41% margin in Russia. The generational difference stands out: 85% of those under 25 favor private farming, with only 19% opposed to allowing farmers to sell their land. As people get older the percentage of those opposed to the sale of land increases significantly at each age division, so
that in the 70 and over group the percentage of those who oppose allowing the sale of land is larger than those favoring privatization (opposed to sale 66%, for privatization 54%). The urban-rural split is evident in this measure also as 31% of those who live in Moscow and 34% of those who live in Leningrad are opposed to the private sale of land, while 62% of the farming population is so opposed.

The Ukrainians have much less trouble with the idea of farmers being able to sell the land they own. They accept the concept by a comfortable 60% to 27%. However, generational differences replicate the Russian pattern, with the youngest favoring the sale of land by 78% and the oldest by only 32%. The Ukrainians are also at variance with the Russians on whether rural or urban populations favor the private sale, although more Ukrainian city dwellers favor the privatization of farming, more of the Republic's farmers support the private sale of land (64% rural, 57% urban).

Privatization of farming and the sale of land clearly brings out political differences. It comes as no surprise that Yeltsin supporters favor privatization by the largest percentage, 78%; however, sizeable majorities of Gorbachev supporters, 71%, and communists 70% also do. It is interesting to note, however, that even those who back Yeltsin have some trouble with a concept which goes so much against the grain as the private sale of land; 33% of them are opposed to the idea (71% of communists and 49% of Gorbachev backers are opposed).

While the support for privatization of various sectors of the
economy highlight the fact that the Russian and Ukrainian people are far from understanding what is needed to transform their command economy into a free market one, there are some hopeful signs for economic reform.

The hopeful signs emanate from the youngest generations and from others most likely to be opinion leaders. They are those with more education, who support reform movements, and who live in cities.

Those least able to accept the consequences of hardships caused by unemployment and higher prices or are otherwise uncomfortable with any type of risk-taking, (older, poorer, less educated, rural people, and women) are less willing to embark on a different path.

For example, by a two-to-one margin Russians and Ukrainians say they are willing to accept some unemployment for the sake of modernizing the economy (Russians 65% to 29%, Ukrainians 58% to 33%). It should not come as a surprise that fewer older people would be willing to risk unemployment than members of the younger generations. Perhaps, understanding that their lack of higher education limits their possibilities for finding other work, 24% of Russians and 27% of Ukrainians would be willing to accept some unemployment. In contrast, the best educated elements of the population accept it by 77% in Russia and 71% in the Ukraine.

Additionally, Russians by a two-to-one margin (64% to 28%) and Ukrainians by a three-to-one margin (69% to 20%) favor the right of an individual to own and sell property at the price he or she sets.
Yeltsin supporters lead the way in Russia with 74% in favor, then Gorbachev supporters with 57% and communists with 41% stet and West Ukrainians at 80% and those who live in the South almost 30 percentage points behind at 51%. 80% of those under 25 in both Republics are significantly more committed than their elders, less than 60% of whom agree (41% in Russia, 46% in the Ukraine).

Surprisingly large percentages of Russians (84%) and Ukrainians (83%) endorse the idea of borrowing to start a private business. In Russia a majority of communists 75% and barely half of those over 70 (57%), are supportive.

A larger percentage of Ukrainian communists (78%) and older people, (65%) are more supportive.

A young engineer in Kiev said, "My attitude to private property is positive. I consider privatization to be necessary and inevitable. Sooner or later we'll come to it, but the sooner the better. I'm just afraid to be a pioneer on this way. Seeing all the problems those who did it have today, something makes me wait."

Although it could be more a sign that they would do anything to put an end to long lines and empty shelves, one of the more encouraging signs for economic reform in the survey is that majorities in both Russia (59%) and the Ukraine (51%) favor letting prices increase as a way of making more products available. Russians and Ukrainians, in fact, are more supportive of the idea than are those who live in Czechoslovakia (40%) Hungary (23%) or Bulgaria (34%). The increases in both Russia and the Ukraine are
among those who show some understanding of the laws of supply and demand and are those who represent the future (under 25, 71% of Russians and 63% of Ukrainians favor price increases and among the better educated who are likely to be opinion leaders, 65% of Russians and 65% of Ukrainians favor increases).

Older Russians are evenly divided on the issue (47% vs. 43%), while Ukrainians over 60 are squarely opposed with 66%. The largest percentages of those who believe in letting the laws of supply and demand work are again those under 25, with the best education, and reformist ideas. Interestingly, there is little difference in Russia between the large cities and the countryside on this issue, with Moscow and Leningrad at 53% each, and rural areas at 50%. In the Ukraine, the Western portion is again considerably more supportive of possible price increases than the South, for example (61% to 39%).

Salary levels clearly affect responses to questions dealing with unemployment and price hikes. About 15 percentage points separates those with lower incomes from their richer counterparts in finding some unemployment acceptable. Between 12 and 14 percentage points separate the reactions of the two groups on price hikes.

It must be pointed out, however, that a solid third (31% in Russia and 37% in the Ukraine) think that prices should be kept low, even if it means scarcity.

Russian and Ukrainian women are much less inclined than the men to theorize about how to get out of their dismal economic
situation and are more concerned about its immediate consequences. They also exhibit a reluctance to sign on to free market concepts. In addition to being less in favor of the sale of private property, fewer Russian women than men agree with the idea that people should be allowed to borrow money from banks or other institutions to start a business (89% men, 80% women). In the Ukraine, the gender difference is insignificant. 85% of the men favor the idea of borrowing money and 82% of women do.

Even though Russians and Ukrainians say that they would be willing to let prices increase to have goods and that they would be willing to have shops privately owned, a majority of Russians 58%, and Ukrainians (54%) think that people who own cooperatives are having a bad influence on what is happening in the Soviet Union at this time. And the Soviet public divides sharply on whether entrepreneurs should be allowed to make as much profit as they can. In Russia 51% favor unlimited profits and slightly fewer (44%) feel that the state should limit profits. In the Ukraine the margin is about as close (49% vs. 46%)

In a number of the Times Mirror focus group discussions it became quite evident that people think that those who make a profit for the most part are doing something illegal. In many instances they equate those who run cooperatives with black marketeers, whom 76% of Russians and 76% of Ukrainians think are having a bad influence on current developments. The word "mafia" is used widely and often to describe those engaged in non-state commercial activity.
OF WORK AND SUCCESS

In what was supposed to be a worker's paradise, the workers do not like their work or the organizations that employ them. And they do not see the connection between hard work and success.

One of the most oft-quoted statements that many Soviet workers offer about themselves is that "The workers pretend to work and the state pretends to pay them." That truism of Soviet life is reflected in Times Mirror survey results that show both Russians and Ukrainians have the lowest work satisfaction rates of any countries studied. In Russia a third of the people said that they were totally dissatisfied with their work (33%) and the organization which employed them (32%). Two in five Ukrainians are dissatisfied with their work (41%), and a third with their place of employment (33%). Only 7% of Americans do not like their work, and 15% say they dislike those who employ them.

What does not bode well for the Soviet economic system is that those with the greatest portion of their working lives ahead of them, and those by virtue of their education who will most likely be the backbone of the working force, are the most dissatisfied with their working conditions.

In the Ukraine, half of those under 25, and half of those with the least education, dislike their work or where they do it.

The situation is somewhat less dramatic in Russia, but nevertheless, 37% of those under 25 are not satisfied with their work. A majority of Russians, 57%, think of each other as hardworking and 24% say lazy; the Ukrainians are less sure (44%
think hardworking, 22% say lazy).

An overwhelming majority of Russians, (70%), and Ukrainians (78%) believe that recent changes have had a very bad influence on how hard people work.

A third of Americans and Lithuanians (32%), agree with the statement that "hard work doesn't guarantee success." In Russia and the Ukraine that percentage is just over 60%. As might be expected the bulk of those who agree with that statement is between the ages 25 and 50, who do not feel that their labors have been rewarded. However, those under 25 are not that convinced either that work guarantees success; 63% of Russians and 57% Ukrainians do not see a correlation between the two.

THE FUTURE SOCIETY

Perhaps the most telling brake upon the development of a working capitalist system in Russia and the Ukraine, is the fact that before and after the August Revolution, a majority of people did not want to end up with one.

When the Russian people were asked to choose between various socialist and capitalist alternatives for the future, support for capitalism was far from evident. In Russia 46% pick a socialist alternative compared to 40% who select a form of capitalism. Most prefer democratic socialism (36%), while a Scandinavian form of capitalism is the second most popular individual scenario for the future (23%). A very small minority chooses "status quo" communism for the future (10%) and only slightly more pick a free market form
of capitalism found in the United States and Germany (17%).

On this issue there is a marked difference between the Russians and the Ukrainians. In the Ukraine there is a distinct preference for some form of capitalism with 49% choosing it, while 38% chose a socialist variant. Democratic socialism was chosen by 28%, and there is only a small difference between those who chose a Scandivanian form of capitalism (26%) and those who chose the American/German form (23%). As in Russia, only 10% chose the old communist system.

The reason that the Ukraine differs from Russia can be found in Western Ukraine, where 70% chose some form of capitalism, and only 9% chose a socialist variant, with old style communism receiving 1% support.

General opinion about capitalism and attitudes toward specific economic changes are once again correlated with the demographics of Soviet life. Men, younger people and the better educated and more affluent people show much more support for advancing along the road to a free market system than do their counterparts in both Russia and the Ukraine.

In Russia 6 out of 10 men favor steps toward a free market economy compared to 46% of Russian women. There is practically no gender gap on this issue in the Ukraine with 51% of men choosing a capitalist alternative, and 47% of women doing so. Among under 25s, seven in ten favor a free market economy compared to less than 20% of Russians over 70 years of age. Interestingly enough, until the age of 50, roughly half of the Russians choose a capitalist

In the Ukraine, the generation gap is similar, with even more under 25 choosing capitalism (69%). In this classless society, both in Russia and the Ukraine, half of those with family incomes of more than 700 rubles per month (600 in the Ukraine) approve of trying a market approach, compared with slightly less than half of those earning less.

A modest 54% majority of Russians and 53% of Ukrainians approved of efforts to establish a free market economy, in contrast to the over six in ten approval for political pluralism (Russia - 61%, the Ukraine - 72%). A solid third explicitly disapproved of the effort (32% in Russia and 34% in the Ukraine). In the economic area Russian and Ukrainian publics differ sharply with others in Central and Eastern Europe, where approval of the free market is 80%, except Bulgaria where it is 73% (Lithuania is 76%), and the former GDR where it reaches 86%.

The vast majority of those who approve of attempting a free market approach believes that the movement to a free market is going too slowly. In other countries approval of a free market is not as closely linked to impatience with its implementation.

It is important to keep in mind that there is a correlation between those who choose a free market and those who favor a multi-party system. Of those who totally approve of efforts to establish a free market economy, 84% of Russians and 85% of Ukrainians also totally approve of efforts to establish a multi-party system and only 12% of Russians and 9% of Ukrainians totally disapprove. On
the other hand, of those who totally disapprove of the free market idea, only 33% of Russians totally approve of the multiparty system, and 47% totally disapprove. The relationship of the two variables is worth keeping in mind, because while there is more support at this time for pluralism than for a market system, it is possible that if efforts to change the economic system fail, it might undermine support for pluralism.

Among the Ukrainians, however, there is a different relationship between the two variables. Of those who totally disapprove of the free market, 59% totally approve of a multi-party system, and 31% totally disapprove. This might well indicate, that support for multi-party democracy in that republic is linked more closely with support for independence, and not so much with the desire to change the economic system.

Social Turmoil: Back To Basics

During the Gorbachev years and now after the August Revolution, the people are trying to deal with what they see as their leaders' deception. The survey provides rich evidence of how difficult people are finding it to live in a society in which old rules no longer apply and new ways have not yet taken hold. While they search for answers, they find comfort in traditional institutions such as the Church and the family.
SOCIAL TURMOIL AND RELIANCE ON FAMILY AND RELIGION

"I am very sorry that the USSR has betrayed my hopes." "You are not alone." This simple dialogue between a man and a woman in Lugansk describes how ordinary people react to the realization that the system under which they lived for more than seven decades had actually been working against them.

Russians and Ukrainians make quite clear that they think the recent changes have had a generally bad influence on most aspects of their lives. They not only have put into question their relations with the state, but also their interpersonal relations.

An overwhelming majority of Russians (83%) and Ukrainians (84%) agree that changes have had a bad influence on interpersonal relations. While a much greater proportion of Ukrainians (82%) believe there is less concern about other people these days, a large majority of Russians (63%) also think there has been a deterioration on that score. As Oleg, a 27 year old student in Volgograd put it in one of our focus groups, "People were kind to each other...they had rejoiced at what their neighbor had bought. And now people are glad to hear about their neighbors disaster."

More than seven out of ten Russians and Ukrainians also believe that public morality has been affected negatively; and a similar margin sees a fall in civic pride (Russia - 69%, the Ukraine - 73%).

Eight out of ten Russians (80%) and Ukrainians (86%) see a deterioration in law and order.

As old structures are being torn down and the Soviet people
are finding themselves increasingly without rules, there is evidence of their finding their moorings in more traditional relationships. There clearly is an increased interest in the family and religion -- not accidentally both institutions which were destroyed or manipulated by the communist regime.

Statistical and anecdotal evidence support growing interest in the family. When asked what they needed to be happy in the future, family well-being and family financial stability, were among the top 5 in Russia and the Ukraine. As a young bachelor in Kiev said, "I see some warmth [thaw] in my private life, in my family and I feel cold in the relations with others. We can express the things which are happening today with an old proverb: My home is my fortress. It is an ancient truth and makes sense today." or a 50 year old woman in Kiev put it this way during a focus group discussion, "I think I'm a pessimist. No expectations at all. I want to have some hopes for the better but I do not have. The only thing which cheers me up is my family."

There is minimal disagreement with the statement, that "I have traditional views about family and marriage;" with 89% of Russians, and 90% of Ukrainians agreeing. As might be expected, Russian and Ukrainian women feel more strongly on this issue than do men, and younger people less strongly.

In marked contrast to what was observed in Western European countries, Russians and Ukrainians would choose marriages in which the husband provides for the family while the wife takes care of the house and children. Of those surveyed, 48% in Russia and 53% in
the Ukraine prefer that type of marriage to the 47% of Russians and 44% of Ukrainians who chose the type of marriage where both husband and wife have jobs and together share the household chores and bringing up the children. In this regard, the Russians are less in favor of traditional marriages than are other peoples emerging from communism where that type of marriage was considered bourgeois and working women were the norm. Paradoxically, it seems that in post-communist societies, to take a woman out of the work force and to put her back in the kitchen, is a step forward.

Perhaps as proof of that point, in Russia, those under 25, better educated, and more affluent city dwellers choose the traditional marriage. (The same is not true in the Ukraine, where in terms of age, the largest percentage of those who want the wife at home is in the 25-39 range, among east educated, and those in rural areas.)

The importance of family and women staying at home, was articulated very clearly by a man in our Leningrad focus group during an exchange with a well known feminist." The family is the foundation stone of everything including the state. If there is no good family there will be no foundation for the society to develop. If a woman has spent 8 hours in her office, then 4 hours more standing in line, she has no time left for her family. And no matter how good our schools are, our nurseries and kindergartens are, they will never bring up a decent person."

**RELIGION'S CHANGING ROLE**
Marx said religion was the opiate of the masses and the Soviet regime has consistently fought against it. And yet Gorbachev called on God's help, quoted the Bible to George Bush during the August summit and before the Communist party became obsolete he even suggested it be sanctified in the party program.

According to the survey, there is evidence of widespread approval of the current role of the church. When people in Russia and the Ukraine were asked to assess whether certain institutions were playing favorable or unfavorable roles, the Church received the largest percentage of favorable mentions (Russians - 68%, Ukrainians - 77%). (The closest contender for favorable influence were newspapers which in Russia received 46%, in Ukraine the 53%, and in Lithuania 76%).

In fact, more than half of the Russians (52%) and Ukrainians, (54%) surveyed think that the role the church is playing at the present time is about right; a third (31%) believe the role too small and (less than 10% say too great.

Although there is no comparison with the United States, where 87% of the people never doubt the existence of God, or with Catholic Poland, Italy, or Spain. In Russia, after seventy years of official atheism, 46% of the people never doubt the existence of God and 41% of them say that God plays an important role in their lives. Of the Soviet Republics we surveyed, the Lithuanians are the most religious of the three, but Ukrainians are not far behind: 57% of Lithuanians and 53% of Ukrainians never doubt the existence of God; and 56% of Lithuanians and 50% of Ukrainians say God
plays a role in their lives. Once again Western Ukraine stands out, and explains the high Ukrainian percentages; in that area 73% say they never doubt the existence of God, and 78% say that God plays an important role in their lives.

It is very difficult to predict, however, what role religion and the Church will play in the future, especially in Russia.

First, very few see the church as an institution which can be relied on to play an active role in the resolution of society's problems. (15% of Russians list it as their first and second choice; 11% of Ukrainians do -- 13% of both list it as the one they would rely on least.) Interestingly enough however, 21% of those who support Yeltsin list the Church as their first and second choice as a structure to be relied on in the future, in contrast to 7% among Gorbachev supporters and 9% among those who favor the communists. (In the Ukraine, there is a similar contrast between those who support independence 8% of whom view the church favorably, and those who favor the Union 7% of whom see a positive church role.)

But the youngest generation of Russians are not particularly religious. For instance, 79% of young Russians (those under 25) do not agree that prayer is a part of their daily lives; 51% doubt the existence of God; 60% disagree that God plays an important role in their lives; and 56% say they never attend church. (The situation is somewhat different in the Ukraine, a third of those under 25 say that they pray daily (33%); 56% never doubt the existence of God and believe He plays an important role in their lives, and 40% say
that they attend church a few times a year; 5% say once a week.)

The current popularity of the church can be explained by the fact that it is seen by many as an appropriate way to identify with pre-Communist, Russian and Ukrainian traditions. The symbolism of the highly spiritual and ornate funeral service, led by the Orthodox patriarch for the three martyrs of the August revolution, was not accidental.

As a counter to the growing interest in religion, it should be noted that there are those who express the view that religion is now being allowed by the authorities to give ordinary people a belief system to replace the communism that failed them. Hence, Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's interest.

A woman in our focus group in Leningrad described how she thought people were being manipulated, and how she disapproved of what she saw.

"It seems to me that the state now tries urgently to substitute our outdated and depreciated ideological values, such as Marxism-Leninism, which has already lost its attractiveness for the majority of people -- for something different. Certainly they turned their attention to the Orthodox church, which is of great power, without hesitation. It is well and widely promulgated nowadays. Maybe it is not at all bad. Life will show, what will come of it. But there was one circumstance, which struck me unpleasantly ... I watched ... TV .. and I was struck by the parade of clergymen in rich vestments, covered with diamonds -- all this against the background of that unhappiness in this country, when
there are many children, deprived of their share, unfortunate families and people who suffer of food shortage .... It seemed to me that religion is far from real needs of the people, it is dangerous, to my mind."

Where Do We Fit Into The International System?

Inhabitants of the disintegrating empire were questioning whether it is natural to have one. In Russia, opinion on that question was fairly evenly divided, with 38% of Russians agreeing that having an empire was natural and 44% disagreeing. It is worth noting that 50% of those under 25 find an empire natural, perhaps because they have always lived in one, in contrast to 35% of those over 70 who witnessed some portions of its construction. As was to be expected, a clear majority of Ukrainians (55%) disagreed with the empire concept. In the Ukraine also, the older people are less pro-Empire, (13%) while the younger ones see it as more natural.

The national identity crisis is also evident in how Russians and Ukrainians deal with the issue of their falling international status. Participants in Times Mirror focus groups frequently questioned a superpower role for the Soviet Union. Some, in fact, seemed embarrassed by their nation's current fall and readily compared themselves to a third world countries.

Recent events in the Soviet Union have damaged people's pride in their country; 69% of Russians and 73% of Ukrainians said that the changes which had taken place had a bad influence on their civic pride. 53% of Russians and 57% of Ukrainians say that
without assistance from other countries they cannot solve their problems, still considerably lower than all other Eastern European countries where more than 7 out 10 think they cannot go it alone.

Domestic problems have crowded out international concerns. No question of international relations is listed among the most important issues facing the country.

When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he quickly made quite clear that the country he had taken over was on the verge of economic disaster. With his slogan of perestroika, he encouraged the rebuilding of the economy. In a political system which had not allowed the type of questioning necessary for creative development, he encouraged glasnost. Unable to control his outer empire, he abolished the Brezhnev doctrine. At home, the effects of decentralization, contributed to rebellion by the various republics and ethnic groups against the control of the Center.

The Times Mirror survey provides vivid evidence of the fact that Gorbachev's policies, did legitimize questions about the old system, but at the same time did not provide answers adequate to deal with the transformation of a society fighting nearly 75 years of a communist system, and hundreds of years of history and political culture.

In the summer of 1991 those surveyed readily admitted that the Gorbachev changes had a good effect on how they thought about things, but the survey also reveals that their commitment to pluralism was in an embryonic stage, their understanding of
capitalism was primitive, and they were deeply conflicted about their national identity. They were dissatisfied with their personal state, obsessed by economic problems, and while groping for new structures and new institutions, turned back to traditional havens, such as their families and religion.
In Lithuania, history is finally catching up with reality. Even before independence and despite over 50 years of Soviet domination, Lithuanians saw themselves, their country, and their future quite differently from those who live in Russia and the Ukraine.

The Times Mirror Survey of Lithuania provides evidence on a number of scales that the Lithuanian people were right all along that they do not belong in the Soviet Union.

In terms of their attitudes and values, the Lithuanians resemble countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and on some measures are more like Germans. Lithuanians (39%), in contrast to the 24% of Russians and 35% of Ukrainians, sometimes think of themselves as Europeans. In terms of their individualism, however, the Lithuanians stand out from the other people we surveyed in Europe, because of their striking similarity to Americans.

As one of the smallest nations in Europe, the Lithuanians will have to consider who their friends are, and what economic and political threats they face. They will be seeking their niche in the international system as a guarantee of their new found independence.

While there are fewer than 4 million inhabitants in Lithuania, and Lithuanians dominate with 80% of the population, the Republic is not completely homogeneous. There are Russian (9%) and Polish
(8%) minorities, who have a greater significance because they are concentrated in and near the capital city of Vilnius. Smaller groups of Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Jews also live in Lithuania. In terms of their tolerance for minorities, Lithuanians do not score high. As ethnic conflicts and border readjustments become issues in other parts of the former Soviet Union, the Lithuanians may also have to consider their ethnic divisions. Certainly, those who are not in the majority may well feel increasingly nervous, with increased interest in nationalist causes.

In our assessment of the Russian and Ukrainian populations, we noted the existence of three distinct Gaps: Gender, Generation, and Urban-Rural. The gender and generation gap in Lithuania are similar to those that exist in Russia and the Ukraine. There is, for example, a significant gender gap on approval for pluralism and capitalism, with men approving of pluralism more than women (81% bs. 69%) and of a market economy more than women (82% vs. 71%).

The urban-rural gap, however, is more closely related to ethnic divisions than location. The disparity between Vilnius and medium-size towns might be more appropriately explained by the fact the capital city is only 51% ethnic Lithuanian, while 80% of the rest of the country is overwhelmingly so.

On a number of measures, our survey shows a difference between the attitudes and values of the Lithuanians, the Russians living in Lithuania, and the Poles living in the Republic.

Generally speaking, the Lithuanians are more interested in
issues of independence, while the Russians and Poles are more concerned about resolving economic problems. In dealing with political and economic reforms, the Lithuanians are much more in favor of changes (73%) and more prepared for multiparty democracy (75% approve) and a free market system (76% approve). The Russians and Poles are less inclined to see any of the benefits of the reforms because they see many aspects of their personal lives and the social situation getting worse.

More Lithuanians think that the changes that have taken place in recent years have had a bad effect on inter-ethnic relations and 62% of all Lithuanians think that there is more of a threat from internal conflicts than from the outside (24%). Of the minorities living in Lithuania, however, 76% of Russians and 69% of Poles are more concerned about internal conflicts than are the ethnic Lithuanians (58%). On the other hand, 28% of the ethnic Lithuanians surveyed, in comparison to the 11% of Russians, and 9% of Poles, living in Lithuania, think that there is a danger of outside intervention -- presumably from Russia.

The dominant majority of Lithuanians do not think very highly of the minorities who live with them. Three out of ten Lithuanians have an unfavorable opinion of the Poles (35%); only slightly more than half have a favorable opinion of them (54%). One quarter of ethnic Lithuanians have an unfavorable opinion of the Russians who live in their Republic (25%). Of the Lithuanians, 67% have a favorable opinion of Byelorussians stet 70% of Russians.

The people living in Lithuania are, however, much less anti-
semitic than those living in Russia and the Ukraine. 26% and 22% of Russians and Ukrainians, respectively, have an unfavorable view of Jews, while this is true of only 10% of Lithuanians.

**DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE**

When ethnic Lithuanians were asked what was the foremost problem facing their country, what was their greatest hope for the future, or what was the most important national priority -- independence always headed the list. Ethnic Lithuanians are not suffering from any identity crisis. As might be expected, 100% of the Lithuanians living there cited Lithuania as their country; and 60% of non-Lithuanians did also. Of the non-Lithuanians, 29% of Russians named the Soviet Union as their country, and 13% of the Poles did.

The economic sanctions instituted by Moscow as a punishment for the Lithuanians' declaration of independence, on top of decades of economic mismanagement, have left the Republic with serious economic problems. As a result, even the highly nationalist Balts are not free of concern about economic instability. Perhaps the most telling evidence of a harrowing fear of economic disaster is reflected in the Lithuanian survey results. When asked to name their greatest worry for the future, the failure of the independence movement was the number two concern (20% cited this). The number one worry by far in the breakaway Republic is that the economy will not improve (35% cited this). (55% named solving economic problems as first and second greatest worry, while 36%
named inability to achieve independence; 34% named threat of all out civil war, and 27% were concerned about political repression.)

Interestingly enough, in comparison to the three quarters of Russians (75%) and Ukrainians (77%) who admit that they often do not have enough money to make ends meet, only 50% of Lithuanians feel that way.

Despite these very legitimate concerns, the Lithuanians' general sense of purpose about the drive for independence and their overall approval of the political and economic changes, makes the Lithuanians among the most optimistic of those surveyed by Times Mirror; 44% of them are optimists and only 9% are pessimists.

**APPROVAL OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES**

The Lithuanians were outpaced only by the citizens of the former GDR in the percentage approving of the political and economic changes that have taken place. While a majority of those who lived in the newly emerging democratic states approved, none reached the 73% approval in Lithuania. It must be noted that the highest approval rating of the changes was to be found among the ethnic Lithuanians, 83% of whom approved, in contrast to the 44% of Poles who liked the changes and the 35% of Russians. The Lithuanian Russians, 50% of whom actually disapproved of changes, were closer in their assessments to the 55% of Russians living in Russia and the 54% of Ukrainians, who express negative feelings.

More than three quarters of Lithuanians (79%) favor the introduction of a multiparty system, and 82% approve of the efforts
to establish a free market system; while 58% of Russians and Poles approve of the political changes, and even fewer approve of the economic ones. Because of its heterogeneous ethnic composition, the capital, Vilnius, is not leading the reform movement, bearing out the gap between Vilnius and other cities. 72% of the capital city's inhabitants favor the economic changes, while 85% of those living in other cities, and 77% of those living in small towns do so.

The Lithuanians were much less critical of how glasnost and perestroika had affected their society than those living in Russia and the Ukraine. 86% of Lithuanians thought that the changes had a favorable influence on civic pride, 70% on spiritual values, 61% on how they thought about things, 55% on family values, 54% on how well people got along with each other, 53% on how hard people worked, 50% on public morality, 46% on people caring about each other. Only in terms of law and order, inter-ethnic relations, and the standard of living did a negative influence outweigh the positive.

Ready For Pluralism And Capitalism

While Russians and Ukrainians did evidence desires for pluralism and a free market economy, our survey showed that they were not quite clear about how to restructure their relationship with the state, and that they had very little understanding of the basic elements of a free market system. Our results show that those living in Lithuania are further along the road to reform in
THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The Lithuanians have few doubts about how they want their future problems solved. When asked if they favor a democratic form of government or a leader with a strong hand in charge, 79% opt for a democratic form including 83% among ethnic Lithuanians, over the 15% who chose a dominant leader.

In terms of how they would like to see their independent country organized, they are not as anti-state. A small plurality of Lithuanians 49% believes that the state is run for the benefit of all people, in contrast to the 46% who disagree with that statement. And they are not as convinced as the Russians and the Ukrainians that when something is run by the state it is usually inefficient and wasteful (51% of Lithuanians, 63% of Russians, 64% of Ukrainians).

Practically every Lithuanian (96%) agrees that it is the responsibility of the state to take care of the very poor and those who cannot take care of themselves; and 84% think that it is the responsibility of the state to guarantee every citizen basic food and shelter.

The Lithuanians (48%) see each other as much more individualistic than the 10% of Russians and 12% of Ukrainians who do.

Half of the Lithuanians agree with the proposition that people who get ahead do so because of their own ability and ambition.
(Far fewer Russians (25%) and Poles (31%) living in Lithuania credit ability and ambition.) A majority, believe that those who do not succeed in life do so because of their own failures (58%), while only 28% blame society. Interestingly enough however, 65% continue to think that success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside their control (the same percentage as Ukrainians, and higher than the number of Russians (59%) who believe that).

On a series of measures, Lithuanians have a somewhat better understanding of individual responsibility than do Russians and Ukrainians. Although a majority of Lithuanians blame society more than the individual for the lack of material goods and a satisfying life, many more of them see the individual as playing a negative role (36%) than the 16% of Russians and the 14% of Ukrainians who feel that people may want too much.

The socialist legacy seems to weigh heavier on the Russians and Poles living in Lithuania. They do not have the same sense of individual responsibility and they blame society for more of their ills. There is even a difference in outlook, with 66% of Russians and 68% of Poles living in the Republic, believing that other people seem to have all the luck, while 47% of ethnic Lithuanians see it that way.

The Lithuanians seem to be further along in working out a viable relationship with their government authorities than are the Russians and the Ukrainians. Although only half of them think that people like themselves have any say about what the government does, fewer Lithuanians (79%) than Russians (89%) and Ukrainians (87%)
think that elected officials are quick to lose touch with the people; and more Lithuanians (30%) than Russians (18%) and Ukrainians (22%) think that elected officials care what people like themselves think. It must be noted, however, that especially the Russians living in Lithuania feel more alienated from their government officials. Two-thirds of them believe that people like themselves have no say about what government does (68%), and 93% believe that elected officials get out of touch with people quickly. And only 14% of Russians who live in Lithuania think that most elected officials care what they think.

Most important of all, three quarters of Lithuanians, in contrast to less than half of both Russians and Ukrainians (47%), think that voting gives them a voice in how the government runs things. And 92% of Lithuanians are interested in keeping up with the country's affairs and 73% with politics in their local area, in contrast to the 81% of Russians and 82% of Ukrainians who are interested in national affairs, and the 61% of Russians and 69% of Ukrainians interested in local matters.

Lithuanians score well on a key indication of a successful democracy. 85% of Lithuanians understand that good political leaders are willing to make compromises in order to get the job done.

Although all three of the Republics we surveyed expressed the feeling that they could rely on their local authorities more than the central ones, the Lithuanians feel much more strongly on the subject. 46% of Russians and 44% of Ukrainians assessed the work of
their republic parliaments positively compared to 65% of the Lithuanians, a much greater percentage of Lithuanians (45%) also appreciated their local authorities more than did the Russians (24%) and Ukrainians (33%).

It is notable also that 61% of Lithuanians thought that their judicial system was having a good influence in comparison to 27% of Russians who thought so, and 27% of Ukrainians.

**POLITICAL AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS**

The Lithuanian people compare favorably with others surveyed in their understanding of the need for political freedom. On the question of whether all political parties should be allowed even those that do not believe in a democratic system, 51% of Lithuanians were far ahead of the 32% of Russians who thought so, and the 40% of Ukrainians, or the Hungarians at 33%.

More than two-thirds disapproved of placing greater constraints on what newspapers print the same as Russians (66%), but lower than the Ukrainians (70%). But 58% agreed that books containing ideas "dangerous to society" should be banned from public school libraries. Almost three quarters of Lithuanians (71%), would not grant freedom of speech to fascists.

Lithuanians would place the most restrictions on homosexuals; 72% believe that they should not be allowed to teach school, while 59% of Russians and 67% of Ukrainians agree. But more Lithuanians than any other of the nations surveyed (52%), thought that AIDS might be God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior; and 72%,
again more than all others, believe that homosexuals should not be permitted to teach school. Lithuanians are more liberal about other personal freedoms. Of those Lithuanians surveyed, 72% did not object to pornography, almost 30 percentage points more than the Russians and Ukrainians.

**READIER FOR CAPITALISM**

Although they bear the signs of having lived under communism for half a century, on a number of measures the Lithuanians are more receptive to a free market system. For starters, the Lithuanians differ markedly from Russians and Ukrainians in their vision of a future society. Of those surveyed, 46% of Russians and 38% of Ukrainians preferred a socialist alternative, while only 12% of Lithuanians did. Of those who selected capitalism, only 17% of Russians and 23% of Ukrainians picked the American style, while 29% of Lithuanians did. A plurality of Lithuanians (38%) prefer a modified form of socialism such as is found in Sweden.

Of those who live in Lithuania, the Poles are the most status quo; 13% of them chose a socialist society along the lines they have now. However, in the end, 48% of them favor some type of capitalism over 33% who favor some type of socialism, including the status quo kind, while only 19% of Lithuanian Russians pick a socialist alternative.

Lithuanians have not completely escaped the marks of life under communism. Although they select shops (43%) and restaurants (49%), in addition to farming (56%) -- the only sector chosen by
the Russians and Ukrainians -- as appropriate for private ownership if Lithuanians continue to believe that the state should control banks (47%), heavy industry (69%), the phone system (81%), radio and television (59%), transportation (67%), schools (56%) and electricity (88%). They think that the health care system (38%), the manufacture of consumer goods (38%), and newspapers (42%) can be controlled by both. The Russians and Poles living in Lithuania would have the health care system (Russia - 52%; Poland - 67%) and newspapers (Russia - 37%; Poland - 57%) also state controlled, in addition to the same sectors chosen for state control by the ethnic Lithuanians.

Lithuanians show some equivocation on a series of other measures used to assess their understanding of the laws of supply and demand and their willingness to accept some hardships while they adjust to a new system. A breakdown of the percentages, however, shows that in almost every case the pro-capitalist tendencies of the ethnic Lithuanians are watered down by the more socialist ideas of the Russians and Poles living in the Republic. For example, all those living in Lithuania are almost evenly divided on the question of whether prices should be allowed to increase so that products will be available, even if as a consequence not everyone could afford them, with 46% favoring price increases, and 44% in favor of keeping prices low. However, when the resident Lithuanians are broken down according to their ethnic origins, it is evident that the Russians and Poles, who earn less than the ethnic Lithuanians, are considerably more in favor of
keeping prices low, with 53% of Russians favoring that option, and 62% of Poles doing so. Twice as many Lithuanians are willing to accept some unemployment while efforts are made to modernize as would not (62% vs. 31%). While the Russians and Poles living in Lithuania are less willing to accept unemployment, than the ethnic Lithuanians, 59% of Russians and 42% of Poles would be accepting of such unemployment.

A razor thin majority in the Republic (52%) approve of people being allowed to make as much profit as they can without government limitation. An overwhelming majority of ethnic Lithuanians (86%) believe that people should be able to borrow money from banks or other institutions in order to start a business; but even a sizeable majority, of Russians (65%) and Poles (66%) living in Lithuania agree with this capitalist concept. On the central question of buying and selling property 70% of ethnic Lithuanians believe that farmers should be able to sell the land they own. However, 58% of the Russians and less than a majority of Poles (49%) who live in Lithuania agree. Nine out of ten ethnic Lithuanians favor the right of an individual to own and sell property at the price he or she sets, as do 82% of Russians in Lithuania, and 77% of Poles.

Lithuanians differ markedly from Russians and Ukrainians about their satisfaction with their work. Of those surveyed, 81% were totally satisfied with their jobs. Lithuanians admire people who get rich by working hard (96%), slightly more than the 92% of Americans who feel that way or the
82% of Germans.

Despite all these positive signs for capitalism, their current experience with people who own their own cooperatives has not left a good impression on Lithuanians; only 19% of them, the same as Ukrainians (20%), and 4% more than the Russians, have a favorable opinion of this type of entrepreneur.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY AND RELIGION

The family and children are considered especially important in these turbulent times.

Because Lithuania is still predominantly a patriarchal society, the preferred role for women is that of someone who cares for the children and the home. It must be noted that the idea of a woman at home, though contrary to Western ideas of feminism, is considered to be more progressive in the context of changing the Soviet system which stressed that women should be liberated to work, even while they performed their domestic duties. Of all the countries surveyed, the Lithuanians were most in favor a marriage in which the husband is the sole provider and the wife stays at home (62%). Although more men (69%) favored that option over the 28% who chose the situation where both work and both care for the children and the house, a majority of women (57%) also chose the more traditional marriage over the 43% who wanted to work as well. There is very little generation gap on this issue, with those under the age of 25 (66%) slightly more traditional than those over 60 (64%). There is some difference according to education on this
issue, although it is not the most highly educated who are less traditional. Of those whose education ended between the ages of 19 and 21, 50% hold the more Soviet concept -- of a working woman, while 61% of those with the highest education and 67% of those with the least favor the situation where only the man provides.

Even though Lithuania is a predominantly Roman Catholic country, 76% of ethnic Lithuanians and 80% of Russians living in the Republic agree that a woman should be allowed to have an abortion in the early months of pregnancy. Of those Poles living in Lithuania, a majority (53%) believe in choice; interestingly, a much lower percentage than the 67% of Poles living in Poland who believe in choice.

Men and women living in Lithuania agree that women have a much harder life. However, their estimates of the difficulty vary, with 81% of women and 54% of men thinking that men have an easier life.

In choosing a profession for their children, Lithuanians favor those that require higher education and have the possibility of a steady income. A medical doctor is the most popular choice (18%). The younger respondents, however, favor managers or a career in business, indicating their pragmatism and their faith in entrepreneurship.

Of the people who live in the predominantly Roman Catholic Lithuania, 75% consider themselves religious, with Poles being more religious (97%) than the ethnic Lithuanians and the Russians. Of those surveyed, 43% of Lithuanians say that prayer is an important part of their daily lives, and 56% say God plays an important role
in their lives, and 57% say they never doubt the existence of God.

Pope John Paul's popularity at 88% in Lithuania, is almost as high as in Poland (96%).

However, a third of the Lithuanians, including 41% of those between the ages of 25 and 39 and with a higher education, think that the church is getting too involved in political life.

**PLACE IN THE WORLD**

The Lithuanians very clearly believe that they need assistance from the outside, if they are going to succeed in changing their country. Of those surveyed, 88% think that it is necessary for the future of their country to be active in world affairs.

Even though they have shown some displeasure with American slowness in recognizing their independence, they are very pro-American (62% believing that the U.S. has had a good influence on the world, the highest percentage of any country mentioned), and they see the U.S. as the country they can rely on most as a dependable ally, with Germany also playing an important role.

**CONCLUSION**

The Lithuanians have been consistent and persistent in their push for independence and support for their Republic authorities. More than half (60%) were supportive of the Lithuanian nationalist movement, Sajudis, even before independence became a reality.

They also show signs of understanding and accepting pluralism and a free market system. A majority of them seem dedicated to
working hard to make their long awaited dream work. However, it should be noted that even this free spirited people bears the burden of socialism, and in fact can be divided according to their views about a future society into three relatively distinct groups.

The first, most numerous group, are those who can be defined as supporting an independent state with a strong welfare system. They include primarily the ethnic Lithuanians. They are found predominately among the highly educated, the young, and the middle-aged. They are interested in politics and they consider independence and economic reform as the most important problems facing the country. They approve of the leaders they have elected and of their efforts to bring change. They are concerned about the hardships caused by moving to a free enterprise system, and want to keep a majority of economic activity under both state and private control. They want the state to continue to guarantee their social welfare.

The second group, is composed primarily of young men, who support an independent free market system. They are interested in politics, but are much less supportive of the new leadership, because they do not think that they are energetic enough in bringing about reforms. They are less concerned about the displacement caused by change, and are more prepared to be entrepreneurs.

The third group is comprised of those who while supporting independence for Lithuania, are more interested in preserving aspects of a socialist system. More often they are non-Lithuanians
who live in the rural areas and in Vilnius. They do not see economic reforms as so vital. They are critical of elected and non-elected officials who they think are just working to preserve their own privileges. They feel materially and socially insecure. They will have extreme difficulty in adjusting to new market conditions.

The Lithuanians have won their independence. More than Russia or the Ukraine, Lithuania is a part of Europe. The challenge they face is the challenge confronting the states of Eastern Europe struggling to overcome a socialist legacy. But because of geography, their fate will be closely tied to the fate of their former partners in the USSR.
In Brief

These are the findings of an 18-month study of the state of public opinion in Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The study was undertaken to assess the basic beliefs, political values and opinions of the European population as it experiences and adapts to the end of the Cold War and the economic integration of Western Europe.

The study draws upon three sources of information about Europe in transition: 1) a series of interviews and briefings with European politicians, academic leaders and journalists in 1990 and 1991; 2) 34 focus group sessions in Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania conducted in the winter and spring of 1991; 3) in-depth interviews in the spring of 1991 in France, Great Britain, Spain and Germany.

For the quantitative survey, 13,000 personal interviews were conducted May 1991 in nine European nations and three Soviet Republics. The samples were nationally representative of the adult populations in each of the Western and Eastern European countries. The Soviet surveys were representative of the adult populations in Lithuania, the Ukraine and the European portion of the Russian Republic. A follow-up survey of 1000 telephone interviews in Moscow and Leningrad was conducted Sept 1-__, 1991. The table on the following page provides estimates of the error attributable to sampling and other random effects for various sample sizes.
The main survey included over 100 questions and took 45 minutes to an hour to administer. It was fielded by leading survey research organizations in Western Europe, former East Bloc countries, and in the Soviet Union. These included:

<table>
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<th>Research Organization</th>
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<tr>
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<td>East</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
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<td>ECOMA</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallup</td>
<td>1107</td>
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<td>France</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fait et Opinion</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>Gallup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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The questionnaire and analytical approach was developed by the Times Mirror Center For The People & The Press. It was designed to facilitate cross-national comparisons of results amongst European countries and between European and American opinions. Many of the questions in the survey were based upon measures developed by Times Mirror for its People, Press and Politics survey series.

The survey research team consisted of Center Director, Donald S. Kellermann; Director of Surveys, Andrew Kohut; survey consultant, Madeleine Albright, Professor of International Relations, Georgetown University, President, Center for National Policy; Los Angeles Times, national security correspondent Robert C. Toth; Los Angeles Times Berlin bureau chief, Tyler Marshall; Los Angeles Times UN Correspondent Stanley Meisler; Research Director, Carol Bowman.
Statistical analysis and adjustments of survey data and cross tabular analysis was provided by Princeton Survey Research Associates and Matrix Inc. of Princeton N. J.

Times Mirror convened a board of academic advisors for analytical guidance that included: Steven Szabo, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Study; Jim Cooney, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Angela Stent, Georgetown University; Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway, Atlantic Council; Ezra Suleiman, Princeton University; Sarah Terry, Tufts University; Steve Larrabee, RAND Corporation; Charles Gati, Union College and Columbia University; Arnold Horelick, RAND Corporation; Robert Legvold, Columbia University; Murray Feshbach, Georgetown University; George Breslauer, University of California at Berkeley; Francois Heisborg, The International Institute for Strategic Studies; Dominique Moisi, Institute Francais des Relations; and Michel Tatu of LeMonde.
## RECOMMENDED SAMPLING TOLERANCES

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<th>COUNTRY</th>
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<th>% NEAR 20 OR 80</th>
<th>% NEAR 30 OR 70</th>
<th>% NEAR 40 OR 60</th>
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</table>
DETAILED METHODOLOGY

Questionnaire Design and Project Management

The initial survey questionnaire was developed over an 18-month period drawing upon field interviews and discussions with academic experts and political leaders across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics. A first draft questionnaire was prepared in fall 1990 by the Times Mirror research team. Approximately half the interview was common to all countries and the remainder of questions were specific to individual countries or regions of Europe. A core of the common questions was drawn from Times Mirror values and attitude surveys that created a new American voter typology (1987-88).

This first draft of the questionnaire was reviewed with European research directors in November 1990 and revised accordingly for pretest. A pretest of 15-20 interviews per country was carried out in December 1990. Results of the pretest were reviewed by full research group in London in January, 1991. A final draft of the questionnaire was written based upon pretest findings and initial soundings of the focus groups. This final version of the questionnaire was transmitted to European research organizations in March of 1991. A split sample design for some of the comparative questions was used in four Western European countries, including Great Britain, France, Spain and Italy.

German, Eastern European, and Soviet research organizations returned drafts of the questionnaires to the US in their languages. These documents were then translated back into English as a check on the local language translation.

Field work began in mid April and ended in late May. During that period European researchers submitted regular progress reports, draft coding and data processing schemes to the Times Mirror Center for approval. At the conclusion of the field period, each Eastern European researcher* personally delivered a data set and supporting materials to the Times Mirror Center team.
Sampling distributions were reviewed and decisions were made about statistical adjustments and data edits with European researchers on location.

The analytical and tabulation plan was developed by the Times Mirror research team, in consultation with the European research directors.

* Bulgaria was the exception to this in that its efforts were coordinated and controlled by Gallup London, under the direction of Gordon Heald.

Focus Groups

The Times Mirror research team conducted focus groups in 34 cities across Germany, Eastern Europe and Soviet Republics. Over 500 people participated in these far-ranging round table discussions. All sessions were video taped, audio taped and moderated by experienced group discussion leaders from each of the local research organizations. The locations of these discussions included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Berlin and Dresden</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Krakow and Bialystok</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Prague and Kosice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Debrecen</td>
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<td>Lugansk</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vilnius</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Interviewing, Sample Design and Statistical Adjustments

Face-to-face personal interviews with representative samples of the adult public were conducted simultaneously in three republics of the U.S.S.R. - the European part of Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania. The Russian and Ukrainian surveys were conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Sociology of the USSR, Academy of Sciences. The Lithuanian survey was conducted by the Sociological Laboratory of Vilnius University.

The Russian and Ukrainian Survey

As this survey was part of a comparative European study, the Russian sample was limited to the European part of the Republic. Although the European part of the RSFSR is only one third of the whole territory of the Russian Republic (the latter being 17,075,400 square km or 6,592,849 square miles), approximately two-thirds of the population of the Russian Republic live in the European part of Russia, which embraces the territory from the Baltic to the Urals. The survey is projectible to the 70 million adults aged 18 and older living in this part of the Russian Republic.

In the Ukraine, the survey covered the whole republic, and is projectible to 38 million adults aged 18 & older.

In RSFSR, 1,123 interviews were conducted in the following regions (oblasts) - Moscow (378), Leningrad (215), Samara (75), Volgograd (133), Kirov (70), Vladimir (39), Pskov (60), Severo-Osetinskaja (78) and Karelia (52), both autonomous republics. In each region, different types of cities, towns and villages were covered; a) a city with the population one million and over, usually the capital city of a region [oblast or autonomous republic]; b) a city with a population of 1,000,000 - 500,000; c) a city with a population of 500,000 to 100,000; d) a city with a population of less than 100,000; (e) a village.
The regions of Moscow and Leningrad were deliberately chosen and oversampled for special analysis, as they represent the parts of RSFSR where the move toward political and economic change is more noticeable. Other oblasts, and also cities and towns in each oblast were randomly selected. Villages were usually chosen because of their vicinity to medium-sized and small towns in oblasts.

Districts in cities and towns were chosen at random (8 in Moscow, 6 in Donetsk, 5 in Leningrad, 5 in Kiev, 4 in Lugansk, 4 in Volgograd, 3 in Samara, 3 in Kirov, 3 in Gouse-Khrustanij, 3 in Pskov, 3 in Petrozavodsk, 3 in Vladikavkas and 3 in each of the smaller cities. In each district, the addresses and names were selected at random out of election lists and no fewer than three election stations were taken.

The interviewers had the lists of randomly selected respondents with the name, address and year of birth of each respondent given (the age limit on this survey was 80 years). They were also given an additional list which is comprised of additional names which were to be used in case of refusals or long absences of respondents. In case of the absence of a respondent, an interviewer was supposed to come back twice more, and then if a respondent was still unavailable, the interviewer moved on to the next name on the additional list.

In small towns and villages with a small number of interviews, the random route procedure was used to select a household and, of the members of that household, the interviewer first applied to a younger man in the family, and in case of his absence, an older woman in the family.

The demographic parameters were checked by the field managers according to the quota of distribution of demographic characteristics - gender, age, and urban/rural type of population.

Interviews were conducted in 99 sampling points in the period between April 15, 1991 and May 5, 1991. The interviews were conducted on weekdays between 5:00 and 10:00 p.m. and on weekends
between 10:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.
In the Ukraine, the sample of 586 people covered 4 major parts:

1. Industrial and mining, which was represented by two big oblasts - Lugansk (151) and Donetsk (30);
2. Central part - Kiev (122), Kirovograd (49), Tchernigov (49) oblasts;
3. South - Odessa (29) and Nikolajev (46);
4. Western Ukraine - Carpathian oblasts (53), Lvov (72) oblasts.

Interviews were conducted in 64 sampling points in the period between April 15, 1991 and May 5, 1991.

For the survey, 99 local interviewers were employed in the Russian Republic and 59 interviewers in the Ukraine. There were two general managers of the fieldwork, one for RSFSR and one for the Ukraine, and also managers for each oblasts. The fieldwork in Moscow, Volgograd, Osetija and Vladimir oblasts (Gouse-Khrustanij) was supervised by the Moscow team [ROMIR and Institute of Sociology representatives]). Fieldwork in Leningrad, Pskov and Karelija regions was supervised by the Leningrad team. Fieldwork in Samara and Kirov was supervised by the local managers. Fieldwork in the Ukraine was supervised by the Lugansk University team.

Training of the fieldwork managers was conducted by the Institute of Sociology on April 9, 1991 by Soviet project leader, Dr. Elena Bashkirova. Training of the interviewers for Moscow and Vladimir oblasts was conducted in Moscow during the week of April 9-12, 1991 by ROMIR and the Institute of Sociology. Training of interviewers for Leningrad, Karelija and Pskov region was conducted in Leningrad and training of interviewers for Volgograd, Samara, Kirov and Osetija was conducted in these cities between April 10-12, 1991.

Training of fieldwork managers for the Ukraine was conducted on April 11, 1991 in Kiev by Dr. S. Milogolov, and training of the interviewers was carried out in the local places on April 12-15, 1991.

The interviewers who conducted interviews were mainly professionals who were experienced in face-to-face interviews and
already used by the Institute of Sociology and ROMIR Company - researchers for the Institute of Sociology, Moscow, Leningrad, Kirov, Lugansk, Kiev and Vladikavkas Universities and part-time interviewers working for ROMIR (Moscow) and SOCIO (Samara).

The field managers controlled the interviewers' work by visiting randomly at least 10% of the respondents (in larger cities; such as Moscow, Leningrad, Volgograd and Samara, 5% of interviews were checked by telephone). Biases in samples were controlled by the field manager according to quota distribution of main socio-demographic parameters: gender, age and rural/urban type of population.

The questionnaires collected and checked by the local field managers were then brought to Moscow to the Institute of Sociology, where both sets of questionnaires were coded (Ukrainian questionnaires were coded by people whose native tongue is Ukrainian). The questionnaire was comprised of 15 open-ended questions, 9 of which were pre-coded (nationality, occupation of respondent, lists of countries, soviet republics, occupation preferences for their children); for 6 questions, code-books were done on the basis of 300 questionnaires in RSFSR and 150 questionnaires in the Ukraine. For two questions (What are your hopes for the future and what do you need to be happy?) a list of codes for other countries was used as a starting point which served quite well and then they were supplemented by a few other codes marked specifically as Russian or Ukrainian.

The open-ended questions were coded, the data punched and data filed in ASCII format and then sent to the U.S.

The general supervision of the survey conducted in the Russian Republic and the Ukraine was carried out by Dr. Elena Bashkirova, a head of department at the Institute of Sociology and the Director of ROMIR Company, which is an independent research company for Russian public opinion and market research.

Russian survey results were statistically adjusted to take into account the oversampling of the Moscow and Leningrad regions
(600 interviews). The 500 interviews obtained in the 40 primary sampling units within seven other oblasts (regions) were statistically weighted to represent 77% of the total sample. Survey results from Russia and the Ukraine were compared to official statistics on age, sex, education and degree of urbanization. Subsequently, it was deemed necessary only to statistically weight the results of the Russian and Ukrainian surveys to account for an over-representation of well-educated people (not unlike the level of over-representation found in American surveys).

The Lithuanian Survey

The survey is based on a republic wide personal interview survey that embraced the adult population, aged 16 years and older, in all five ethnic regions of Lithuania.

Given the degree to which ethnicity is an important factor differentiating the opinions of inhabitants of the Republic, non-Lithuanians, Russians and Poles were oversampled.

The field interviewing was carried out in 50 primary sampling units by trained interviewers from the Sociological Laboratory of Vilnius University. Interviews were conducted in Lithuanian and Russian languages. Households were drawn on a "random route basis". One interview was conducted per household and age and sex quotas were used to select respondents within the household.

The sample of primary sampling units was drawn at random based on the latest Lithuanian Census data on sex, age, nationality, and urban-rural structure. Russians and Poles were oversampled so as to have a sufficient number for analysis. A total of 501 interviews were conducted, 332 with Lithuanians, 68 Russians, and 87 Poles. The sample was statistically weighted to account for this ethnic disproportionality. Given the completeness and recent nature of the census data, the survey data was statistically fit to an age, sex, and education model after the ethnic weighting was accomplished.
GERMAN SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The sampling and fieldwork for this survey were conducted by EMNID - Institute GmbH and Company under the direction of Mr. Klaus P. Schoppner. A total of 720 in-person interviews were conducted in East Germany and 760 in-person interviews were conducted in West Germany between April 22 and May 31, 1991.

The sample was a stratified sample which was designed and drawn to be representative of the adult population, 18 years of age and older, of Germany.

In the Eastern part of Germany 150 sample points were selected from the official "Gemeinderegister". This source was first stratified on the district and municipality level and then sample points were selected with probabilities proportional to size of the area. In the West, 150 sample points were selected with probabilities proportional to size from a national sample network which covers all Federal States and sizes of towns.

Within each sample point a total of 5 interviews were to be conducted. Households were selected by following a designated route around the sample area and selecting every Nth house. Interviewers were instructed to make two callbacks to households where no one was home at the time of the first contact. At each contacted household interviewers selected a respondent according to which adult in the household had the first birthday of the year. Two callbacks were made in cases where the selected respondent was unavailable to be interviewed at the time of the first contact.

All interviewers used for this survey were trained and supervised in the field by EMNID staff. A total of 206 interviewers were used in West Germany and a total of 143 interviewers were used in East Germany.

Upon completion, all questionnaires were checked by EMNID staff for completeness and to ensure that answers had been properly recorded. Ten percent of all interviews were randomly selected for verification. In the East, verification was done in-person, in the West, verification was done by telephone.
Codes for open-ended questions were developed by EMNID based on the first few hundred interviews and were then approved by Times Mirror. The data were edited, key entered, cleaned and weighted in Germany and then sent in ASCII format to the U.S. for analysis.

Key demographic distributions of the sample data were compared to data from 1990 national official statistics for West Germany and 1989 national official statistics for East Germany (the most recently available official national statistics). This comparison suggested a need to statistically adjust the age by sex by region distributions of the sample in order to bring these distributions into alignment with the national data.

In order to appropriately combine the data for the two parts of Germany, an additional weight was calculated that would bring East and West into their correct proportions relative to one another based on population figures. This weight is not used when the data are tabulated separately.

The procedures used to draw the sample, collect the data, and weight the sample of completed interviews were thus designed to allow the projection of survey results to the total population of adult citizens of Germany,

WESTERN EUROPEAN SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The sampling and fieldwork for the surveys done in Great Britain, France, Spain, and Italy were conducted by the Gallup affiliates in each country under the direction and supervision of Jean-Francois Tchernia of Gallup France - Fait et Opinion.

In Great Britain the sample was a two stage sample consisting of a random selection of sampling areas and a quota sample of respondents within each sampling area.

The sample was drawn from a stratified list of the parliamentary constituencies which were classified into 12 regions. A total of 110 sampling areas were selected with probabilities proportional to the size of the electorate. Within each sampling area, 10 respondents were selected based on quotas designed to
represent the sex, age, and class distributions of the sampling area.

A total of 1107 in-person interviews were conducted between May 2 and May 13, 1991. The final sample of completed interviews was weighted to bring the region and sex distributions of the sample into alignment with the region and sex distributions from national data.

In Spain, the sample was a multistage stratified sample drawn proportional to Nielsen region and town size. Ninety sampling areas were selected as starting points and within each area respondents were selected according to sex and age quotas. A total of 1003 in-person interviews were conducted between April 25 and May 26, 1991.

In Italy, the sample was a quota sample of adults stratified by region and town size. A total of 110 sampling areas were selected and within each sampling area, respondents were selected using quotas designed to represent age, sex, social class, and level of instruction distributions. A total of 1051 in-person interviews were conducted between April 30 and May 8, 1991.

In France, the sample was stratified by sex, age, class, and region, and size of locality. Respondents were selected using quotas in each area. A total of 1035 in-person interviews were conducted between April 22 and May 4, 1991.

All interviewers used for this survey were trained and centrally supervised by the Gallup affiliate staff in each country. Upon completion, all questionnaires were checked by the Gallup staff in each country for completeness and to ensure that answers had been properly recorded.

Codes for open-ended questions were developed by each country based on the first few hundred interviews and were then approved by Times Mirror. The data were edited, key entered, cleaned and weighted (if necessary) in each country and then sent in ASCII format to the U.S. for weighting and analysis. The procedures used to draw these samples, collect the data, and, where necessary,
weight the sample of completed interviews were thus designed to allow the projection of survey results to the total population of adult citizens of each country.
HUNGARIAN SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The sampling and fieldwork for this survey were conducted by Median Opinion and Market Research Inc. under the direction of Mr. Endre Hann. A total of 1000 in-person interviews were conducted in Hungary between May 10 and May 16, 1991.

The sample was a four-stage probability sample designed and drawn to be representative of the adult population, 18 years of age and older, of Hungary. In the first stage of sampling, 100 sample points were selected from the 176 electoral districts of Hungary with probabilities proportional to the size of the district. Next, a block was randomly selected from within each of the chosen districts.

Within each sample point a total of 10 interviews were conducted. Households were selected by following a designated route around the area and selecting every Nth house. Interviewers were instructed to make two callbacks to households where no one was home at the time of the first contact. At each contacted household a respondent was randomly selected from a household listing of all adults in the household using a Kish table. Two callbacks were made in cases where the selected respondent was unavailable to be interviewed at the time of the first contact.

All interviewers used for this survey were trained and supervised in the field by Median staff. A total of 110 interviewers were used to conduct the fieldwork and were supervised by 10 Median local county supervisors.

Upon completion, all questionnaires were checked by Median staff for completeness and to ensure that answers had been properly recorded. Fifteen percent of all interviews were randomly selected for verification and were verified in-person by field supervisors.

Codes for open-ended questions were developed by Median based on the first few hundred completed interviews and were then approved by Times Mirror. The data were edited, key entered, and cleaned in Hungary and then sent in ASCII format to the U.S. for weighting and analysis.
Key demographic distributions of the sample data were compared to data from the 1990 Census (Central Office of Statistics) and from the 1989 Statistical Yearbook (based on the 1989 microcensus). These were the most recently available national statistics. This comparison suggested a need to statistically adjust the age by sex by education distribution of the sample in order to bring it into alignment with the national data.

The procedures used to draw the sample, collect the data, and weight the sample of completed interviews were thus designed to allow the projection of survey results to the total population of adult citizens of Hungary.

POLISH SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The sampling and fieldwork for this survey were conducted by Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej (CBOS) under the direction of Mr. Eugeniusz Smitowski. A total of fifteen hundred in-person interviews were conducted between May 10 and May 20, 1991 across Poland.

The sample was a stratified, clustered, area probability sample which was designed and drawn to be representative of the adult population, 18 years of age and older, of Poland.

The country was divided into 12 regions, each of which was comprised of 3 to 5 adjacent voivodeships (districts). Each region was further divided into four size of locality categories: 1) Cities of 100,000 or more; 2) Cities of 20,000 to 99,999; 3) Cities under 20,000; and 4) Rural areas, thus creating 48 strata.

In the first stage of sampling, Census districts within each strata were selected with probabilities proportional to the size of the population of the strata (based on 1988 Census data). Three hundred and seventy-five Census districts were selected.

In the second stage of sampling, one address was randomly selected from within each of the 375 chosen Census districts. Four interviews were conducted in each sampling district; the randomly selected address was the first, after which interviewers were
instructed to interview at every 5th house on a designated route from the first selected address.

Interviewers were instructed to make two callbacks to households where no one was home at the time of the first contact. At each contacted household interviewers selected a respondent according to who in the household had the most recent birthday, alternating at each house between men and women. Two callbacks were made in cases where the selected respondent was unavailable to be interviewed at the time of the first contact.

All interviewers used for this survey were trained and supervised in the field by CBOS staff. A total of 208 interviewers were used and were supervised by 36 experienced area managers.

Upon completion, all questionnaires were checked by CBOS staff for completeness and to ensure that answers had been properly recorded. Ten percent of all interviews were randomly selected for verification. Selected respondents were sent a card containing questions about the interview. If the card was not returned the respondent was visited in-person to verify the interview.

Codes for open-ended questions were developed by CBOS based on the first few hundred interviews and were then approved by Times Mirror. The data were edited, key entered, and cleaned in Poland, and then sent in ASCII format to the U.S. for weighting and analysis.

In the U.S. key demographic distributions of the sample data were compared to data from the 1988 National Census for Poland (the most recently available official national statistics). This comparison suggested a need to statistically adjust the age by sex, sex by education and age by education distributions of the sample in order to bring these distributions into alignment with the 1988 Census data.

The procedures used to draw the sample, collect the data, and weight the sample of completed interviews were thus designed to allow the projection of survey results to the total population of adult citizens of Poland.
CZECHOSLOVAK SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The sampling and fieldwork for this survey were conducted by ECOMA – Research Institute of Commerce under the direction of Dr. Jana Berova. A total of 920 in-person interviews were conducted between May 10 and May 31, 1991 across Czechoslovakia.

The sample was a stratified, random sample of citizens of Czechoslovakia which was designed and drawn to be representative of the adult population, 18 years of age and older, of Czechoslovakia.

The sample was drawn from the Central Register of Citizens under the supervision of Dr. Jan Rehak of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences – The Institute for Sociology. The Register is a computerized list of all citizens of Czechoslovakia residing in Czechoslovakia.

The list was first stratified by region, size of place, sex, age and, in larger cities, additionally stratified by structure of the city. A systematic sample of citizens was then selected after a random start. The sample was clustered by areas that are reachable by interviewers with each cluster being equal in number of interviews conducted. Interviewers were placed across the country to ensure the proportional representation of regions and different size of community strata.

Interviewers were instructed to make two callbacks to households where no one was home at the time of the first contact or in cases where the designated respondent was unavailable at the time of the first contact.

All interviewers used for this survey were trained and centrally supervised by ECOMA staff. A total of 143 interviewers in 121 places across the Czech and Slovak republics were used for this survey.

Upon completion, all questionnaires were checked by ECOMA staff for completeness and to ensure that answers had been properly recorded. Approximately five percent of all interviews were verified.

Codes for open-ended questions were developed by ECOMA based
on the first few hundred interviews and were then approved by Times Mirror. The data were edited, key entered, and cleaned in Czechoslovakia and then sent in ASCII format to the U.S. for weighting and analysis.

In the U.S. key demographic distributions of the sample data were compared to data from 1989 official national statistics (the most recently available official national statistics). This comparison suggested a need to statistically adjust the age by sex, and region distributions of the sample in order to bring these distributions into alignment with the 1989 national data.

The procedures used to draw the sample, collect the data, and weight the sample of completed interviews were thus designed to allow the projection of survey results to the total population of adult citizens of Czechoslovakia.

BULGARIAN SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The fieldwork for this study was conducted by the Balkan British Social Surveys, an Associate member of Gallup International, and the analysis was carried out by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), the British affiliate of Gallup International.

A total of 1267 in-person interviews were conducted between May 8 and May 16 1991 with members of the Bulgarian general public. The survey method used was a random sample of named individuals. A quota could not be used, due to the absence of any up-to-date Bulgarian profile data. Again due to this reason, the data were not weighted.

The general evaluation, made on the basis of the sample distributions and experience up to now, is that the sample reproduces the structure of the population and is representative for the Bulgarian population 18 years of age and older and in the fixed error limits.